Olga Alieva, National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Associate Professor, CSc in Philosophy
‘Enemies of Philebus’ and the ‘Wise’ of the Republic 9
We examine the connection between the theory of pleasure ascribed by Plato to the ‘enemies of Philebus’, in the homonymous dialogue, and to the ‘wise men’, in the Republic 9. Though this connection was noted already by J. Adam in 1907, his observations did not receive further elaboration, because, as R. Hackforth observed in 1945, the ‘wise’ of the Republic 9 admit at least one ‘real’ pleasure, whereas the ‘enemies of Philebus’ hold that pleasures do not exist at all. The identification was further hampered by the fact that the ‘enemies of Philebus’ came to be almost universally admitted to represent the views of Speusippus: indeed, Plato could not possibly refer to his nephew as ‘the wise’ who influenced Socrates’ views on pleasure in the Republic. Without questioning this identification, we would like to reestablish the connection between the ‘the wise’ and ‘the enemies’. If the views endorsed by the ‘enemies of Philebus’ did echo Academic discussions on pleasure, this does not necessarily imply that such views were coeval with these discussions. By exploring certain parallels between the dialogues, we hope to shed some light on Plato’s literary and philosophical strategies, as well as on the making of his own theory of pleasure.
Among various views on pleasure discussed in the Philebus, Socrates mentions the theory of some physiologists (δεινοὶ λεγόμενοι τὰ περὶ φύσιν), whom he also calls ‘enemies of Philebus’. They hold ‘that pleasures do not exist at all’1 (44b10: τὸ παράπαν ἡδονὰς οὔ φασιν εἶναι) by which we are meant to understand that pleasures have no nature of their own, but are simply λυπῶν ἀποφυγαί (44c1). Therefore, these stern (δυσχερεῖς) physiologists regard pleasure as ‘thoroughly unsound’ (οὐδὲν ὑγιές), and its very attractiveness they regard as ‘sorcery’ (γοήτευμα). Though Socrates does not share their views on pleasure, he apparently sympathizes with them, saying that their hatred of pleasure is that ‘of a nature far from ignoble’.
More than a century ago, J. Adam noticed that the doctrine of the δυσχερεῖς was also referred to in the Republic, and that it was implied in the Gorgias.2 On the basis of the similarity of doctrine, as well as on certain textual parallels, he identified the ‘enemies of Philebus’ with the ‘wise men’ mentioned in the Republic 9. Adam’s guess did not receive further consideration after Hackforth noticed that the δυσχερεῖς of the Philebus denied any nature to pleasure at all, whereas for the σοφοί of Rep. 583b ‘there was at least one true pleasure’ (sc. τοῦ φρονίμου).3
An alternative explanation of Plato’s allusion to the Republic 9 in the Philebus was proposed by D. Frede, who does not exclude that in the Philebus 44a Plato ‘humorously characterizes his own attitude of an earlier stage’ (i.e. that of the Republic 9 and of the Phaedo), when he himself denied reality to pleasures.4 However, in this case we must face the same problem: in the Republic 9 Plato leaves room for some ‘real pleasures’, unlike the ‘enemies of Philebus’.5 It is therefore unrealistic to connect the position of the ‘enemies’ to that expressed by Socrates himself in the Republic 9. As for the Phaedo, the description of bodily pleasures in terms of ‘sorcery’ can be found at 81b, but Plato did not fully deny reality to pleasure even in this dialogue.6
According to another interpretation, the description of the δυσχερεῖς physiologists exactly fits Speusippus,7 whose antihedonist position is reported by Aristotle (Eth. Nic. 1153b, 1173a). The parallels could then be explained by the fact that Speusippus relied directly on the theory of the Republic 9. As H. Tarrant convincingly argues, Plato’s commitment to the ‘real pleasures’ in the Republic 9 is ‘closely linked to the so-called Theory of Forms’. Speusippus, ‘the most famous opponent of the Forms apart from Aristotle’, rejected Plato’s distinction between ‘the true and higher pleasures of the philosopher and the false and lower pleasures of those dominated by the irrational parts of the soul’.8 Still, his description of the ‘lower pleasures’ must have remained dressed in Plato’s terms. Despite its indisputable advantages, this explanation does not account for the fact that in the Republic Socrates admits his indebtedness to some ‘wise’ instructors, and, just as in the Philebus, their instruction gives the initial impetus to his own research.9 Surely Speusippus cannot be simply identified with the ‘wise’ of the Republic 9.
With these problems in mind, we would like to return to the parallels between the two dialogues. Let us start with the Philebus. Socrates has just demonstrated that pleasures and pains qua propositional attitudes can be ‘false’ (36c-41a; ‘Dairymaid’s pleasures’ and ‘Rumpelstiltskin’s pleasures’ in Frede’s classification; kind 1 in that of Wolfsdorf).10 He goes on to analyse another type of falsity (41a7: τὰς ψευδεῖς κατ' ἄλλον τρόπον), that of quantitative evaluation (41a-42c; ‘Esau’s pleasures’ in Frede’s classification; kind 2 Wolfsdorf).11 Socrates shows that pleasures and pains appear greater and more intense (μείζους φαίνονται καὶ σφοδρότεραι) because of juxtaposition (τιθέμεναι παρ' ἀλλήλας) with each other (42b2-6). As Wolfsdorf put it, such juxtaposition ‘distorts at least one of the affective conditions’, so the pleasure is considered false because of this ‘distorted portion’.12
After that, Socrates goes on to consider other pleasures (Frede’s ‘the Ascetic’s pleasures’; kind 3 Wolfsdorf13), ‘even more false’. The lines 42c5-7 have been interpreted differently, so it is worthwhile to cite the Greek text:
Phil. 42c5-7: Τούτων τοίνυν ἑξῆς ὀψόμεθα ἐὰν τῇδε ἀπαντῶμεν ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας ψευδεῖς ἔτι μᾶλλον ἢ ταύτας φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις.
Nach diesen Fällen wollen wir als nächstes sehen, of wir nicht auf folgende Weise auf noch falschere Arten von Lust und Unlust stoßen als diese, die scheinbar und auch wirklich bei den Lebewesen auftreten (Frede 1997).
Next I want to see whether there are not some examples of pleasure and distress that creatures experience that seem and indeed are even more false than these (Gosling 1975, compare Hackforth 1945: ‘that appear false and are false’).
On Frede’s reading, there are two types of ‘even more false’ pleasures: one (φαινομένας) is a mere appearance of pleasure (‘Freiheit von Schmerz’ = ‘Ascetic’s pleasure’, discussed in 42c-44d, we shall call it ‘kind 3’ with Wolfsdorf), another is a real (οὔσας), but distorted pleasure (‘Falschheit als Mischung’ = ‘Calliclean pleasures’, discussed in 44d-50e).14 It permits her to claim that it is, in fact, ‘Calliclean pleasures’ (kind 4) which are really (‘wirklich’) ‘even more false’.15
This, however, makes little sense in terms of argument. The comparison (ἢ ταύτας) can only be with the kind 2 pleasures (‘Esau’s pleasures’), the discussion of which precedes the passage. However, kind 2 ‘turns out to be a sub-kind of false pleasure kind 4’, as several commentators have rightly observed.16 But the whole kind 4 (genus) cannot be ‘more false’ than one of its sub-kinds (= kind 2).17 For this reason, we think that Hackforth’s and Gosling’s translations, taking φαινομένας τε καὶ οὔσας as referring to one kind of pleasure, seems preferable.18 And it is clear from what follows that the kind in question is kind 3 (mistaking the neutral state for pleasure).
Let us now see what these ‘even more false’ pleasures have to do with the ‘enemies of Philebus’. First, Socrates mentions the doctrine of some ‘wise men’ (43a2: σοφοί) who claim that our φύσις is being constantly (43a2: ἀεί) destructed ‘by processes of combination and separation (συγκρίσεσι καὶ διακρίσεσι), of filling and emptying (πληρώσεσι καὶ κενώσεσι), and by certain kinds of growth and decay (αὔξαις καὶ φθίσεσι)’ (42c10-d3). These processes, as long as they destabilize the natural balance, bring pain. Pleasure is restoration to the natural state (42d5: εἰς τὴν αὑτῶν φύσιν; cf. 31b-32b). The ‘wise’ see this destruction/ restoration process as a part of the continuous cosmic cycle (43a3: ἀεὶ γὰρ ἅπαντα ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω ῥεῖ), and for this reason they do not admit of the ‘third condition’ (i.e., when living creatures experience neither deterioration nor restoration): ‘one of these processes must always be going on in us’.
Against them, Socrates argues that μέσος βίος (43e) is, in fact, possible, for some of bodily depletions and restorations pass unnoticed by the soul (43a). He does not question the constant flux as such, but shows that this flux is not yet a decisive argument for denying the possibility of a ‘neutral state’. Once that neutral state, or μέσος βίος, is proved possible, it turns out that some pleasures are ‘even more false’ than those intensified by contrast (kind 2). Namely, when one thinks that he feels pleasure when he simply is not feeling pain (44a10: χαίρειν οἴονται τότε ὅταν μὴ λυπῶνται = kind 3).19
At this point, Socrates asks: ‘Then are we to take the line that these things are three in number, as we said just now, or that they are only two, pain being an evil for mankind, and release from pain (44b2: τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τῶν λυπῶν) being called pleasant as in itself a good?’ (44a).20 Protarchus does not understand (44b5: οὐ μανθάνω) how can one possibly claim that ‘at this stage’. Then, Socrates reacts, you do not understand the ‘enemies of Philebus’.
The way the ‘enemies of Philebus’ are introduced into the dialogue testifies to the effect that Plato identifies them with the ‘wise’: they, too, do not admit of the third alternative Protarchus and Socrates has just claimed possible.21 This identification goes in line with the interest of the ‘enemies’ to the natural philosophy (44b9: τὰ περὶ φύσιν) and with their definition of pleasure as λυπῶν ἀποφυγαί (44c1). Therefore, Socrates’ words that he intends to modify the theory of the ‘wise’ (43c1: ἔσται κάλλιον καὶ ἀνεπιληπτότερον τὸ λεγόμενον), applies also to them.
The character of this modification is explained by Socrates himself. After Socrates has presented the doctrine of the δυσχερεῖς, Protarchus asks: ‘Should we believe (πείθεσθαι) them?’ (44c). ‘Not believe’, Socrates replies, but ‘avail ourselves of their gift of divination’. At 51a, when pleasures of kinds 3 and 4 have already been considered, Socrates shows how far this ‘divination’ has taken him:
With those who maintain that all pleasures are a cessation (παῦλαν22) of pain I am not altogether inclined to agree (πείθομαι), but, as I said (reference to 44c — OA), I use them as witnesses to23 show that (1) some pleasures are apparent and unreal (τινὰς ἡδονὰς εἶναι δοκούσας, οὔσας δ' οὐδαμῶς), (2) while others present themselves to us as being great and numerous (μεγάλας ἑτέρας τινὰς ἅμα καὶ πολλὰς φαντασθείσας), but are in fact jumbled up with pains and processes of relief (συμπεφυρμένας ὁμοῦ λύπαις τε καὶ ἀναπαύσεσιν ὀδυνῶν) from such severe suffering as besets both body and soul.
This passage is in some respects unique, for Plato ‘lays bare’ his own philosophical device and exposes the inner mechanism of the dialogue. Socrates seems to be making an important point here, namely that he used the doctrine of the δυσχερεῖς in order to show that (1) some pleasures are entirely unreal (=kind 3), whereas (2) others are real, but seem more intense than they really are by contrast with accompanying pains (=kinds 2 and 4). Thereby he admits that the doctrine of the δυσχερεῖς has been significantly modified.
Namely, (1) must refer to the mistake of δυσχερεῖς themselves: they mistake the neutral state (rest) for pleasure (movement). Such pleasures are ‘even more false’, as we have seen, for under no condition can rest be regarded as pleasure, which is essentially a movement. On the other hand, (2) the ‘unreal’ pleasures (in terms of the ‘physiologists’) are now declared to possess some degree of reality.24 Pleasures of this type appear more intense by contrast with corresponding pain — unlike the previous type, these are pleasures, albeit ἐσκιαγραφημέναι.
The above given reconstruction of the argument against the ‘wise’ in the Philebus makes parallels with the Republic 9 (583b-586d) even more striking than Adam suggested. Having briefly presented the ‘doctrine of the wise’ (583b: τῶν σοφῶν τινος), i.e., that pleasures apart from those of the φρόνιμος are a sort of σκιαγραφία, Socrates builds upon this doctrine (Rep. 583c1: ὧδ' … ἐξευρήσω … ζητῶν). First, he introduces, at 583c, (i) an intermediate state between pleasure and pain (ἡσυχία), analogous to the μέσος βίος in the Philebus. It is important for the distinction Socrates makes here that it is a state, not movement as pains and pleasures are (583e10: κίνησίς τις).25 Nonetheless, being neither pain nor pleasure, this intermediate state can appear (584a7: φαίνεται) as both, if preceded by either of them. This is why Socrates calls it ‘sorcery’ (584a10: γοητεία τις) which has ‘nothing sound’ (584a9: οὐδὲν ὑγιές) in it. One immediately notes lexical parallelism with the doctrine of the δυσχερεῖς in the Philebus (44c8: οὐδὲν ὑγιές; γοήτευμα). To be sure, the δυσχερεῖς apply this characteristics to the pleasure in general, whereas in the Republic the reference is made to one particular kind of mistake (ἡσυχία mistakenly taken for pleasure). However, as we already know from the Philebus, the ‘wise’ themselves did not distinguish between different kinds of ‘false’ pleasures, as Socrates does in Plato.26 Consequently, what was for them a term applicable to the whole genus of pleasures, becomes a characteristic of one species within Socrates’ ‘investigation’.
Second, Socrates discusses (ii) ‘pleasures that do not derive from pains’ (584b: αἳ οὐκ ἐκ λυπῶν εἰσίν),27 or ‘pure’ pleasures (584c1: καθαρὰν ἡδονήν), to which he also adds (iii) ‘impure’, or ‘mixed’ pleasures (586b7-8: μεμειγμέναις λύπαις, εἰδώλοις τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἡδονῆς καὶ ἐσκιαγραφημέναις), or liberations from pain. The pleasures of the latter type are characterized by intensity (584c6: μέγισται), and this intensity is again, as we have already seen in the Philebus, associated with σκιαγραφία (586b7-c5: ὑπὸ τῆς παρ' ἀλλήλας θέσεως ἀποχραινομέναις, ὥστε σφοδροὺς ἑκατέρας φαίνεσθαι).
Now, what we have in the Republic is (1) an initial reference to the ‘wise’; (2) the idea that the neutral state is to be distinguished from both pleasure and pain; (3) the idea of mutual intensification in case of mixed pleasures28; (4) terminological parallels29. The only difference is that in the Republic 9 Socrates does not specify where, and in which respect, he has modified the doctrine of the ‘wise’. However, since the starting points (the doctrine of some ‘wise’) and the endpoints (its modified version) of the argument on pleasure in the two dialogues mainly coincide,30 and also given the similarity of wording, we think that the onus probandi lies on those who divorce the ‘wise’ of the Republic and the ‘wise’ of the Philebus.
With this in mind, we can now return to the embarrassing qualification πλὴν τῆς [sc. ἡδονῆς τῆς] τοῦ φρονίμου (583b4). Socrates clearly states that his wise instructors admitted at least one real pleasure, which goes against the picture given in the Philebus, as Hackforth justly noted. If we agree with Hackforth, we need to admit that there were at least two groups of thinkers to whom Plato refers to as the ‘wise men’ and whose views on pleasure were practically indistinguishable, but for this particular detail. That would be a strange coincidence indeed.
Another, more economic, solution would be to take πλὴν τῆς τοῦ φρονίμου as Socrates’ own conclusion from the doctrine of the ‘wise’. In dramatic context of the Republic, unlike in that the Philebus, the polemical element is less relevant: Socrates needs some quick and steadfast arguments to prove the pleasantness of the philosophical life. So he only presents the result of the modification (later explained in the Philebus). The resulting theory is still significantly dependent on earlier speculations of the ‘wise’ — it is this dependence that Socrates admits here.
In any case, the fact that in both texts Plato accurately ascribes the doctrine of illusionary pleasures to the ‘wise men’ cannot be solely due to a scrupulous ‘observance of copyright’. Instead, it makes perfect sense if Plato was not ready to endorse it without qualifications. Let us remind that Callicles’ vehement criticism of ἡσυχία (Gorg. 493e7), suggested by the ‘wise men’ as a life ideal,31 testifies to the effect that already at this early stage of his career Plato was aware of the problems inherent in the doctrine of the ‘wise’.32 A life of no motion is not, properly speaking, a life: it is more appropriate to stones or to corpses (492e5).33
It is often tacitly (and wrongly) assumed that Plato himself was tempted by this ‘life of a corpse’. If it had been so, he would not have taken pains in the Republic to show that philosophical life is not only pleasant, but is in fact the most pleasant of all lives. In our reading, then, Plato gives credit to his predecessors for having detected some illusionary pleasures; however — and he is particularly insistent on this point — their idea of the ‘real’ pleasure as complete rest harbors even more difficulties. Thereby, he not only proves the reality of pleasure qua movement, but also defends the attractiveness of the philosophical life in front of those who thought ὅτι τῷ ὄντι οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες θανατῶσι (Phaed. 64b).
Let us now return to the hermeneutical problem we raised in the beginning of this article: in the Philebus, Plato alludes to Speusippus, who cannot be identical with the ‘wise’ of the Republic. We do not intend to question the identification defended, on solid grounds, by Tarrant and others34. If the views endorsed by the ‘enemies of Philebus’ did echo later Academic discussions on pleasure, this does not necessarily imply that such views were coeval with these discussions. By rejecting the upper part of the pleasure-scale, Speusippus joined the chorus of radical ascetics like those with whom Plato had argued long before the Philebus. By reopening the discussion of the Republic 9, Plato must tacitly admit that his nephew’s views on pleasure were not particularly novel. So, when the necessity arose to react to the dispute inside the Academy (of which Aristotle informs us), Plato already had some of the necessary arguments at hand, and only needed to shake the dust off.35 This leaves us with a solution suggested as early as in 1865 by G. Grote: ‘the δυσχερεῖς to whom Plato makes allusion in the Philebus, are the persons from whom his nephew and successor Speusippus derived [this] doctrine’, i.e. Plato’s ‘pythagorizing friends’.36 Well, as Plato himself seems to hold, a proper argument is never antiquated.
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