Although Philo conducts his discussion of the sophistic tradition within a framework of OT characters and texts,2 we will see that his critique of it depends heavily on Plato's evaluation of the sophists.3
Philo did not direct his complaints about the sophistic tradition against the educational ethos which was its source, that is, Greek paideia, but rather against its misuse by the orators and sophists of his day. His concerns were threefold. Firstly, the sophistic tradition's use of paideia hindered the development of virtue both in its teachers and in its pupils. Since 'all the sophists professed themselves masters of virtue', this failure reflected badly upon their professional ability and integrity.4 Secondly, the rhetorical skills taught in
The sophistic misuse of paideia for vice
Philo was not opposed to Greek paideia per se, for he himself had enjoyed the benefits of this educational system.5 He was trained in Greek grammar and considered it an art (τέχνη), its teachers τεχνιταί, and thought it of great value for the study of philosophy, Congr. 74, Somn. I.205.6 Grammar itself — consisting of reading, writing and the studying of the poets and the historians — he called the 'younger sister' of philosophy. It had rules or laws which were passed on to succeeding generations, and its specialised vocabulary enabled professionals, but not non-professionals, to communicate with each other. For the expert grammarian 'no limits can be set in the extensions and enlargements of his subject', but sadly this expertise so often dies with the individual grammarian.7 He praised it for producing both 'intelligence' and 'a wealth of knowledge', Congr. 74, Agr. 18, Ebr. 49, Congr. 15, and was convinced of its great importance in the acquisition of virtue, which could employ 'no minor kind of introduction'. In fact, two of the elements which constituted an appropriately 'great introduction' to virtue were Greek grammar and rhetoric, Congr. 15, and of the latter he said, 'Rhetoric seeks out and weighs the materials for shrewd treatment in all the subjects which it handles, and welds them to the language that befits them…it gives fluency and facility in using our tongues and organs of speech' (Chr. 105). Other purposes are described elsewhere: 'Rhetoric, sharpening the mind to the observation of facts, and training and welding thought to expression, will make the man a true master of words and thoughts, thus taking into its charge the peculiar and special gift which nature has not bestowed on any other living creature' (Congr. 17). In spelling out the benefits derived from the different branches of paideia, Philo recalled that from rhetoric he derived 'con-
5D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Titnaeus of Plato (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), pp.35-36.
6Elsewhere he distinguished between 'elementary' and 'advanced' grammar, Congr. 148. The former undertakes to teach reading and writing, and the latter the elucidation of the works of poets and historians. Philo does not consistently maintain the distinction made here between γραμματιστική and γραμματική; Η. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, English translation (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956), p. 160.
7Det. 75, Prob. 49-50, Somn. I.9, Mut. 80.
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ception, expression, arrangement, treatment, memory and delivery', Somn.
I.205.8 A. Michel notes 'que Philon ne condamne pas la rhétorique lorsqu'elle
est segment utilisée; il en préconise au contraire le bon usage'.9 Philo, like Plato, did not despise rhetoric, 'but only the excesses of the sophists'.10
Indeed, Philo, following Plato, adopted a recognised dichotomy in paideia, and thus used the term to refer both to an intellectual discipline and the training of the will by moral precepts and the control of a superior.11 In contrasting those trained by the intellectual discipline of paideia with the training of the will of others by moral instruction, Philo notes:
For it is a characteristic mark of the learner that he listens to a voice and to works, since by these only is he taught; whereas he who acquires goodness not through teaching but through practice, fixes his attention not on what is said but on those who say it, and imitates their life as shown in the blamelessness of their successive actions.12
Both pedagogical modes are significant, for they represent two of the three means by which one achieves perfection in Philo's schema.13
Instead of paideia leading to a life of virtue, the sophistic movement too often produced κακία in its proponents and their pupils — 'loving self (φιλαυτία) rather than 'loving God' (φιλοθεῖα).14 This stark contrast between the virtuous person, usually the pious Jew, and the sophist colours much of
8With some minor variations, these are the fundamental divisions of rhetoric and precise terminology found in most works on rhetoric, LCL, vol. V, Appendix, p. 604. For terms see J. C. G. Earnesti, Lexicon technologiae graecorum rhetoricae (reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlag, 1962); A. Mendelson, Education in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982), p. 7; Michel, 'Quelques aspects de la rhétorique chez Philon', in R. Arnaldez, C. Montdésert and J. Pouilloux (eds.), Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1967), p. 83: 'précisément sur la définition de la rhétorique et de ses fonctions exactes'.
9Michel, 'Quelques aspects de la rhétorique chez Philon', p. 83.
10For an excellent discussion of this matter see Black, 'Plato's View of Rhetoric', pp. 171-91, esp. pp. 190-91.
11On the former in Plato see The Republic, 376e; Symposium, 187; Laws, 641 and on the latter 656c, 803d, 832c-d. For discussion see Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus, pp. 85-87.
12Congr. 69 and the discussion of Gen. 16. Cf. Fug. 172, Sobr. 38 and Plato, Laws, 653c, 656c, 803d, 832c-d.
13On the third, the spontaneously virtuous man, see Plato, Phaedrus, 247b and Philo's discussion of this heaven-born man in Mendelson, Secular Education, pp. 53-58.
14For a discussion of the antithetical character of these terms and the contention that it is the central theme of Philo's thought see W. Warnach, 'Selbtliebe und Gottesliebe im Denken Philons von Alexandrien', in H. Feld and J. Nolte (eds.), Wort Gottes in der Zeit: Festschrift Hermann Schelkle (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1973), pp. 198-214.
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Philo's thought and betrays an animosity towards the sophists which cannot be appreciated until one grasps the vital nexus in his system between paideia and virtue and its opposite, κακία.15 He attached great importance to paideia because it was a 'vestibule' to ἀρετή, Fug. 187, and 'great themes need great introductions, for it deals with the greatest of materials, that is, the whole life of man', Congr. 11-12.16 The terms ἀρετή and its antonym κακία are indeed central to an understanding of Philo's anthropology.17 Virtues and vices are peculiar to man, and distinguish him from the rest of creation, for unlike the heavenly creatures and the rest of creation, man has νοῦς and λόγος which are the dwelling places of ἀρετή and κακία: within man is mixed good and evil, fair and foul, virtue and vice, Op. 73.18
In fact, like the sophists and philosophers, Philo incorporated into his system the four traditional Greek cardinal virtues with their four corresponding vices.
| virtue |
(ἀρετή) |
|
vice |
(κακία) |
| prudence |
(φρόνησις) |
|
folly |
(ἀφροσύνη) |
| self-control |
(σωφροσύνη) |
|
intemperance |
(ἀκολασία) |
| courage |
(ἀνδρεία) |
|
cowardice |
(δειλία) |
| righteousness |
(δικαιοσύνη) |
|
injustice |
(ἀδικία)19 |
15He uses this term over nine hundred times in his corpus. For a general discussion of Philo on virtue see Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus, ch. 5; H. A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), vol. II, pp. 200-225; and also S. Sandmel, 'Confrontation of Greek and Jewish Ethics: Philo, De Decalogo', in D. J. Silver (ed.), Judaism and Ethics (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1970), vol. I, pp. 61-76 and 'Virtue and Reward in Philo', in J. L. Crenshaw and J. T. Willis (eds.), Essays in Old Testament Ethics: J. P. Hyatt In Memoriam (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1974), pp. 217-23. For a thorough treatment see A. Bengio, 'La dialectique de Dieu et de l'homme chez Platon et Philon d'Alexandrie: une approche du concept d'ἀρετή chez Philon', Ph.D. dissertation, University of Paris (1971). More recently Philo's views on ethics have been taken up in the context of determinism, e.g., D. Winston, 'Philo's Ethical Theory', ANRW II.21.1 (1984), 372-416, who makes no mention of ἀρετή.
16W. H. Wagner, 'Philo and Paideia', Cithera 10 (1971), 57. 'His general principle is that encyclical studies form only an attractive vestibule.'
17See more recently Τ. Η. Tobin, The Creation of Man: Philo and the History of Interpretation, CBQ Monograph Series 14 (Washington: Catholic Biblical Association, 1983).
18Philo takes this opposing view to his nephew in the dialogue De animalibus. For discussion see A. Terian, Philonus Alexandrini De Animalibus: The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Studies in Hellenistic Judaism I (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), p. 45.
19Here Philo follows the Platonic ordering of the tetrad of traditional virtues; see The Re-
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Thus in effect he endorsed the topics upon which the sophists declaimed: 'The social character of righteousness', 'The advantageous nature of moderation', 'The great benefits of piety' and 'The power of every virtue to bring health and safety'. If they discussed aspects of virtue, they also dealt with the opposite vices, namely 'The unsociability of injustice', 'The ill health from a licentious life', 'Irreligion makes one a pariah' and 'The serious harm from all other forms of κακία', Det. 72.20
Because the sophists were 'the self-proclaimed teachers of ἀρετή'21 both in Plato's day and in his own, Philo did not criticise the topics upon which they declaimed, but the fact that their lifestyles contradicted their teaching, Det. 73.
| Topics |
|
|
Sophists' Vices |
|
| prudence |
(φρόνησις) |
|
folly |
(ἀφροσύνη) |
| self-control |
(σωφροσύνη) |
|
intemperance |
(ἀκολασία) |
| righteousness |
(δικαιοσύνη) |
|
injustice |
(ἀδικία) |
| piety |
(εὐσέβεια) |
|
impiety |
(ἀσέβεια) |
To the four cardinal Greek virtues Philo added the greatest of all. 'Reverence of God' (θεοσέβεια) was signified by the tree of immortal life, and was considered 'the consummation of virtue'.22 Adam and Eve rejected this tree to grasp 'that fleeting and mortal existence which is not an existence but a period of time full of misery', Op. 154-56. The penalty for ceding control to irrational pleasures was difficulty in wresting the necessities of life from the earth. In concluding De opificio mundi Philo says, 'Such is the life of those
public, 419-45e. Listed elsewhere thus in Philo see LA I.63, Chr. 5, Sacr. 84, Det. 75, Ebr. 23, Mos. II.185, Spec. II.62, Prob. 67, 159, QG IV. 113, although he does not always follow the order, and note 'piety' also playing an important part. For the ordering and a discussion of these virtues see H. F. North, 'Canons and Hierarchies of the Cardinal Virtues in Greek and Latin Literature', in L. Wallach (ed.), The Classical Tradition: Literary and Historical Studies in Honor of Harry Caplan (New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 166-68. See Wolfson, Philo, vol. II, pp. 213, 218-25, for his explanation of the cardinal virtues and their link with others. For a good discussion of their meaning see Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus, pp. 148,157-58,164 and 171.
20LCL's translation of this passage does not make it sufficiently clear that these were topics on which the sophists declaimed.
21D. Zeyl, 'Socratic Virtue and Happiness', Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophic 64 (1982), 227 and n. 10 for evidence, and Rowe, Plato, p. 156.
22In the exposition of Genesis 2.9-14 in LA I.56-76 every tree and river stands for virtue flowing from Eden.
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who from the outset are in enjoyment of innocence and simplicity of character, but later on prefer vice to virtue', Op. 170.
In the hands of the sophists, then, paideia led to perversion, for even while engaged in teaching the importance of the pursuit of virtue, they lived a contradictory lifestyle. Using the OT figure of Balaam the sophist, Philo argues that they cherish the very things against which they declaim. 'What good have they done?' he asks. Cain, like Balaam, has 'done nothing…accomplished nothing…their souls have died', Det. 71-75.23
When God inquires of the wise man 'what is in his soul, i.e., his hand', the answer is 'schooling', paideia. This is said to be the bridge over which one crosses to leave behind lethal vices and passions. The disciplined mind makes this crossing by means of paideia, and the virtuous man achieves it by leaning on instruction as on a rod. When Moses was instructed to lay hold of the tail of the serpent, God told him to grasp it and quell it so that once again it became a rod instead of a serpent. 'Instead of pleasure, paideia shall be in your hand', LA II.89-90. W. H. Wagner comments that 'the rod of paideia could be transformed into a serpent which bit the soul back to sophrosyne-arete when the soul wandered into the wilderness of passion'.24 Philo maintains that the soul which rejects paideia becomes a lover of pleasure rather than of virtue.
Virtue for Philo was thus not a merely theoretical concept; it was also practical: 'clearly, it involves theory, since philosophy is the road that leads to it, involves it through its three parts, logic, ethics, physics; and it involves conduct, for virtue is the art of the whole of life, and life includes all kinds of 'conduct' (πρᾶξις)' (LA I.57). The gravamen of Philo's charge against the sophistic tradition lay in its failure to express virtue in everyday living, a charge which illuminated the gaping discrepancy between the cardinal Greek virtues so strongly endorsed in the sophists' teaching and the way they themselves lived.25 The sophistic tradition engaged in 'mis-education in rhetoric', for it used rhetorical techniques against virtue, Post. 52.26 In a word, from their lips 'poured forth the sophist-talk which wars against virtue' (ὁ πολέμος ἀρετῆς σοφιστὴς λόγος, Somn. II.281).27 With the sophists virtue had effectively degenerated into 'a kind of amoral "art of success"' no less than in Plato's day.28
23Balaam was a good choice in this instance: as a foreign seer summoned by Balak, the king of Moab, to curse Israel, he was overthrown.
24Wagner, 'Philo and Paideia', 57.
25For discussion see Untersteiner, Sophists, p. xv.
26Mendelson, Secular Education, p. 8.
27Cf. Rowe, Plato, pp. 157-58. The sophists in Plato's day treated ἀρετή as merely 'skill in eristic debates, the ability to tie one's opponents in knots by whatever verbal means'.
28Ibid., p. 158.
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Philo further explains that those who proceed through the stages of paideia but do not seek virtue, by this very failure, become sophists. Ishmael, the son of Hagar, illustrates this.29 The mother stood for 'encyclical studies' (μέση paideia),30 and the boy when grown became a sophist, Post. 130-31. This theme reappears in Chr. 6-10 where Philo presents the expulsion of Hagar and her son as an allegory of the banishing of the sophist and his mother from the presence of wisdom and the wise. She represents μέση καὶ ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία or ἡ τῶν προπαιδευμάτων διδασκαλία, her downfall being her impatience with 'the stern and gloomy life of the virtue-seekers (φιλάρετοι)', #10. Sobr. 8-10 contrasts Isaac, fully grown in virtues, with Ishmael who, although full grown, remains 'a child', 'thus marking the contrast between the sophist and the sage'.31 Philo intimates that he proposes to demonstrate subsequently that 'wisdom is Isaac's inheritance and Ishmael's sophistry'. Though no such work is extant, the information cited above allows us to reconstruct the general distinctions he would have drawn.
Defining sophists as virtuoso orators who enjoy a large public following aptly portrays their activities from the perspective of secular Alexandria,32 but it would not have satisfied Philo because that description lacked a moral judgement. He would have added that because these men's education failed to produce personal virtue, they misused it in the instruction of
29For the view that Philo used here the Stoic and Cynic treatment of the Homeric incident of Penelope and her maids, see Colson, 'Philo on Education', 154, and the substantial objections to this raised by T. Conley, 'General Education' in Philo of Alexandria, Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture 15 (Berkeley: Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, 1975), 6-7, and Mendelson's response, Secular Education, p. 16. Philo can follow other sources closely as in Plant. 156; see E. J. Barnes, 'Petronius, Philo and Stoic Rhetoric', Latomus 32 (1973), 787-98. He was bound by a source but naturally used it for his own purpose. For discussion of Hagar and Ishmael see Colson, 'Philo on Education', 159-60; Wagner, 'Philo and Paideia', 57; Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1971), p. 156; Mendelson,'Encyclical Education in Philo of Alexandria', Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago (1971), 107, 148, 178.
30LCL, I, p. xvii, n. a reports difficulty in translating this phrase because the Stoic use of μέσος implies neither good nor bad. They dismiss the translation 'intermediate' or 'secondary' education because of 'modern connotations' of the word. Mendelson, Secular Education, p. 3 supports the view that it has 'a definite value' when not used by Philo in educational contexts. In Chr. 3, 6, Ebr. 33, Congr. 12, 14, 20, 24 and Fug. 188 it is a technical term for the second stage of Greek paideia. The terms μέση καὶ ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία and ἡ τῶν προπαιδευμάτων διδασκαλία used in Chr. 6-10 are synonyms as they both refer to Hagar. Paideia was only a stage or prelude to virtue for Philo, and the term is highly apposite for his purpose.
31ἀντεξετάζω means 'to measure oneself against another'.
32For the definition see Introduction, pp. 3-4.
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others.33 They themselves could declaim on ἀρετή, but could not reproduce it in their own lives. Philo warns that one may be trained in paideia, having great ability in expounding themes, yet be a most evil thinker as the sophists are, Migr. 72. 'This is the way of life of the sophists, for as they spin out their discourses (περὶ φρονήσεως) and endurance they grate on the ears of those most thirsting to listen, but in the choices that they make and the action of their lives we find them going very far wrong', Post. 86. Both Plato and Philo saw that these self-appointed teachers of virtue failed in the very thing for which they claimed expertise.34
It should be noted in concluding this section that Philo saw a solution to the bleak situation created by the sophistic tradition. The unchecked impulses of men's passions and the infliction of evil on others could be overcome by means of two traditional virtues: self-control and righteousness. These calmed and checked evil; and ἀρετή and the corresponding good works replaced κακία with its fruitless practices, Op. 81-82.
If, in a word, the vices and the fruitless practices to which they prompt were to give place to the virtues and their corresponding activities, the warfare in the soul, of all wars veritably the most dire and most grievous, would have been abolished, and peace would prevail and there would be hope that God, being the Lover of virtue and the Lover of what is good and beautiful and also the Lover of man, would provide for our race good things. (Op. 81)
In conclusion, the successful inculcation of virtue in a pupil's soul was as crucial for Philo as for Plato. As in the Protagoras, so in Philo, one sees the accusation that the sophists jeopardise this important process.35 Both therefore oppose the sophists' claims to the title 'teachers of virtue', however much the latter pressed their claim upon their contemporaries.36 The tensions between word and deed which characterised their lives and the lives of their students obviated such claims.
33Dio Chrysostom also complained that the sophists robbed men of the classical virtues. See p. 55, n. 59.
34As will be seen in the following chapter, the sophists had a philosophical defence for 'the witness' of their lifestyle based on a contemporary exposition of Platonic categories, and were therefore critical of their opponents, whom they designated 'the so-called lovers of virtue'.
35Protagoras, 313c and the discussion in Zeyl, 'Socratic Virtue', 227-29.
36Rowe, Plato, p. 156.
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The sophistic misuse of paideia for deception
ἀπάτη ('illusion' or 'deception') was the goal of magic and, in Plato's estimation, also characterised rhetoric.37 The sophist was indeed a magician, 'a kindof juggler (γοής), an imitator of realities…in the guild of false-workers and jugglers'.38 Rhetoricians and sophists were engaged 'in delivering speeches and pouring out words, which have a magical and seductive influence on the audience; here is magic'.39 Philo leans on this Platonic criticism to inform his second critique of the sophistic tradition. The craft of the sorcerer, σοφιστεία, was, for Philo as for Plato, the art of wizardry, Mos. I.277.40
Philo therefore identified as sophists the Egyptian magicians against whom Moses contended, for they engaged in the 'tricks' (τέχναι) and 'deceptions' (ἀπάται) of sophistry 'like the enchantments of magic', Det. 38.41 This required no exegetical chicanery because 'the sophists and magicians' of Egypt (οἱ σοφισταὶ καὶ μάγοι) actually did practice deception in their battle with Moses when they cast down their rods which turned to serpents.42 Just as Socrates overcame the magic of the sophists with his own 'magic', so too, Philo assures us, Moses triumphed with divine power and not with deception of his own, Mos. I.92-94.43
Deception can only be overcome by a dialectic which 'distinguishes true arguments from false, and convicts the plausibility of sophistry, and will thus
37Plato was responding to the work of Gorgias, Plato, Helen, 10, who used such terms of rhetoric. For a full discussion see de Romilly, 'Gorgias and Magic', Magic and Rhetoric, ch. 1.
38The Sophist, 235a, 241b. Cf. the master of γοητεία καὶ φαρμακεία καὶ σοφιστεία, The Symposium, 203d. For a discussion of this issue from Plato onwards see de Romilly, 'Plato and the Conjurers', Magic and Rhetoric, ch. 2. Her study covers the second- and third-century-A.D. evidence of Aristides and Philostratus, but she never refers to Philo or The Cynic Epistles, 6.30,in this helpful examination of subsequent writers.
39Citing de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric, p. 29, and see also Kelly, 'Rhetoric as Seduction', pp. 313-23.
40de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric, pp. 31-32.
41Cf. Ios. 103, 106. J. Leopold, 'Philo's Knowledge of Rhetorical Theory', in D. Winston and J. Dillon (eds.), Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria: A Commentary of De Gigantibus and Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis, Brown Judaic Studies 25 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), p. 130, notes in passing that 'Philo's figures of the "Egyptian" sophists and Jethro are strongly reminiscent of Plato's attack on probability and sophistical rhetoric'.
42LCL's translation renders the term oἱ σοφισταί as 'wizards' without warrant.Magic and Rhetoric, pp. 32-37, citing Meno, 80b and Symposium, 215c, The Republic, 358d, et al., and concludes, 'Whereas the magic of the sophists aimed at producing illusion, Socrates' magic rests on the obstinate destruction of all illusions. It is the magic of implacable truth.…The new magic was the answer to the first', Magic and Rhetoric, pp. 36-37.
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heal the great plague of the soul, "deceit"', Congr. 18.44 Philo again leans on Plato in his campaign against sophistic deception: 'The genuine, or nobly born education is that of the dialectic',45 and the true paideia counteracts sophistic deceit.
Philo interprets Moses' plea that he lacks eloquence as a claim 'that he has no gift for oratory'. His opponents engaged in 'specious guesswork at what seems probable' (πιθανῶν εἰκαστικὴ ῥητορεία), which is an interesting phrase, for εἰκαστική refers to 'conjuring', Det. 38. The sophist was also a dissembler, 'the trickster' who put on a confident front for popular consumption.46
Magic, sophistry and illusion were treated by Plato as virtual synonyms,47 and Philo also refers to ἀπάτη, γοητεία, and σόφισμα together in Somn. II.40 as reprehensible sophistic practices.48 It often depends on vanity, the 'impostor', which spins 'that web woven of lies and cunningly devised to deceive the beholders…along with σόφισμα [it] beguiles every city and loses no time in capturing the souls of the young', Praem. 25.49
Both Plato and Philo also regarded sophistic rhetoric as a form of seduction, for 'while the seducer (the sophist) pretends to the greatest good (love), they perpetuate the greatest evil (deceit) on his victim', as W. G. Kelly notes of Plato's critique.50 'Deceit' (ἀπάτη) and 'sophistry' (σόφισμα) elsewhere work deception and illusion through the eyes of souls which are willingly seduced, Gig. 59. The serpent 'played the sophist with innocent ways' (ἐνσοφιστεύων ἀκακωτάτοις ἤθεσι) and 'deceived the woman with seductive plausibility' (πιθανότης), Agr. 96.51 Sophists engage in rhetorical arguments by which they seek to 'seduce us with their plausibility, while their enticements make us powerless to turn away'. Philo argues that even if all the plausible fallacies are refuted by true beliefs, one should still sail away from the land of falsehood and sophistry to the most secure anchorage, the haven of truth, Her. 304-5.
44See also Agr. 13.
45R. J. Mortley, 'Plato and the Sophistic Heritage of Protagoras', Eranos 67 (1969), 28, on the importance of dialectic in Plato. For a brief discussion of dialectic in Philo as the means ofopposing errors see Mendelson, Secular Education, pp. 10-12.
46Mortley, 'Plato and the Sophistic Heritage of Protagoras', 31.
47de Romilly, Magic and Rhetoric, p. 32.
48For a discussion in Dio and others see p. 57.
49The 'delusive arguments' of the sophists are referred to in Aet. 132.
50Kelly, 'Rhetoric as Seduction', p. 323 discusses this theme in Plato's Symposium and Phaedrus. Philo considers it possible for a sophist who wishes to pass from vanity to truth to become
a sage by instruction, διδασκαλία, Praem. 58.
51In Plato πιθανότης refers to an argument based on probabilities as against an argument based on demonstration, ἀπόδειξις, Ebr. 70-71: 'the sophist implants the specious, the probable and the persuasive for the destruction of our noblest possession, truth.'
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Philo calls the sophists 'impostors, flatterers, inventors of cunning plausibilities (oἱ πιθανῶν σοφισμάτων εὑρεταί), who know well how to cheat and mislead, but that only, and have no thought for honest truth', Her. 302. They are interested in 'the sophistries of deceitful word and thought', Her. 85; and by 'fallacies of any kind and verbal ambiguities', the sophists of Plato's day sought to achieve or appear to achieve 'victory in argument'. However, 'concern for truth is not a necessary part of the art — victory in argument can be secured without it, sometimes more easily so'. Philo, like Plato, also used ἐριστικός of the sophists who loved wrangling in debates,52 and he argued that it epitomised the sophists' way with their 'excessive open-mindedness' and 'love of arguing for arguing's sake', Det. 36, 45.
The role of the sophists in the political life of the city also drew criticism from Philo, for the deception of the sophistic tradition inevitably spilt over into that arena. 'All the sophists of Egypt' were said to have sprung up in the area of politeia from 'a meagre mixture' of truth and 'many large portions of false, probable, plausible, conjectural matter'. They became experts 'in decoying, charming, and bewitching' their hearers, Somn. I.220. Plato's view was that among the sophists, those who attempted to direct the polis through deliberative oratory were the greatest sorcerers and most practised in charlatanism. For him they were 'the sophists of the sophists…the greatest imitators and cheats…the so-called statesmen'.53 Furthermore, Philo and Dio Chrysostom were concerned, just as Plato had been, that the sophists had won the admiration of city after city and the honour of nearly the entire world. Philo objected to their 'hair-splitting' and their clever inventiveness, Agr. 143,54 and yet consoled himself with the thought that though the world misjudge the sophists, God would not, Ebr. 71.
Philo also denounced forensic orators for similar reasons: 'the kind of oratory practised by the hired advocate is concerned not to find out the rights of the case, but to influence the hearers by falsehood', Agr. 13. A similar con-
52The term can refer to the art which cultivates and provides appropriate means and devices for so doing. See G. B. Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1981), pp. 62-63 for discussion. Philo uses ἔρις to describe the wrangling among the sophists, Mut. 10 and Her. 246, and in Congr. 129 he refers to the quarrelsome sophist.
53The Statesman, 291c, 303c.
54δεινότης referred to the 'cleverness' or 'shrewdness' of an orator, in contrast to a person who spoke ἀλήθεια. It was regarded as one of the three high qualities needed to govern a country, Praem. 97, and referred to the requisite skill needed in attaining political power, Fug. 82. Somn. II.283 is a possible reference to Epicureans and Sceptics who were clever at words, LCL, vol. V, pp. 570-71, n.a and Hyp. 6.4 a reference to eloquence. On the honouring of sophists see the discussion of the Corinthian council and people in the honouring of Favorinus and Herodes Atticus on pp. 129-34, 134-40.
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cern, noted by Philodemus, was that the use of deception by forensic orators had cost them their credibility, that a jury often found 'even stammering' by a layman more persuasive than the fluid speech of the orator. The classical virtues of δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρεία and σωφροσύνη were preferred by juries to the forms of rhetorical speech;55 and the judges also needed to evaluate truth without σοφιστεία, Spec. III.53.56 Sihon the sophist illustrates the perils of playing the game. He indulged in sophistic riddles in forensic cases, loved to engage in probabilities and plausible arguments without concern for the truth, and relished trials, disputations, eristic contests and victory; yet he perished because he was the corrupter of the healthy rule of truth, LA III.233.57
The sophistic misuse of paideia for personal gain
Philo levelled three criticisms against the sophists who used paideia to makemoney. Firstly, he was critical because they 'sell their tenets and arguments like any bit of merchandise in the market', Mos. II.212. This statement summarises Plato's critique: 'Can it be…that the sophist is really a sort of merchant or dealer in provisions on which the soul is nourished …hawking them about to any old purchaser who desires them'.58 Neilus remarked that Didymus advertised himself by promising better care than any other of the city's sophists.59 Dio Chrysostom detested the way that sophists viewed their pupils as 'their catch', concerned only for 'gain and glory'.60 In The Cynic Epistles, 'Socrates' excoriates them because they 'have little regard for education, but concern themselves with making money'; in contrast he states that he does not fear for his 'own things' as the sophists do.61 The sophists' defence against this charge was that poets, artists and doctors charged fees, and merchants also charged for their goods.62
Secondly, Philo detested those 'teachers of the lower subjects' who arro-
55For a discussion see p. 224.
56Barraclough, 'Philo's Politics: Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism', ANRW II.21.1 (1983), 515 where he notes that the judge was 'to possess those virtues which made him alert to deceit'.
57He is clever at searching out verbal artifices and transgressing the boundaries of truth by the exercising of his sophistic techniques, LA III.232.
58Protagoras, 313c-d.
59P.Oxy. 2190, lines 21-22.
60Or. 32.10 and discussion on pp. 49-50.
61The Cynic Epistles, 'Of Socrates', 1.4 and 6.10. These are from either the first century A.D. or slightly earlier.
62Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, p. 25.
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gantly claimed credit for a pupil's attainments. Such claims allowed them to demand huge fees from those who attended their courses, a fault compounded by their refusal to enrol the poor regardless of their thirst for paideia, Congr. 127.63 In contrast, the Cynic 'Socrates' states, Ί give my philosophic instruction in public, and equally allow the one who has much and the one who does not to hear me'.64 Not only were excellent pupils of the sophists a reason for boasting but they also generated substantial income.
Thirdly and most seriously, he accused the sophists of actually stunting the growth of their pupils by withholding 'much that they ought to tell them, carefully reserving for themselves against another day the opportunity of making money', Post. 150. 'They zealously pursue wealth' and 'the luxurious life'.65 Given that the sophists were from the wealthy ruling class, and were benefactors of the cities where they settled and taught, their use of paideia for the purpose of obtaining more money by stringing out instruction rightly evoked disdain. Wealthy parents were, of course, willing to pay.66
G. B. Kerferd has argued that the real objection to sophists charging fees for paideia was that they sold their 'wisdom to all comers without discrimination — by charging fees they have deprived themselves of the right to pick and choose among their pupils'.67 Philo was not alone in objecting to sophistic greed; Plato voiced similar criticisms, and they even lay behind Domitian's rescript.68 Certainly by the first century, if not already in Plato's time, the fees charged to pupils put paideia beyond the reach of all but the wealthy, so it was not available to all comers.69 Alongside Dio Chrysostom's objections that the sophists did not care for the welfare of the city but only for glory and greed,70 the Cynics had another reason for their objections: they sought to highlight and commend their particular philosophy by teaching for free. 'And it is not surprising that other people consider one who is thus inclined (to take no money for teaching) to be insane. Yet one must consider not only this feature but also the rest of our way of life, and if we appear different from others in regard to bodily practices, one must not be surprised if we also stand apart in
63G. W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 21 and Philostratus, Lives of the Sophists, 519, 527, 591, 600.
64The Cynic Epistles, 1.2.
65The Cynic Epistles, 6.1-2.
66For the comments of Neilus, see pp. 28-29.
67Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, pp. 25-26.
68For Domitian's concerns, see pp. 23-24.
69Mendelson, Secular Education, pp. 26-27. On the size of the fees in Plato's day see Kerferd, The Sophistic Movement, pp. 26-28.
70On the comments in Or. 32 see pp. 54-55.
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our attitude to material gain'.71 Thus, given the important role of paideia in establishing virtue, the Platonic charge of merchandising was still repugnant to some in Philo's day.
Some Jews pursued paideia not for virtue but 'with no higher motive than parading their superiority, or from desire of office under our rulers', LA III.167.72 That such civic ministrations were open to Jews possessing Greek paideia even before the letter of Claudius to the Alexandrians is no longer contested.73 Philo clearly attests that wealth and rank together with status were gained by sophists, Det. 33-34.74
Philo fears that those who have received paideia in a crooked and distorted form have transformed the stamp of wisdom's beauty into the ugliness of σοφιστεία, Prob. 4.75 Clearly one such distorted form is the sophistic tradition; the sophists mimicked and debased the authentic coin, and like Balaam, mocked wisdom with soothsayer's sophistry (σοφιστεία μαντική), Mut. 203, 208.76 As we have seen, Philo's was no lone voice crying out against the so-
71The Cynic Epistles, 6.2.
72This definitely included Jews, for Philo refers to Our race' in LA III.166. See P. Borgen, Bread from Heaven: An Exegetical Study of the Concept of Manna in the Gospel of John and the Writings of Philo (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), p. 125, and Mendelson, Secular Education, p. 29.
73For evidence of Jews among the list of ephebi see V. A. Tcherikover and A. Fuks (eds.), Corpus Papyrorum Judaicarum (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), vol. I, p. 39, n. 99; pp. 41, 75-76. On the letter of Claudius relating to Jewish participation see P.Lond. 1912, lines 52-54, 92-93. For the view that Jews were excluded see Wolfson, Philo, vol. I, p. 79; and that some did participate see L. H. Feldman, 'The Orthodoxy of the Jews in Hellenistic Egypt', JSS 22 (1960), 223; V. A. Tcherikover, Hellenistic Civilization and the Jews (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society of America, 1961), p. 350; P. Borgen, Bread from Heaven, pp. 124-26; M. Hengel, Jews, Greeks and Barbarians: Aspects of the Hellenization of Judaism in the Pre-Christian Period, English translation (London: SCM Press, 1988), p. 101; and Mendelson, Secular Education, pp. 28-33. Jews were involved in trade guilds in Alexandria during the Roman period; see M. Wischnitzer, 'Notes to a History of the Jewish Guilds', HUCA 23.2 (1952), 252-53. For the positive response of some Jews to Hellenism, in contrast to the early Roman reaction recorded by Suetonius, On Rhetoricians, 1, see J. Goldstein, 'Jewish Acceptance and Rejection of Hellenism',
in E. P. Sanders (ed.), Jewish and Christian Self-Definition: Aspects of Judaism in the Graeco-Roman Period (London: SCM Press, 1981), vol. II, p. 70. For evidence of a Jew who was a Greek not only in his language but also in his soul' see M. Hengel, Judaism and Hellenism: Studies in Their Encounter during the Early Hellenistic Period, English translation (London: SCM Press, 1974), vol. I, p. 59.
74On their status see also pp. 34-38.
75This statement follows a comment relating to those who have not experienced education, Mendelson, Secular Education, pp. 1-2. Those not exposed to education he elsewhere calls Barbaroi, Spec. III. 163, and identifies them with those who have been miseducated by the sophists, who claimed to make a person wise.
76Cf. Plato, The Sophist, 267b, 'an ignorant mimic of knowledge'.
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phistic tradition in the first century, nor was he the only critic to pattern his responses after Plato's. The Cynic Epistles yield a similar if much briefer contemporary discussion. They too attack the sophists who have lost the true fame that derives from virtue and 'have sold themselves for the sake of profit'.77
