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document.body.onload="BodyResized()"; } var tInit = SetBodyProps(); </script> <!-- InstanceBeginEditable name="MainContent" --> <blockquote style='margin-top:5.0pt;margin-bottom:5.0pt'> <p align="right" style='text-align:right'><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt; font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;'><a href="../index3.htm">  !!# $ &</a></span></b></p> </blockquote> <div style="text-align: center;"> <center> <table> <tr> <td> <img src="IMAGES/PPhS.png" border="0" alt="" /> </td> <td style="text-align: center; white-space: nowrap; vertical-align: middle;"> <span style="text-align: center; font: Georgia; font-size: 40px; font-weight: bold; font-variant: small-caps;">The Universe of Platonic Thought<br /> #=825@AC< ?;0B>=>2A:>9 <KA;8</span><br /> <span style="text-align: center; font: Georgia; font-size: 20px; font-weight: normal; font-variant: small-caps;">26th International Conferecne&nbsp;&nbsp;&middot;&nbsp;&nbsp;XXVI 564C=0@>4=0O :>=D5@5=F8O</span><br /> <span style="text-align: center; font: Georgia; font-size: 14px; font-weight: normal">28&ndash;30 August 2018&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;St Petersburg, Russia&nbsp;&nbsp;&middot;&nbsp;&nbsp;28&ndash;30 023CAB0&nbsp;2018&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;!0=:B-5B5@1C@3, >AA8O</span> </td> <td> <img src="IMAGES/pla150.png" border="0" alt="" /> </td> </tr> </table> </center> </div> <hr /> <div class="d1"> <table class="ovrBtn"> <tr> <td class="c1" style="vertical-align:bottom !important;"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_11.png" alt="" /> </td> <td class="c1"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_12.png" alt="" /> </td> <td class="c7"> </td> <td class="c1"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_15.png" alt="" /> </td> <td class="c1" style="vertical-align:bottom !important;"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_16.png" alt="" /> </td> </tr> <tr> <td class="c1"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_18.png" alt="" /> </td> <td colspan="3" class="c8" > <a href="upt26en.htm">Back to the Conference Program</a> </td> <td class="c1"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_19.png" alt="" /> </td> </tr> <tr> <td class="c1"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_23.png" alt="" /> </td> <td class="c1"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_24.png" alt="" /> </td> <td class="c9"> </td> <td class="c1"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_26.png" alt="" /> </td> <td class="c1"> <img src="IMAGES/ovrbrd_27.png" alt="" /> </td> </tr> </table> </div> <table border="0" cellspacing="0" cellpadding="0" width="100%"> <tr> <td><img src="tabs/tii_48.png" border="0" /></td> <td style="background:url(tabs/tii_45a.png) repeat-x"></td> <td><img src="tabs/tii_56.png" border="0" /></td> </tr> <tr> <td style="background:url(tabs/tii_68.png) repeat-y"></td> <td width="100%" bgcolor="#F0FFF0"> <div style="text-align:right;font-family:Tahoma, Geneva, sans-serif;font-size:16px;"><span style="color:#555">5B @CAA:>9 25@A88</span></div> <div style="font-family:Tahoma, Geneva, sans-serif;font-size:14px;"><p class='pcAuthor'><span class='pcName'>Satsuki Tasaka</span><span class='pcAffil'>, Rissho University, Japan</span><span class='pcPosition'>, Professor</span></p> <p class='pcTitleD'>The Definition of Knowledge and the theory of Forms</p><p class='tcSumma'>In recent years, regarding the <I>Theaetetus</i>, scholars have debated whether the so-called  middle period theory of Forms was indeed held or abandoned. In the <I>Republic,</i> written prior to the <I>Theaetetus</i>, knowledge was defined within the framework of the  middle period theory of Forms , that is, the object of knowledge is  what is (being) , while the object of belief is  what is and is not (being and not-being) , which we use to describe perceptual objects. However, in the <I>Theaetetus</i>, which is said to be written either at the end of the middle period or the beginning of the later one, Plato could not differentiate knowledge from belief; thus, defining knowledge ends in failure without having explicit mention of the  middle period theory of Forms . That is why the ending of the <I>Theaetetus</i> is strange compared to the <I>Republic</i>. <br />This is a serious problem concerning Plato s theory of Forms from the middle period to the later one. In this article, I first survey recent interpretations of the <I>Theaetetus</i>. Secondly, I evaluate the Secret Doctrine in the <I>Theaetetus</i> from the texts. It reveals that the three theses in the first part of the<I>Theaetetus</i> is based on the Secret Doctrine that nothing is one being just by itself, thus opposing to Parmenides thesis. Therefore, I argue that Plato investigates the possibility of building a theory of knowledge based on the anti-Parmenideans theses. We must pay attention to the expression  one being just by itself  which is used to refer the Form as in the <I>Pheado</i> and the<i> Symposium,</i> and the Secret Doctrine prohibits anyone from using it.<br />Then, I contend that this argument contains the same points of view that can be found in the Theaetetus by comparing the Republic V (474b3-480a13) with the <I>Theaetetus(</i>185a-186a). In conclusion, the argument in the Republic V (474b3-480a13) begins and ends with the cognitive approach, and Plato s concerns in this respect continue on into the Theaetetus.Finally, I conclude that Plato dose not discard the theory of Forms; he keeps the theory, which explains the relation between the Forms and perceptual objects, yet tries to brash up his theory by criticizing it from the viewpoint of Parmenides. Additionally, Plato considers the possibility of building a theory of knowledge without the presupposition of  what is (being) , and he argues that there is no possibility of it in the <I>Theaetetus</i>.</p><br /> <p class='hcAbstract'>I. Introduction&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> In the beginning of the first part of the <I>Theaetetus</i>, Theaetetus defines knowledge as perception. Next, Socrates does not closely examine the definition but introduces two theses   Man is the measure of all things and  All things really are in the process of becoming as the result of movement and change. Furthermore, Socrates demonstrates Theaetetus definition and says,  We find [that] the various theories coincide (160d6). Finally, he refutes each thesis in order. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> Concerning the structure of the first part, M. F. Burnyeat elucidates on two possible readings.<sup><a name='ret30_1' href='#ftn30_1' class='ftnLink'>1</a></sup> According to Reading A, Protagoras and Heraclitus give a true account of perception. Therefore, the two theses stand in the phenomenal world, but the definition of knowledge as perception fails from the perspective of the theory of Forms. However, Plato does not explicitly mention the theory of Forms, and it seems bizarre compared to the Middle-Period dialogues. On the other hand, according to Reading B, Plato does not accept the theses because Theaetetus definition and the theses logically constitute a three-in-one theory, and the structure of the argument is that of <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>. Therefore, all three cannot hold true anymore. However, I propose a new reading on the structure of the first part in the following way. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> First, we survey the background of the two readings and evaluate Reading B, which intends to analyze the texts from the logical point of view and clarify the interrelation between Theaetetus definition and the other two theses. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> Second, we investigate the textual evidence of Reading B. It reveals that the three (Theaetetus definition and the other two theses) are not logically three-in-one, and the whole argument cannot be interpreted as <i>reductio ad absurdum</i> from the key passage of Reading B. Thus, we clarify the meaning of  We find [that] the various theories coincide from the construction of the arguments. We concentrate on the statement  Nothing is one being just by itself , which connects the two theses. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> Third, we must pay attention to the expression  one being just by itself , which is used to refer to the Form, as in the Middle-Period dialogues<i>. </i>However, the two theses prohibit anyone from using the expression. Hence, Plato depicts the relationship of all the theses as the simile of conflict; anti-Parmenideans and Parmenides oppose each other, while Socrates party takes a middle position between them(180e5 181a2).&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> That is why, I argue that Plato investigates the possibility of building a theory of knowledge based on the anti-Parmenideans theses in the first part of the <I>Theaetetus</i>. Thus, Plato rejects the anti-Parmenideans theory of knowledge, and he also scrutinises his theory of Forms by criticizing the anti-Parmenideans theses. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>a! Interpretations &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> The <I>Theaetetus</i>, written at the end of the Middle Period or in the beginning of the Late Period, must be later than the <I>Republic</i>. The theme of the <I>Theaetetus </i>is the definition of knowledge, but Plato could not differentiate knowledge from belief. However, in the <I>Republic</i>, knowledge seems to be defined, implying the existence of the Two Worlds (TW),<sup><a name='ret30_2' href='#ftn30_2' class='ftnLink'>2</a></sup> as the object of knowledge is  what is (being), and the object of belief is  what is and is not (being and not-being).<sup><a name='ret30_3' href='#ftn30_3' class='ftnLink'>3</a></sup> In the <I>Theaetetus</i>, the task of defining knowledge ends in failure without the TW ever being explicitly mentioned. As a result, this ending of the <I>Theaetetus </i>is somewhat peculiar in comparison to the content of the <I>Republic</i>.<sup><a name='ret30_4' href='#ftn30_4' class='ftnLink'>4</a></sup> For this reason, it has been debated whether the theory of Forms is still held or abandoned in the <I>Theaetetus.</i><sup><a name='ret30_5' href='#ftn30_5' class='ftnLink'>5</a></sup> &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> Regarding the confusing ending, the traditional interpretation is that of F. M. Cornford. According to him, Plato shows that a person will fail to define knowledge without presupposing the TW. Thus, the relativism of Protagoras and the wise men s view that  All things flow , which are taken up in the first part of the <I>Theaetetus</i>, are opposed to the TW. According to Cornford, Plato argues that these views hold true in the phenomenal world, but they cannot construct the theory of knowledge. In the second and the third parts of the <I>Theaetetus</i>, the definition also fails because the TW is not presupposed.<sup><a name='ret30_6' href='#ftn30_6' class='ftnLink'>6</a></sup> &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> Cornford argues that in the <I>Theaetetus</i>, the definition of knowledge as perception fails from the perspective of the theory of Forms. Burnyeat calls this reading  Reading A and summarizes it adequately as follows: Perception is something of which Protagoras and Heraclitus give a true account, but nothing of which these theories are true can yield knowledge. Therefore, knowledge is not perception. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> However, Burnyeat believes that this reading is not based on the arguments of the <I>Theaetetus</i> but on the theory of Forms in the Middle Period.<sup><a name='ret30_7' href='#ftn30_7' class='ftnLink'>7</a></sup> This is why Burnyeat indicates another interpretation based on the construction of the arguments in the <I>Theaetetus</i>,<i> </i>which he calls  Reading B . He insists that we must watch for  the stage-directions ,<sup><a name='ret30_8' href='#ftn30_8' class='ftnLink'>8</a></sup> which Plato scatters throughout the text to indicate how he views the three thesesÿTheaetetus definition of knowledge and Protagoras doctrine that man is the measure of all things, and Heraclitos theory of flux ÿin their interrelations. He also focuses on  a key passage (160de), saying that it is  centrally an emphatically placed at a turning point in the discussion . In conclusion, Burnyeat interprets the statement  The three theses have been found to coincide as follows. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'> On Reading B,  this is just what he does think Protagoras and Heraclitus provide sufficient condition for Theatetus definition to come out correct(160e;cf.183a).What Socrates has been arguing at length down to 160e is that they are the only sufficient conditions that could reasonably be devised. That means they are necessary conditions (Theaetetus’!Protagoras’!Heraclitus) as well as sufficient(Heraclitus’!Protagoras’!Theaetetus), and the three really do stand or, later fall together .<sup><a name='ret30_9' href='#ftn30_9' class='ftnLink'>9</a></sup> According to Reading B, Plato does not accept the theses of Protagoras and Heraclitus, while Theaetetus definition and the theses logically comprise a three-in-one theory. Thus, the structure of the argument is that of <i>reductio ad absurdum</i>. Therefore, all three cannot hold true anymore. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>III. Construction of the Arguments&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>In this section, we scrutinize the construction of the arguments in the same way as Reading B. We focus on the key passage 160de, and then we observe the stage-directions, viewing the first part of the <I>Theaetetus</i> as a whole. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>3-1. Key passage &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Thus, we begin to closely examine the key passage, observing the translation adopted by Burnyeat. We find that the various theories coincide  that of Homer and Heraclitus and all their tribe, that all things flow like streams; that of Protagoras and the wisest men, that man is the measure of all things; and that of Theaetetus, that these things being so, knowledge proves to be perception.<sup><a name='ret30_10' href='#ftn30_10' class='ftnLink'>10</a></sup> &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>We argue on two points against Reading B. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>First, the theory that all things flow like streams is not only that of Heraclitus but also of Homer and Heraclitus and all their tribe. For this reason, we name the three theses without using any pronoun. We refer to them as the flux-stream thesis and the human-measure thesis, accordingly. We will further argue concerning this point later. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Second, viewing this key passage, Plato demonstrates only the sufficient condition  if the condition (these things being so) is satisfied, knowledge proves to be perception. There is no argument about the necessary condition. Therefore, Theaetetus definition and the theses do not logically form a three-in-one theory. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Therefore, we must consider the meaning of  the various theories coincide . We move on to the stage-directions in order to view the arguments of the first part as a whole. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>3-2. Stage-directions&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Observing the stage-directions, we notice the remarkable statement  Nothing is one thing just by itself <i> </i>(152d2 3). It appears frequently in the stage-directions where Plato explains the relationship of the theses. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>We concentrate on all appearances of this statement, where Plato introduces the flux-stream thesis and tries to connect it with the human-measure thesis. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>3-2-1. Stage-directions 1 (151e 152c)&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>After Theaetetus defines knowledge as perception, Socrates states that Theaetetus may mention the very same thing as Protagoras does, in a rather different way. Then Socrates explains it, picking up the example of the wind, as follows. Protagoras says that <i>the wind itself, by itself is </i>either cold or not but that it is cold for one who feels cold, and for another, it is not cold. Thus, Theaetetus agrees with Protagoras that things are for the individual such as he or she perceives them. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>To sum up this argument, the human-measure thesis presupposes that  to be must be predicated with  for someone . Therefore, it cannot admit the use of  to be without  for someone because if  to be can be used only by itself, without  for someone , there is an objective and absolute measure, independent of individual perception. For this reason, the human-measure thesis and the definition of knowledge as perception hold the same position in that they cannot adopt the use of  to be absolutely. Therefore, they should stand in the same position as  Nothing is one thing just by itself (152d2 3). &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>3-2-2. Stage-directions 2 (152e)&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Next, Socrates says that  he [Protagoras] perhaps put this [human-measure thesis] as a riddle for the common crowd of us, while he revealed the <I>Truth </i>as a secret doctrine to his own pupils . He then mentions,  I mean the theory that <i>nothing is one thing just by itself </i>(152d2 3). Next, he explains it from two points of view. One is (A) the use of  to be , that is, the problem of language already discussed in the previous argument (3-2-1). The other is (B) the state of the world, that is, the flux-stream thesis. We will analyze the text thoroughly. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Socrates says,<sup><a name='ret30_11' href='#ftn30_11' class='ftnLink'>11</a></sup> Since (A) and (X) appear twice, we refer to them as first (A1) (X1) and second (A2) (X2). &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>(A1) You cannot correctly speak of anything either as something or as qualified in some way. If you speak of something as big, it will also appear small; if you speak of it as heavy, it will also appear light, and similarly with everything since (X1) <i>nothing is one  either one thing or qualified in one way</i>. (B) The fact is that as a result of movement, change and mixture with one another, (A2) <i>all things that we say are  which is not the right way to speak of them  </i> are coming to be because (X2) <i>nothing ever is</i>, but things are always coming to be. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>To compare (A1) with (A2), and (X1) with (X2), we concentrate on their differences. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Since Protagoras agrees with (X) based on the previous argument (3-2-1), (A1) must be understood in the same way as the example of the wind  the wind is cold for someone who feels cold; for another, it is not cold, which is based on the human-measure thesis. Thus, to be precise, (A1) must be interpreted as if you speak of something as big, it will also appear small; therefore, it <i>is big for you</i>. Hence, (X1) means that nothing is one  either one thing or qualified in one way, but anything is qualified in any way for anyone. This interpretation is natural from the previous argument (3-2-1). However, according to this interpretation, (X2) is clearly different from (X1) because (X2) insists that all things are always coming to be. The reason is explained in (B), which shows the fact of movement, change and mixture with one another. We call this  the flux-stream thesis . Thus, (A2) prohibits the use of  to be for describing all things since all things that we say are  which is not the right way to speak of them  are coming to be. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Therefore, (X) has two interpretations  (X1) and (X2). (X1) is based on the human-measure thesis, and (X2) is based on the flux-stream thesis. In a sense, (X) is ambiguous, but (X1) and (X2) stand in the same position as they cannot admit the being itself. Therefore, the human-measure thesis and the flux-stream thesis admit (X)   Nothing is one thing just by itself <i> </i> for different reasons. On the other hand, (A1) is also ambiguous because we can interpret (A1) from (B) the flux-stream thesis, that if you speak of something as big, it will also appear small; therefore, it <i>is coming to be big </i>for you. This ambiguity connects the human-measure thesis with the flux-stream thesis by the use of  to be . &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>We move on to the last part of stage-directions 2. About this theory, we can assume the agreement of the whole succession of wise men, apart from Parmenides, not only Protagoras but Heraclitus and Empedocles as well. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Remarkably, only Parmenides is excluded from the whole succession of wise men. Plato adds Epicharmus and Homer to this party. This contrast is important in the first part of the <I>Theaetetus</i> because Plato emphasizes it, depicting the simile of wrestling between two parties in the last part of the refutations (180b9 181b4). While we have space for no more than an indication of the simile of the sport, we can consider the logical contrast between these theses. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Parmenides only admits an eternal being itself without movement and change (180d1, e3 5). Protagoras disagrees in admitting the being itself without relativising as the human-measure thesis does. Then, Parmenides being does not permit movement and change against the flux-stream thesis. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>This is why the contrast seems to be a wrestling match by discussion between the two parties. Plato s position must be noted. As is generally known, Plato s Form is eternal being itself without movement and change. Therefore, (X) is an anti-thesis of his theory of Forms. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>He says that we have come forward little by little and without noticing it; we have gotten ourselves into the middle space (meson) between the two sides (180e5 181a2). His theory of Forms explains the relationship between the Form and perceptual objects. For this reason, Plato cannot stand either position  neither that of the wise men nor that of Parmenides  thus the middle position. The construction of the arguments in the first part of the <I>Theaetetus </i>shows us that Plato chooses the middle position between Parmenides and Protagoras Heraclitus and considers the possibility of building a theory of knowledge without the presupposition of being itself. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>According to our considerations on Stage-directions 1 and 2, we must confirm the meaning of  the various theories coincide (160d6). Observing the stage-directions, the theses are not logically similar. One is Protagoras relativism; the other is the fact of a perpetually changing world. However, they hold the same position on (X) although the logical basis of (X) is as diverse as (X1) and (X2). Therefore, we conclude that  the various theories coincide on (X)  Nothing is one thing just by itself. &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>IV. Conclusion &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Plato s theory of Forms explains the relation between the Form and perceptual objects, yet tries to brush up his theory by criticizing it from the viewpoint of Parmenides in the Parmenides. In the Theaetetus, Plato considers the possibility of building a theory of knowledge without the presupposition of  what is (being), and he argues that it is impossible. Thus, Plato chooses the middle position between Parmenides and Protagoras Heraclitus.&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>References&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Brown L. (2014). <I>Plato Theaetetus, </i>Oxford: Oxford University Press( Burnyeat M.F. (1990). <I>The Theaetetus of Plato</i>.Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hacktt Publishing Company( &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Chappell T.(2005), <I>Reading Plato s Theaetetus</i>.Hackett,( Cornford, F. M. (1935). <I>Plato s Theory of Knowledge</i>, London: Routledge&Kegan Paul LTD&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Cornford, F. M. (1941) <I>The Republic of Plato</i>. Oxford : Oxford University Press( &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Cross R. C. and Woozley A. D. (1964), <I>Plato s Republic: A Philosophical Commentary</i>, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul LTD( &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Duke E.A, Hicken W.F, Nicoll W.S.M, Robinson D.B,Strachan eds. (1995). <I>Platonis Opera I</I>. Oxford: Oxford University Press( &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Fine G. (2003)  Knowledge and Belief in <I>Republic </i>V  ,in her <I>Plato on Knowledge and Forms, </i> Oxford: Oxford University Press( &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Gonzalez F. (1996)  Proposition or Objects? A Critique of Gail Fine on  Knowledge and Belief in Politeia V .<I>Phronesis</i>. vol.XLI/3, 245-275.&nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>McDowell J (1973). <I>Plato s Theaetetus</i>. Oxford: Oxford University Press( &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Owen G.E.L.(1953). The Place of the <I>Timaeus </i>in Plato s Dialogues ,<I>Classical Quarterly </i> N.S.3.79-95.( &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Slings, S.R.eds.(2003).,<I>Platonis Rempvlicam</i>, Oxford: Oxford University Press( Rowe C.(2015) Plato Theaetetus and Sophist,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Sedley D. (2004) <I>The Midwife of Platonism: Text and Subtext in Plato s Theaetetus</i>, Oxford: Oxford University Press( &nbsp;</p> <p class='hcAbstract'>Vlastos G. (1969),Plato s  Third Man Argument (<I>Parm</i>.132A1-B2):Text and Logic , <I>Philosophical Quarterly </i>19,289-301,in his <I>Platonic Studies</i>, Princeton University Press342-360.1973 <p class='pcEndnotesSection'>&nbsp;</p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_1' href='#ret30_1' class='ftnLink'>1</a></sup>&nbsp; Burnyeat encourages readers to examine which is the better reading but indicates that Reading B is better than Reading B. Cf. Burnyeat 1990: 7 10,61 65. </p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_2' href='#ret30_2' class='ftnLink'>2</a></sup>&nbsp; Cf. Cornford 1941: 180 181. On this interpretation, researchers have discussed Plato s attitude during the Middle Period regarding the theory of Form. See also Burnyeat 1990: 8 14. On the other hand, G. Fine (2003: 67 68) doubts whether Plato s theory of knowledge is based on the TW. According to Fine, Plato clearly allows knowledge and belief about the same objects, and he may also allow the knowledge of perceptions in the <I>Meno </i>98a and the <I>Theaetetus </i>201a c. Cf. Fine 2003: 66. An example of an argument against her position is advanced by Gonzalez (1996: 245 275).</p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_3' href='#ret30_3' class='ftnLink'>3</a></sup>&nbsp; Cf. Cross and Woozley 1964: 153 157; Vlastos 1969: 58 59; Burnyeat 1990: 8.</p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_4' href='#ret30_4' class='ftnLink'>4</a></sup>&nbsp; Cf. Cornford 1935: 2, 38 39.</p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_5' href='#ret30_5' class='ftnLink'>5</a></sup>&nbsp; Cf. Burnyeat 1990:,7 10;.Chappell 2005: 16 24.</p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_6' href='#ret30_6' class='ftnLink'>6</a></sup>&nbsp; Cf. Burnyeat 1990: 7 10, 45 47. In the second half of the 20th century, Vlastos finds a type of criticism of the TW similar to the third man argument in Aristotle s <I>Metaphysics</i> in the first section of the <I>Parmenides</i>. If it is true, in the <I>Theaetetus</i>, Plato may discard the theory of Form. However, it can suffice to rebut that the Form appeared in the <I>Timaeus</i> written in the Later Period. Thus, Owen (1953) proposed moving the <I>Timaeus</i> from the Later to the Middle Period so that the TW could not appear the later dialogues. Thus, the <I>Theaetetus</i> is a main battlefield for the greatest dispute between alternative interpretations of Plato s work  those of Unitarians and of Revisionists (Cf. Burnyeat 1990: 7 10;.Chappell 2005: 16 24,etc.). This dispute depends on his interpretation of the TW, referring to the phenomenal changing world and the ideal eternal world. </p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_7' href='#ret30_7' class='ftnLink'>7</a></sup>&nbsp; Sedley approves Reading A based on his unique interpretation of midwifery, apart from the interrelation of the three theses. (Cf. Sedley 2004).</p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_8' href='#ret30_8' class='ftnLink'>8</a></sup>&nbsp; Burnyeat refers to the following stage-directions as 151e 152c,152e,155de,157cd,158e,160ce,164d, 166ab,168b, 177c, 179cd,183ac, etc. (Cf. Burnyeat 1990: 9).</p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_9' href='#ret30_9' class='ftnLink'>9</a></sup>&nbsp; Cf. Burnyeat 1990: 10.</p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_10' href='#ret30_10' class='ftnLink'>10</a></sup>&nbsp; Cf. Burnyeat 1990: 284.</p> <p class='pcFootnote'><sup><a name='ftn30_11' href='#ret30_11' class='ftnLink'>11</a></sup>&nbsp; Cf. McDowell 1990: 17. I agree with McDowell that  to be must be interpreted as a predicate. The newest translation that I know is Rowe s, which is more radical. Rowe uses the verb  refer (Cf. Rowe 2015: 15). Levett s translation is as follows:  Nothing which you could rightly call anything or any kind of thing. If you call a thing large, it will reveal itself as small, and if you call [it] heavy, it is liable to appear as light, and so on with everything, because nothing is anything or any kind of thing. (Cf. Burnyeat 1990: 272 273).</p></p> </div> </td> <td style="background:url(tabs/tii_69.png) repeat-y"></td> </tr> <tr> <td><img src="tabs/tii_72.png" alt="" /></td> <td style="background:url(tabs/tii_74.png) repeat-x"></td> <td><img src="tabs/tii_79.png" alt="" /></td> </tr> </table> <p class="MsoNormal" align="right" style='text-align:right'><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;'>© ;0B>=>2A:>5 >1I5AB2>, 2018 3. </span></p> <p align="right" style='margin-top:0mm;margin-right:3pt;margin-bottom: 0mm;margin-left:-36.0pt;margin-bottom:.0001pt;text-align:right'><b><span style='font-size:10.0pt;font-family:&quot;Tahoma&quot;,&quot;sans-serif&quot;'><a href="../index3.htm">  !!# $ &</a></span></b></p> <!-- InstanceEndEditable --> </td> </tr> </tbody> </body> <!-- InstanceEnd --></html>