He [the Therapeutai Elder] does not make an exhibition of clever rhetoric like the orators or sophists of to-day …οἱ ῥήτορες ἢ οἱ νῦν σοφισταί. (Contempl. 31)

Philo declares as he begins his discussion of De vita contemplative that he has not added to the information 'to improve upon the facts as is constantly done by poets and historians', #1.^15< He purports instead to provide a reliable account. A similar criticism of orators and sophists who strive for 'improvement' is found in Philo's 'unadorned' history of the Therapeutai (#31).¹⁶ G. W. Bowersock's definition of the term 'sophist', drawn from first- and second- century sources, also notes that these prominent groups attempted to

enhance the facts, although he does not cite Philo as a source.¹⁷ Philo describes them in contrast both to the ancient sophists, #4, and the Therapeutai elder in #31. The latter individual and his activities he describes in detail while, significantly, he offers no detailed explanation of the activities of the orators and sophists; surely because their methods were well known. Such knowledge, shared by Philo's audience, thus offers him a point of comparison to explain the unknown activities of the Therapeutai elder.

Philo used the sophists as a benchmark to empower five comparisonsand contrasts which informed his discussion of the little-known, or perhaps misunderstood, Jewish community of the Therapeutai. Firstly, orators and sophists and the Therapeutai elder all sought to educate. H. I. Marrou observes that 'For the very great majority of students, higher education meant taking lessons from the orator, learning the art of eloquence from him.'¹⁸ Philo similarly describes the Sabbath meeting of the Therapeutai as taking the form of a lecture with the elder resembling the proven teacher who 'has the fullest knowledge of the doctrines which they profess', #31.

Secondly, similar teacher/student relationships characterised both sides. The pupils or members of the community 'sit in order according to their age in the proper attitude…and listen, showing their approval merely by their looks or nods…with ears pricked up and eyes fixed on him always in exactlythe same posture…[they praise the speaker] by cheerful change of expression which steals over the face', #30,32,77. Orators and sophists were known to have enjoyed the loyalty of their pupils, and often developed an intimate relationship with them.¹⁹

Thirdly, and by way of contrast, Philo claims that the elder 'gives a well-reasoned and wise discourse', #31b, while the orators and sophists are said to 'make an exhibition'.²⁰ He establishes the superiority of the elder's discourse by means of a negative comparison with sophistic declamation, emphasizing in the process that the elder 'does not make an exhibition of clever rhetoric like the orators and sophists of today, but follows careful examination by careful expression of the exact meaning of the thoughts', #31b. Philo's word

choice stresses the notion that the elder's concern for precision runs parallel to the affection for 'clever' words shown by orators and sophists in their public declamations.

Fourthly, Philo contrasts the effectiveness of communication between the lecturer and his audience. He says of the elder's message: 'this does not lodge just outside the ears of the audience but passes through the hearing of the soul and then stays securely', #31b. The strong adversative in this sentence indicates that he is still defining the elder by contrasting him with orators and sophists.

Fifthly, Philo notes the motives of the two groups later in the treatise. There he again discusses the elder's methods of addressing his audience on a biblical issue or a matter that has been discussed by another member of the community.²¹ These methods betray no thought of giving a 'display lecture' (ἐπίδειξις) for, Philo explains, 'he has no ambition to get a reputation for clever oratory', #75.²² This contrasts with the ambitious speakers who declaim solely for reputation's sake.²³ The elder speaks for honourable purposes: to 'gain a closer insight into some particular matter and, having gained it, not to withhold it selfishly from those who, if not clear-sighted as he is, have a similar desire to learn', #75. Philo may be here alluding to teachers who, for financial gain, refuse to share their knowledge freely but dole out pieces one at a time, thus compelling their pupils to return again and again, Ios. 125.

Again Philo contrasts effective communication by the elder with the technique of the orators and sophists. To ensure that the truth is grasped permanently repetition is used, for without this, Philo argues, the hearer will not apprehend the lesson. The elder differs in this from the speaker who 'goes on descanting with breathless rapidity'.²⁴ The audience of the Therapeutai even

employ gestures to signal their comprehension: they motion with 'nods and glances if they comprehend and if in difficulty they move their head gently and point with a finger-tip of the right hand', #77. Their lecturer aims to communicate with his audience and so takes time to explain those points not readily understood: the sophists do not share his concern.

The use of orators and sophists and their activities in the Therapeutai discussion was apposite, for they were instructors of rhetoric, which remained at the heart of all Hellenistic and Roman education and culture. They were regarded as specialists in eloquence who both completed a student's higher education and declaimed before an audience.²⁵ By developing the contrast with these highly specialised professionals — themselves involved in an educative process — Philo successfully demonstrates the superiority of the Therapeutai elder.²⁶

In addition to these five comparisons we find that Contempl. 31, 75 depends on a number of rhetorical terms. These terms and their import would have been lost on Philo's readers if they were not well versed in rhetoric, for he never explains them.²⁷ The fact that Philo does explain the activities of the unknown Therapeutai elder in contrast with techniques of known groups of orators and sophists in Alexandria (often referred to with technical language) adds to our impression of a widespread understanding of rhetoric. This familiarity, furthermore, suggests that the sophists under discussion were present and operative in Philo's world.

Contempl. 31 is not, moreover, Philo's only specific reference to contemporary orators and sophists which uses νῦν. In Post. 101 he refers to "the sophist group of present day people', denying that their teaching contains true philosophy, namely the utterance and word of God, #102. He supplies three reasons for this. Firstly, they 'practised arts of speech to use against the truth', that is, 'rhetorical art'.²⁸ Secondly, 'they have given the name of wisdom to rascality'. Thirdly, they have conferred 'on a sorry work a divine name'. Philo

notes, with the use of another strong adversative, how present-day sophists differ both from the 'ancient band of aspirants', who pursued with rigour the study of philosophy, #101b, and the followers of Moses.²⁹ Again we see that Philo speaks not anachronistically but of his own contemporaries.

We can now conclude, in view of (1) the known role of orators and sophists as teachers in first-century Alexandria, (2) the rhetorical terminology Philo used to explain both their work and that of the Therapeutai elder in Contempl. 31, 75, and (3) the reference to the sophists as a contemporary, professional group misusing the art of rhetoric in Post 101, that Fischel's assertion of a Philonic use of some 'implied anachronism' or symbol is unsustainable.³⁰ The evidence suggests that Philo denotes contemporary, professional orators and sophists in Alexandria.³¹ Other first-century writers such as Plutarch, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom likewise refer to both groups as a sort of contemporary, identifiable and professional guild.³²

Who then should we include in the throng³³ of sophists which Philo daily observed everywhere? Is Bréhier justified in including all teachers? 'Les sophists désignent en général chez Philon, non pas toute une espèce d'enseignement régulier. Ce sont non seulement des chercheurs, mais des grammairiens, des musiciens, des geómètres, ce sont les specialistes dans chaque science.'³⁴

He rests his case on the statements made in Agr. 136-42, especially #136.³⁵

Day after day the swarm of sophists to be found everywhere wears out the ears of any audience they happen to have with disquisitions on minutiae, unravelling phrases that are ambiguous and can bear two meanings and distinguishing among circumstances such as it is well to bear in mind…Or do not some [of them] divide the letters of written speech into consonants and vowels? And do not some [of them] break up language into its three ultimate parts noun, verb and conjunction? Do not geometricians put all lines under two main heads? Do not musicians divide their own science into rhythm, metre, tune? Do not other experts place everything in principal categories?

Bréhier's conclusion, however, falters when one properly assesses the genre used by Philo. The whole treatise, a discussion of Genesis 9.20 ('And Noah began to be a husbandman'), is followed by a lengthy discourse on the virtues of 'distinguishing', #126-68.³⁶ It indicates how Noah began well, but failed to reach the final stage, #181. In #136-41 Philo provides examples of 'distinguishing', diairesis, undertaken by various groups, namely sophists, grammarians, musicians, geometricians, any other 'technician' (τεχνίτης), philosophers or dialecticians. Bréhier assumes that this list of professions can be subsumed under the title of 'sophists' who are discussed in #136a, basing this at least partly on the fact that the second group are grammarians but are not referred to by name.

But do grammarians (and the other professions) really form a subset of the class 'sophists'? The difficulties with this view are worth setting out. #136b provides examples of diairesis of the grammarians. The use of οἱ μέν and ἔνιοι δέ in #136b indicates the division of grammarians at the levels of primary and secondary education. The first comments refer to primary work: 'Do not some of them divide the letters of written speech [letters of the alphabet] into consonants and vowels?' Children began with reading, first learning the names of the twenty-four letters of the alphabet and then pro-

gressing to simple syllables in alphabetical order: βα, βε, βη, βι, βυ, βω.³⁷ Dionysius Thrax' Τέχνη γραμματική observes this division.³⁸ The second example from #136b refers to a first-century-B.C. innovation, namely instruction in the 'technique' of grammar combined with the study of poets and historians at the secondary level. It comprised the systematic study of the elements of language.³⁹ 'And do not some of them break up language into three ultimate parts, noun, verb, conjunction?' This division of grammatical technique under three headings originates with Aristotle, who added to Plato's twofold division of the noun and the verb, the concept of conjunction to cover all other parts of speech. Philo here follows this division rather than the eightfold division of Dionysius Thrax which was finally accepted.⁴⁰ Bréhier implies that Philo has connected #136b to #136a, subsuming the grammarians under the sophists, but in fact this misses the flow of thought. Philo simply provides two examples of diairesis by grammarians, one from each level of grammatical study. Their work was so well known that he need not name them but only describe their activity in much the same way that mention of 'learning the ABC would signal a reference to primary education today. Thus Philo's distinction succeeds because of the clear and well-known differences between primary and secondary grammatical studies, as well as clear differences within the levels.

In #136a Philo has provided examples of diairesis from sophists who engage in 'unravelling phrases that are ambiguous and can bear two meanings and distinguishing among circumstances such as it is well to bear in mind'.⁴¹ Then comes his illustration based on the two levels of work undertaken by the grammarians, which is then followed by more illustrations of diairesis from other professions: musicians, #137; geometricians and other experts, #138; philosophers, #139-40a; and dialecticians, #140-41. Philo then resumes

his discussion of those events which stimulate the intellect in #141, that is, beneficial teaching sessions during which the participants are not merely 'chewing the cud', #142. This bovine imagery he then applies to the sophists and adds a further reference to 'their hair-splitting and their clever inventiveness', though not without acknowledging 'their precision in speech and their rhetorical skill in collating material', #143. Thus, in reality Philo speaks of the sophists, turns aside momentarily to provide (non-sophist) examples of diairesis (#137-41), and then returns to the sophists. In #136 he does not classify the other professions under the one heading but uses them — through an analogy — to explain diairesis.

The Loeb translation contributes to the confusion by translating oἱ μέν and ἔνιοι δέ in #136b as 'some of them' when the description of the activities is of two levels of grammarians. 'Or do not some on the one hand divide…And do not others on the other hand…?' Furthermore, it does not translate at all ἢ, 'or', which begins the sentence discussing the two levels of the work of grammarians.

Bréhier's mistake is explicable. An initial reading of #136-42 which misconstrues (1) diairesis as a literary genre, (2) Philo's use of examples of diairesis among professional groups, (3) the background of the differing roles of primary and secondary grammarians and (4) the particle introducing the sentence and the division of the labour of the grammarians indicated by οἱ μέν and ἔνιοι δέ, prompts his conclusion that the other professional groups are subsumed under the term 'sophist'. We conclude that the 'throng of the sophists' constitutes a specific group in #136, distinguishable from others who specialize in grammar, music, geometry, other sciences, philosophy and dialectics.

Philo, in commenting on Genesis 16.12, 'He will be a wild man; his hand will be against all, and the hands of all against him', states in QG III.33:

Now this picture clearly represents the sophist whose mother is wise learning and wisdom. But the sophist is wild in thought, while the wise man is civil and is suited to the state and to civilisation; but the man of wild thought is from that very fact a lover of contention. Therefore (Scripture) adds, 'his hands against all, and the hands of all against him', for, being trained in wide learning and much knowledge, he contradicts all men. (He is) like those who are now called Academics and Sceptics…

For they are all kin, in a certain sense, uterine brothers, offspring of the same mother, philosophy. Therefore (Scripture) says, 'over against all his brothers he will dwell'. For in truth the Academics and the Non-committals take opposite stands in their doctrines, and oppose the various opinions which others hold.

Nikiprowetzky suggests that Philo uses 'sophist' in this portion to denigrate the Sceptics and Academics, and that he does not confine it to the followers of the ancient sophist Protagoras.⁴² If this is correct, we must adjust our understanding of Philo's use of the term to include, at least in this instance, negative connotations.⁴³ But can we agree that Philo considers Academics and Sceptics actually to be 'sophists', or are we again witness to a metaphor which effectively describes their methods?

Unfortunately, we have only an Armenian translation of the whole of Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim and Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum. Greek fragments of both works exist, but none of QG III.33, so that Philo's actual terms remain uncertain.⁴⁴ For example, the word 'Sceptics' in #33a means literally 'investigators' in Armenian, and LCL notes that it evidently reflects the Greek. Of Philo's phrase 'Academics and "Non-committals'" in #33b, we are uncertain that the latter refers only to 'Sceptics'. LCL comments, literally 'non-sayers', and notes that 'probably the Sceptics are meant as above'. Now, 'non-committals' could refer explicitly to Sceptics, but why then use a different word in #33b from the one introduced in #33a to refer to the same group?⁴⁵ Clearly Philo chose a word which encompassed the characteristics of both Sceptics and sophists: both were certainly contentious, as Philo notes in #33a. In fact, any doubt that he recognises the differing positions of the two most closely linked members of his analogy, the Academics and the Sceptics, dissolves upon his remark that they 'take opposite stands in their doc-

trines'.⁴⁶ He has already mentioned one common denominator between the Academics and the Sceptics, namely their opposition to other schools of philosophy, a point which he repeats again in describing the Academics and the 'Non-Committals'. Thus, Philo speaks pejoratively of the Sceptics when he uses the term 'Non-Committals' and creates a useful analogy. 'Philo seems to jettison his general dogmatic principles and enrol himself in the school of the Sceptics.' Although he reproduces the arguments of eight of the ten tropes of the Sceptic philosopher, Aenesidemus, Philo does not in fact endorse these views. With respect to Ebr. 164-68 it needs to be noted that in the preceding treatise, De plantation, of which De ebrietate is the sequel, Philo has been reproducing the arguments of other philosophers on drunkenness which he has 'stated to the best of his ability', Ebr. 1, and Plant. 142-77 follows the model of a θέσις in structure and in the convention of presenting others' arguments in the first person.⁴⁷

Does Philo, however, identify the Sceptics as sophists? Nikiprowetzky suggests that he does, citing Mos. II.212 as supporting evidence:⁴⁸ 'wisdom must not be that of the systems hatched by word-catchers and sophists who sell their tenets and arguments like any bit of merchandise in the market, men who for ever pit philosophy against philosophy'. He notes that Philo also uses λογοθῆραι in Congr. 53 to describe certain philosophers 'who are merely word-mongers and word-hunters'.⁴⁹ That context, however, describes the 'third race', that is, the Sceptics. While Nikiprowetzky correctly identifies the λογοθῆραι of Mos, II.212 with the Sceptics of Congr. 52-53, it does not follow that the discussion of the false wisdom in the former passage equates the Sceptics and the sophists, oἱ λογοθῆραι καὶ σοφισταί refer to two separate groups, and the καί is not epexegetical in the former citation.

Congr. 52 is also conscripted as evidence for identifying Sceptics and Academics with sophists.⁵⁰ Here Philo speaks of the Sceptics who 'spend themselves on petty quibbles and trifling disputes'. But the use of the term σόφισμα

in this passage does not imply that Sceptics are sophists, for it has a wider meaning.⁵¹

Thus, against Nikiprowetzky's notion that Philo identifies the sophists as Academics and Sceptics, we have suggested that 'the wild man', the sophist, is merely described as possessing certain characteristics shared also by Academics and Sceptics. Only such a conclusion can adequately account for the words: '(he is) like…', #33. We do not argue that no sophist ever held Sceptic or Academic views on particular issues, but that Philo does not say Sceptic and Academic philosophers as a class are sophists. In QG III.33 Philo notes that the sophists possess 'wide learning and wisdom'. As men of 'wild thought' they love contention. Thus, like the Academics and Sceptics, they contradict all men as a result of having been trained in 'wide learning and much knowledge'. The analogy is apposite, although it constitutes no argument for identifying them with these particular philosophers.

Sandmel argues that in Congr. 67 Philo identifies as sophists the philosophers of the following schools of thought: 'the Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans, Eleatics, Sceptics and non-Sceptics'. He cites in support of his conclusion the editors of LCL. While the editors do indeed extract a list of disagreements among the philosophical schools concerning the nature of the cosmos from Philo's comment in Her. 247, they do not share Sandmel's conclusion that the philosophers are sophists.⁵²

Two difficulties weaken Sandmel's thesis that all who hold the philosophical positions outlined in Her. 247 are sophists, and thus the concomitant that this passage can help explain Congr. 67. Firstly, this would demand that Philo and Plato are also sophists, for both hold that the cosmos is created and not to be destroyed. As Runia notes: 'The reason that Philo quotes this Platonic text [The Timaeus, 41a-b, cited in Aet. 13] is to prove that according to Plato the cosmos is created (γενητός) but not to be destroyed (ἄφθαρτος). It is more-

over clear that there is no difference of view between Plato and Moses [and of course Philo] on this issue, for also Moses affirms this' (Gen. 1.1, 8.22, Aet. 19),⁵³ what Philo has explicated in Aet. 13ff. he merely notes in Her. 246: 'Thus those who declare the universe to be uncreated are at strife with those who maintain its creation; those who say that it will be destroyed with those who declare that though by nature destructible it will never be destroyed, being held together by a band of superior strength, namely the will of its maker.'

On this second proposition, καὶ πάλιν, the editors of LCL observe that Philo quotes from The Timaeus; but Sandmel ignores this note. He then simply identifies the third proposition as Eleatic, that is, those who subscribe to the notion that 'nothing is, but all things become', in antithesis to Plato's Theaetetus. Again Sandmel overlooks the holders of the antithesis even as he cites the holders of the thesis.⁵⁴

Secondly, in Her. 246a Philo cites the sophists simply to base an analogy on their conduct, not to identify them, as the context shows. In discussing what 'the man of worth' is like he compares him with a chairman or a president of a council who can arbitrate, Her. 243. He comments that some who might be regarded as allies, holding the same position as Philo and Plato, ultimately cause offence when they engage in the conduct of the sophists, namely 'strife' (ἔρις). Philo thus simply notes the similarity between the sophists' conduct and that of allies. He next remarks that some of the proponents of certain views are allies and friends: 'In so far as their minds are fixed on one end to discover the facts of nature they are friends, but when they do not agree, they engage in civil strife.' He thus sees the need of a 'man midwife' who possesses discernment, a chairman who can 'observe', 'throw away', 'save' and 'approve'.⁵⁵ In addition, Philo observes that the history of philosophy is 'full of discordance, because truth flees from the credulous mind which deals in conjecture', Her. 248.

Hence this portion simply describes the conduct of philosophers of differingviewpoints and insists that allies can hinder one another if their argumentative behaviour begins to resemble the sophists' combativeness.

In addition, Sandmel has linked Her. 246-47 with Congr. 67 as examples of a negative attitude on the part of Philo compared to a more favourable outlook elsewhere. The latter text, he maintains, supports Philo's identification of the philosophers as sophists.

Again, however, Sandmel neglects certain germane facts. In exegeting Genesis 16.2 in Congr. 63-67, where Abraham 'hearkened to the voice of Sarah', Philo comments that hardly a day goes by but lecture-halls and theatres fill with οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες. Various classes of people listen with different but inadequate responses. But to whom does Philo refer? While οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες can be translated as 'philosophers', it often means sophists in the Philo corpus. In Post. 34 Philo mentions that many who have 'professed' philosophy arrive at conclusions belonging to the ancient sophist, Protagoras. Det. 74 refers to sophists who have proven to be 'lecturers of the highest order as far as understanding beautiful things and philosophical discourses are concerned', yet they invariably are caught 'indulging in practices that are base'. This clearly refers to those already designated 'sophists' in Det. 72. This charge against them, that is, that they teach virtue and yet practise evil, appears elsewhere in Philo. In Deus 170 those who commend κακία are said to φιλοσοφεῖν, and their activities to bar 'the heavenly and royal road of virtue'. They are epitomised by the earthly Edomites, referred to elsewhere as 'present day sophists', Post. 101. In this same passage Philo alludes to 'the philosophy which is pursued by the present day sophists'. So sophists did debate philosophical subjects,⁵⁶ an instance being the thesis, 'The unevenness of the earth would no longer exist if the world were from everlasting', Aet. 132.

Congr. 67 seems to authorise translating oἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες not simply as 'philosophers' but as those who discourse on philosophical subjects. Further evidence only reinforces this conclusion: Philo equates their efforts with typical sophistic activity, for they are said to be ἀπνευστὶ συνείροντες τοὺς περὶ ἀρετὴς λόγους;⁵⁷ and the subject of their discourse in Congr. 67 is one upon which the sophists elsewhere declaimed, for example, Mut. 196-97.⁵⁸

Finally, this audience in the lecture-hall responds to the sophist in one of three ways, Congr. 65. The minds of some wander to their daily preoccupations. Others hear but do not profit, for they listen 'to please their sense of hearing rather than to gain profit', Congr. 66. The third group appear to be students of sophists who learn to reproduce what was said but never bring their lives into conformity with their words.⁵⁹ While capable of speaking on

the best, that is, about virtue, they fail to live up to what they say, #67. The significance of these reactions for our purpose is that these same charges are leveled elsewhere against sophists, Det. 72.

Based on both the description of the activities of οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες and the observation that they affect their audience in ways elsewhere ascribed to the sophists, we conclude that Philo refers to sophists, not philosophers per se, in Congr. 67.

H. A. Wolfson and P. G. Geoltrain state that Philo uses the term 'sophist' to include the ancient poets, especially Homer and Hesiod.⁶⁰ Wolfson finds support for his statement in Diogenes Laertius: 'Sophist was another name for the wise men, and not only philosophers but for the poets also. And so Cratinus when praising Homer and Hesiod in his Archilochi gives them the title of sophist', I.12.⁶¹

Philo does not follow Cratinus in the use of the term 'sophist' but regards the poets, including Homer and Hesiod, as important lifelong educators:⁶² 'if we are justified in listening to the poets — and why should we not, since they are our educators through all our days, and as parents in private life teach wisdom to their children, so do they in public life to their cities' (Prov. 1.143). He elsewhere elevates the poets when he speaks of their importance in the acquisition of 'civic virtue'. 'No doubt, it is profitable, if not for the civic virtue, to feed the mind on ancient and time-honoured thoughts, to trace the venerable tradition of noble deeds, which historians and all the family of poets have handed down to the memory of their own and future generations' (Sacr. 78).

In the same section Philo cautions against rejecting ancient learning and argues that 'we should make it our aim to read the writings of the sages', Sacr. 79. He acknowledges his own debt to the poets, for he had been exposed to what he called the 'handmaid of philosophy', namely grammar, when at the secondary level he 'consorted' with 'the study of the writings of the poets', Congr. 74.

Philo attaches importance to the poets — 'For grammar teaches us to study literature in the poets and historians, and will produce intelligence and wealth of knowledge', Congr. 15. The task of this level of grammar is 'the elucidation of the writings of the poets and the historians', Congr. 148. Elsewhere he commends 'research into poetry…and the study of the doings of old times', Chr. 105, or 'the diligent search into what wise poets have written', Agr. 18. Lovers of wisdom, among whom Philo numbers himself, must have an 'acquaintance with the poets and learning of ancient history', Somn. I.205. The index in LCL indicates his considerable knowledge and use of literary references.⁶³ He speaks positively of poets in a way he never does of sophists.⁶⁴

For Philo, Homer⁶⁵ is the poet par excellence: 'Homer [is] the greatest and most reputed of poets', Conf. 4, and 'the poet most highly esteemed among the Greeks' is Homer, Mut. 179; 'we give the title "the poet"⁶⁶ to Homer in virtue of his pre-eminence', Abr. 10. Philo provides twenty direct quotations from Homer.⁶⁷ In one instance he cites 'chapter and verse' from memory:'The same idea is suggested, I think, by Homer in the Iliad at the beginning of the thirteenth book', Contempl. 17. LCL, responding to the notion that Philo's attempt to locate the quotation is strikingly rare, suggests that it must have been an obscure passage the relevance of which would not have readily occurred to the reader. Philo may, however, remember simply because of a deep familiarity with the context: it is the only Homeric quotation that appears at the beginning of a book in either the Iliad or the Odyssey.⁶⁸ In at least one instance Philo knows the context of two lines of Homer, for he notes of Iliad

II. 13.204-5 that the words apply more appropriately to God and the world than to 'cities and men', Conf. 170: 'It is not well that many lords should rule… Multiplicity produces many evils.' Significantly, in this instance he cites Homer over against Genesis 1.26, 3.22 to substantiate the monotheism for which he contends, for the text of Genesis says 'Let us make man'. In Legat. 149 he uses this same quotation to apply to Augustus, which better fits the Homeric context.

Philo's reapplication of Homeric texts to new situations resembles his approach to other literary sources.⁶⁹ For example, Iliad II. 13.5-6 reads: 'The Mysians fighting hand to hand, and noble mare's milk drinkers — Nought else but milk sustains their life, these men of perfect justice.' Philo's rendering, offered in a discussion of the superiority of the Therapeutai over the Greek philosophers Anaxagoras and Democrates, explains: 'the idea conveyed is that injustice is bred by anxious thought for the means of life and moneymaking, justice by holding and following the opposite creed', Contempl. 17. A survey of Philo's use of Homeric quotations indicates that he, while always accurate with the text, sometimes attends less carefully to the context, a legacy of his literary education and proof of his esteem for this poet.⁷⁰

Philo's debt to Homer is also reflected in his Quaestiones et solutions. R. Marcus suggests that in its form it resembles the Hellenistic commentaries on the Homeric poems.⁷¹ P. Borgen and R. Skarsten's preliminary exploration of the whole Philo corpus would suggest that the influence of such commentaries was even more widespread.⁷² Indeed, the influence of Homer on Jewish literature may reach well beyond Philo if F. E. Halleway is correct that aggadic works 'resemble Greek and Hellenistic commentaries to the poems of Homer'.⁷³ H. Dorrie argues that Philo followed the Stoic allegorical exegesis of Homer which regarded the non-literal meaning as superior to the literal.⁷⁴

LCL also suggests a Homeric allegorising influence on Philo's treatment of the OT.⁷⁵ Whatever the outcome of current attempts to measure his indebtedness to Homeric exegesis, Philo's attitude to Homer was consistently positive and his debt considerable. He never calls him a 'sophist'.

Wolfson cites Contempl. 4 as his only evidence that other ancient poets were called sophists. There Philo refers to the ancient sophists who gave divine names to the elements: 'air [is called] Hera, because it is lifted up and exalted on high'. But Wolfson neglects the fact that those who gave divine names to the elements were sophists, namely Theagenes, Empedokles and Prodikos.⁷⁶ While others may have referred to ancient poets as sophists, Philo never so designates them.

Moreover, Wolfson's view that the term designates Jewish 'sages' cannot be substantiated by a single occurrence from the Philo corpus. His only evidence comes from Josephus where, appropriately, a virtuoso forensic rhetorician described as 'learned in the law' was called a sophist. Wolfson's case thus rests on comments from Diogenes Laertius and Josephus, and an unexplored assumption about Contempl. 4.

This examination of opinions on Philo's sophists has shown that orators and sophists comprised an identifiable grouping in Alexandrian society similar to those mentioned in P.Oxy. 2190 and Dio's Alexandrian Oration. Within the educational system of the first century, the term 'sophist' was not a fluid one: it excluded philosophers, dialecticians, grammarians, musicians, geometricians and any other specialised group. Philo's 'sophists' comprised a specific group within paideia, Agr. 136-42.

Philo does not use the term 'sophist' to stigmatise philosophers such as

the Academics and the Sceptics (QG III.33), non-Sceptics, Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans or Eleatics, Her. 246. Nor does he join others in applying it to poets, ⁷⁷ although he does associate it with those who gave divine names to the elements, Contempl. 4.

The term in Philo's corpus is neither a 'symbol' nor a pejorative label applied to Greek or Jewish teachers or Greek philosophers.⁷⁸ Heinemann correctly concludes that the word should be read literally.⁷⁹ Philo may well speak of the sophists in a pejorative way, but like Dio, he does not use it pejoratively of non-sophists.⁸⁰ A distinct vocabulary of invective, drawn from Plato and well suited to its purpose, was used of the actual sophists in the first century.⁸¹

While this chapter has endeavoured to identify the Alexandrian sophists mentioned by Philo as the virtuoso orators who have public followings, the survey has yielded important information on the sophistic movement which also ought to be noted. Philo records the impact of the sophists on city after city, and describes the great admiration that their technical prowess won for them. They drew the whole world after them, yet were prematurely aged by indulging their lower natures, Agr. 142-43. Another complaint is that the sophists bestow no lasting benefit upon their hearers: they only declaim to enhance their own reputations, Contempl. 75. In this passage one also finds the allegation that some sophists withhold information for a later lecture merely to inflate profits. Philo notes that there is a threefold response of the audience to the sophist. Some allow their minds to wander as they hear the declamation. Others derive sensory pleasure from the performance without benefit to the soul: the moment the sophist ceases, so does that pleasure. The students listen to their teacher's display just to learn rhetorical techniques, never to reproduce that over which the sophists proclaimed themselves master, namely ἀρετή, Congr. 66-67. The next two chapters will add greater detail to this sketch as they build upon this chapter's conclusions concerning Philo's use of the term 'sophist'.