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PHILO AND PAUL AMONG THE SOPHISTS

Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses
to a Julio-Claudian Movement






CHAPTER 5



Philo among the Sophists



 

 

Philo's own experiences among the sophists are important for two reasons. Firstly, his rhetorical ability is made abundantly clear by his presentation of a case for the Alexandrian Jews before the emperor, Gaius, together with his debate with his famous apostate nephew, Tiberius Julius Alexander, the future Prefect of Egypt. Secondly, he subsequently would provide the 'lovers of virtue' with his guidelines for debating: rules which grew out of these two experiences.



Philo as orator and debater

Orator


Philo participated in the Jewish embassy from Alexandria to the emperor, Gaius in the aftermath of the carnage of the anti-Semitic stasis by Alexandrian Greeks.1 That a person with his training in paideia was selected conformed to custom, for it was normally able orators such as sophists who undertook such important embassies to provincial governors, prefects, or indeed to the emperor himself to seek redress or concessions on behalf of a city.2 It is evident



1For a discussion see Ε. Μ. Smallwood, Philonis Alexandrini: Legatio ad Gaium (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961), pp. 19-27.

2On the use of the term 'orator' for an envoy see C. Phillipson, The International Law and Custom of Ancient Greece and Rome (London: Macmillan, 1911), vol. I, p. 305. On the role of sophists in embassies see R. W. Smith, The Art of Rhetoric in Alexandria: Its Theory and Practice in the Ancient World (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. 50-59; G. W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 44-58; and E. L. Bowie, 'The Importance of the Sophists', Yale Classical Studies 27 (1982), 53,55-57, with a list of some embassies.



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that he was conscious of fulfilling this role from his reference to his own qualifications — namely training which distinguished him from the remainder of the Jewish delegation.3 This appears in Philo's response to the brief word from the emperor to the Alexandrian Jewish delegation: 'But as I believe myself in virtue of my age and my good education, what gave joy to others rather alarmed me', Legat. 182. The Greek delegation contained Isidorus, one of the three leaders of the anti-Semitic party in Alexandria and later holder of the important post of gymnasiarch; Apion the anti-Semitic writer; and possibly Lampon.4 The Greeks were well represented by these men who, needless to say, possessed the rhetorical training needed to present their case.

The considerable rhetorical ability of Philo was put to good use in his extant captatio benevolentiae, recorded in De legatione ad Gaium.5 He incorporates into his discussion this customary section of the exordium, which was an important element in an official petition, #8-22a.6 This captatio benevolentiae would have been perspicuous to a first-century educated reader as would other aspects of the speech.7

He follows form by referring to a universal feeling of providential inspired by the accession of the emperor:

by Greek and Barbarian, the civil with the military with the accession of Gaius over a dominion not confined to the really vital parts which make up



3We do not know who comprised the Jewish delegation. The numbers tended to be five: Phillipson, International Law and Custom, vol. II, p. 322, and Smallwood, Philonis Alexandrini, p. 24.

4Flacc. 20 and discussion LCL, vol. IX, p. 532.

5For other examples of captatio benevolentiae and their significant function see my 'The Importance of the Captatio Benevolentiae in the Speeches of Tertullus and Paul in Acts 24:1-21', JTS n.s. 42 (1991), 505-31, and P.Coll.Youtie 66 A and C published, New Docs. 1976, no. 26.

6He refers elsewhere to a document presented to Gaius which summarised their 'sufferings'and their 'claims'. It was the petition sent through King Agrippa, #178-79.

7On the question of the structure of the Legatio ad Gaium see LCL, vol. XX, pp. xxiv-v. Smith, The Art of Rhetoric in Alexandria, pp. 54-56, suggests that Philo was indebted to Isocrates' division of a judicial speech within the proemium, narration, proof and epilogue, 'though the speaker was probably not aware of it'. It would seem that Philo has used a petition with the exordium, perhaps expanding it. The captatio benevolentiae is interspersed with relevant comment, and the narrative would have shown readers that the Jewish delegation clearly observed the proper form in presenting an imperial petition, and rightly addressed the emperor as 'Emperor Augustus' and 'Lord Gaius', #352, 356. On the structure of #53-56 see M. Alexandre, 'The Art of Periodic Composition in Philo of Alexandria', in D. T. Runia, D. M. Hay and D. Winston (eds.), Heirs of the Septuagint: Philo, Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity, Festschrift for Earle Hilgert, The Studia Philonica Annual 3 (1991), 149.

8M. P. Charlesworth, 'Providentia and Aeternitas', HTR 29 (1936), 107-32.



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most of the inhabited world … and all the more brutish nations… but a dominion extending, as I said above from the rising to the setting of the sun both within the ocean and beyond i t … a joy to the Roman people and all… (#8-11)

This portion continues by noting that the recovery of the emperor from illness was accompanied by an empire-wide feeling of great relief, #15, and

every continent, every island, returned once more to its former happiness, for they felt that they personally shared in his preservation … to take their place under a guardian, a shepherd of the civilised flock … ὁ σωτὴρ καὶ εὐεργέτης, who would pour new blessings on Asia and Europe, giving happiness indestructible to each singly and all in common. (#18-22)

Philo repeats this sentiment in a refutation of the charge of Jewish impiety towards Gaius alleged by the Greeks. He indicates that a sacrifice had been offered up in Jerusalem 'when you escaped the severe sickness which all the habitable world suffered with you', #356. The captatio benevolentiae also remarked upon the competence of the judge to hear a particular case, for it referred to qualities exhibited by the recipient of the petition which had a direct bearing on the matter under adjudication.9 Here Philo pays homage to that great ideal, the continuation of the Pax Romana, made sure by Roman law and order. The peace had already been established early in the Principate of Gaius:

In these days [that is, the opening months of his Principate] the rich had no precedence over the poor, nor the distinguished over the obscure, the creditors were not above the debtors, nor masters above slaves, the times giving equality before the law … [there was] the freedom from grief and fear, the joy which pervaded households and people, night and day. (#13)

Philo states all this within the conventions of the captatio benevolentiae in order to contrast the Roman pursuit of justice with the Alexandrian injustices manifested in the attack on Jewish synagogues. His words tactfully imply an erosion of order, and are first supplemented with statements concerning the loss of civic rights in the narratio, and then supported by evidence and argument in the confirmatio.10

The presence of the narratio or the refutatio11 and confirmatio can be



9Winter, 'The Importance of the Captatio Benevolentiae, 507-15.

10Legat. 191, περὶ προσευχῶν, which raised the issue of religious liberty for Jews; Smallwood, Philonis Alexandrini, p. 25.

11The opponents also appear to have introduced earlier charges of impiety by the Jews



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seen from the account.12 Though the emperor said, 'We want to hear what claims you make about your citizenship', he soon cut short their preliminary 'arguments' in the confirmatio.13 He did this after getting 'a taste of our pleadings and recognised that it was by no means contemptible', but before the Jews could produce their 'stronger' arguments, #363-64. Because he rushed into another room to instruct his workmen they could not introduce the points which came next 'in the thread of the argument' (τὰ ἀκόλουθα), #365. 'So with the statement of our case thus mangled and disjointed … we gave up …' After a short statement by Gaius about the 'unfortunate, rather than wicked' Jews, he dismissed the case, #366-67.14

De legatione ad Gaium never concedes that the Jews argued an inferior case. On the contrary, only the Greek delegation's appeal to Gaius' anti-Semitism, which perhaps inevitably drew a response from an emperor determined to erect a statue in the temple in Jerusalem, resulted in the case's dismissal.

Although our evidence for the body of the forensic presentation of the Jewish case is fragmentary — the petition to the emperor is no longer extant  — the preserved captatio benevolentiae stands as a monument to Philo's rhetorical skills.15 He argued his case so effectively that at least at one point he caught the elusive attention of Gaius, 'who recognised it was by no means contemptible', # 363.



Debater


We possess portions of Philo's debate with his nephew, namely De Providentia I and II and De animalibus.16 They record the interactions of two


against the emperor during the proceedings. The Jews roundly denied making these accusations and produced confirmatory evidence, although it did not satisfy the emperor, #335-36.

12The emperor conducted the case while issuing instructions to workmen concerning his redecoration programme and moving from room to room as he did so, which greatly dislocated the proceedings and did not help the Jews.

13δικαιολογία, a reference to 'a plea in justification' in court which alludes to part of the confirmatio, Aristotle, Rhetorka ad Alexandrum, 1438a.25.

14See Legal 356, 358, esp. 363, 365-67.

15Smallwood, Philonis Alexandrini, p. 24. In addition there is his skilled use of forms elsewhere in his corpus. See D. T. Runia, 'Philo's De Aeternitate Mundi: The Problem of Its Interpretation', Vigiliae Christianae 35 (1981), 101-51; and on his composition skills generally, Alexandre, 'The Art of Periodic Composition in Philo of Alexandria'.

16For the translation of these Armenian texts of Philo's debates see M. Hadas-Lebel, De Providentia I et II: Les oeuvres de Philon d'Alexandrie, 35 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1973). LCL, vol. IX, has only a Greek fragment of Eusebius for I and a fuller text of II; and De animalibus, in



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Jews who were well trained in Greek rhetoric. In De Providentia I the topic and the syllogistic methods are laid out, #1-5, three issues are discussed (namely the creation of the world, its governance and destruction, #6-36; the problem of natural catastrophes, divine protection and retribution, #37-76; and the foolishness of the fatalism of astrology, #77-88); and a summary of the arguments concludes the dialogue, #89-92. The debate resumes the following day to explore further the issue of #6-76. The problems of retribution, #3-44, the creation of the cosmos, #45-58, its governance, #59-84, and natural phenomena, #85-112, are also probed. From the epilogue one sees that Philo believed himself to have answered the difficulties raised by his nephew. He invited further questions, but the offer was declined.17

Much of De animalibus presents Alexander's written discourse defending the rationality of animals as well as men, #10-71, and Philo's refutation of it, #77-100. It also contains the comments of an interlocutor, Lysimachus, in #1-9, 72-76.18 The debate was sophisticated, with Philo calling upon Platonism and Stoicism,19 and reflects the ethos which drove him to argue elsewhere that the ἰδιωτής had no business being 'on the plain', Det. 1.

It has been suggested recently that the dialogues of Philo represent a later apologetic interest, rather than the exegetical approach which characterises the remainder of the corpus.20 This opinion attempts to correct the earlier view that these dialogues, together with De aeternitate mundi and Quod omnis probus liber sit, belong to his 'youthful' period,21 but it merely begs the important question of the relationship between his exegesis and his Greek philosophy. A better suggestion comes from D. T. Runia who, after a careful analysis of the genre of a θέσις in relationship to De aeternitate mundi, demonstrates Philo's sophisticated adaptation of it for his own purposes. He suggests that the philosophical treatises were serious works written for Alexandrian intellectuals, proselytes or fellow Jews such as Philo's nephew.22

The philosophical treatises, the dialogues and his rhetorical ability as


A. Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus: The Armenian Text with an Introduction, Translation, and Commentary, Studies in Hellenistic Judaism 1 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981).

17A. Terian, 'A Critical Introduction to Philo's Dialogues', ANRW II.21.1 (1984), especially 276-67, for a synopsis.

18Terian, Philonis Alexandrini De Animalibus, pp. 62-63.

19Terian, Ά Critical Introduction to Philo's Dialogues', 277-81, and the relationship between De Animalibus and Plato, Phaedrus, 285-89.

20Ibid., 294.

21Ibid., 275-76 and authors cited n. 12.

22Runia, 'Philo's De aeternitate mundi, 139-40.



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demonstrated in De legatione ad Gaium, clearly reveal Philo's educational and intellectual milieu. Quod detenus potiori insidiari soleat shows that those whom he considered competent to argue with the sophists, among whom he himself operated with apparent ease and effectiveness, were 'ready and equipped…with the means of withstanding their enemies' with λόγους ταῖς περὶ αὐτοὺς τέχναις, Det. 35-36.



Debating with and defeating the sophists

In Quod detenus potiori insidiari soleat, Philo deals more fully than anywhere else in his corpus with the subject of debating (συζήτησις) with the sophists.23 He distinguishes 'shadow' debates from genuine ones. Choosing Cain and Abel, because of their conflict, to epitomise the sophist and the layman24 he warns his fellow Jews, 'the friends of Moses',25 who were 'laymen' in rhetoric, not to accept a challenge from the sophists to a debate. He then discusses who should in fact engage the sophists, which affords him yet another opportunity to reinforce the importance of virtue for those who love God, be they laymen or orators.



Debating and not declaiming


Philo asserts from the beginning of this work that Cain's invitation to Abel to come 'to the plain' was an invitation to a disputation, not simply to a declamation given by the sophists, Det. 1. Philo later differentiates between these distinct events by comparing a disputation with the activity of a boxer engaged in actual combat, and a 'declamation' (ἐπίδειξις) with another who is engaged in shadow boxing.26 The images are apposite because σκιαμάχειν means 'to fight in the shade' and is applied figuratively to activity 'in the



23In only one other instance does he use this term for debating, LA III.131.

24They also represent a central theme in Philo's thought, namely the stark contrast between the φιλόθεος and the φίλαυτος. For a discussion of the antithetical character of these terms and the contention that it is the central theme of Philo's thought see W. Warnach, 'Selbliebe und Gottesliebe im Denken Philons von Alexandrien', in H. Feld and J. Nolte (eds.), Wort Gottes in der Zeit: Festschrifl Hermann Schelke (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1973), pp. 198-214.

25οἱ γνώριμοι refers to 'friends' rather than 'pupils' as LCL translates the term.

26LCI. translates ἐπιδείκνυσθαι δόξουσι δύναμιν as 'they will be seen to be exhibiting the prowess of men sparring for practice', ἐπίδειξις refers to declaiming and δύναμις to rhetorical power or ability.



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school', #41.27 Declamations were not only carried out in public, but, as we have already seen, were also important school exercises.28

The real abilities of the contestants, however, are needed not for declaiming, but for debating. Thus Philo considered debate no showpiece but a 'contest and desperate battle', #1,29 the danger of which he stresses by treating 'the plain' as the location of this debate in the opening section of Det. 1-31.



Qualifications for debating


If debating is such a serious activity, who should accept the challenge to a disputation? In Philo's judgement, Abel should certainly never have done so, for he had 'never learnt the art of rhetoric' (τεχναί λόγων), #37. Philo reaffirms this in Migr. 75 where Abel is said to be untrained (περὶ λόγους) and thus is defeated by Cain. In spite of his many natural endowments, fault is found with Abel because he actually accepted the challenge instead of remaining silent. He ought to have ignored his quarrelsome brother, for Philo adds that 'the village sages usually get the worst of it when they encounter those who acquire the cleverness of the town'.30 Elsewhere he discusses those who should not engage 'in the war waged by the sophist', designating them ἰδιῶται, Agr. 159-65. They include not only those who have never been instructed in rhetoric, but even 'those who are beginning to learn, those making progress and "those who have reached perfection". Experience had shown they were defeated for different reasons: the beginner [was overthrown] because of his lack of experience, the man who was progressing because he was incomplete, the man who had reached completeness because he was unpractised in virtue', Agr. 160.31 Philo later in Agr. 143 distinguishes these three groups from sophists, and both from men in gen-



27See Plutarch, Moralia, 514d.

28 See pp. 21-22.

29LA III.131. Philo uses the term συζήτησις to denote a debate among those who love to contend and in which anger arises from the wrangling.

30See A. Mendelson, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982), p. 7.

31It has been suggested that Philo may be reproducing Seneca's threefold classification of learners, D. Winston and ]. Dillon, (eds.), Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria: A Commentary of De Gigantibus and Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis, Brown Judaic Studies 25 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), p. 260. In Seneca's Epistles, 75.9-15, the three categories relate to passion and vice and the extent to which men escape them. The third group is beyond their reach. Philo may have been influenced by this particular division among philosophers whose teaching Seneca is citing, while adapting it to his own purpose.



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eral.32 The 'unlearned' thus include not only students of rhetoric, but also those who have graduated from such schools. The graduates often fail, however, because they lack training in virtue.

Philo suggests that no shame derives from declining to debate with the sophists; indeed, friends will consider 'shrinking back' from the challenge of 'the enemy' prudent, not cowardly, Det. 37. Moses did precisely this because he was not 'eloquent', which Philo argues is the equivalent to saying he had no gift, literally, 'he did not have the defences against the rhetoric of eloquence and plausible arguments based on specious guess-work', #38. He thus imputes to Moses the notion that to engage in conflicts with the sophists before undergoing a thorough training in all ἰδέαι would have been wrong, #39.33 It is important for the unprepared not to join the fray with the sophists, but to keep quiet and so win the prize which involves no risks. Such is the task of the man who has been equipped with all virtues, #42.

Philo praises those who pursue virtue, calling them 'experts' not in rhetoric,34 but in praiseworthy deeds. They alone make the soul the treasure house of the good without even a thought for the 'juggling tricks of rhetoric', #35a.35

Another group, however, also seeks virtue; thus they too may enter into disputations with the sophists. Their strength is twofold: they fortify themselves by 'wisdom in counsel' and good works, and their speech with the art of rhetoric, #35b. All who possess good works and words are thus equipped to successfully counter the wranglings of the sophists, #36. They can then expose the sophists as mere 'shadow boxers' and not real combatants. While shadow boxers may win the admiration of fellow boxers, they 'are thought very little of when they engage in a real match', #42.



The sophists' debating


Philo then cites in toto an argument the sophists present to defend their lifestyle.36 They contend that because 'the body is the soul's house', the physical



32LCL translates ἰδιώτης pejoratively in Agr. 146 as 'a nobody' and Agr. 160 as 'a mere professional'. However, in the latter citation Philo refers to them as 'friends' and contrasts them with 'trained and seasoned fighters'.

33A technical word in rhetoric referring to various qualities of ἑρμηνεία ('style').

34ἀσκητής is the antonym for ἰδιώτης.

35See pp. 88-91.

36LCL rightly places Det. 33-45 in quotation marks. #33 consists of a series of questions, as Philo notes: 'They leave no stone unturned, as the saying is, while they ply their questions.' The six questions are sequential in thought and connected with particles. Then follows support-



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senses that surround the soul are indeed its 'allies and friends'. The senses thus have value equal to that of the soul. Since nature intended that 'pleasures and enjoyment and the delights that meet us all the way through life' should appeal to our senses, they must be legitimate. It follows then that 'the πλοῦτος, δόξα, τιμή, ἀρχή and "everything else of that sort" exist not only for our security, but also for our happiness', #33. Thus in the sophists' hands ἀρετή had effectively degenerated into 'a kind of amoral "art of success"'.37

The sophists' argument is extremely interesting, for it shows how the imagery associated with Plato's trilocation of the soul was developed and interpreted in the first century A.D. not only by the sophists but by others as well.38 It allowed them to insist that their status, privileges and pleasures were the quite legitimate result of treating the senses as 'friends and allies'. They further added that nature did not create enjoyable sense experiences for the dead and the unborn, but for the living. Hence the enjoyment of their lifestyle was not wrong; indeed, their 'success' proved that they were right while their opponents  — the so-called seekers after virtue — were wrong.

'The mode of life of these two is a witness of the truth of what I say (μάρτυς ὁ βίος τούτων)', #33.39

Sophists' μάρτυς

  Opponents' μάρτυς

ἔνδοξοι   ἄδοξοι
πλούσιοι   εὐκαταφρόνητοι
ἡγεμόνες   ταπεινοί
ἐπαινούμενοι   τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεεῖς
τιμώμενοι   ὑπηκόων καὶ δούλων ἀτιμότεροι
ὑγιεινοί   ῥυπῶντες
πιόνες   ὠχροί
ἐρρωμένοι   κατεσκελευμένοι
ἁβροδίαιτοι   λιμόν ὑπ' ἀσιτίας ἐμβλέποντες
θρυπτόμενοι            νοσωρώτατοι
πόνον οὐκ εἰδότες    
ἡδοναῖς συζῶντες   μελετῶντες ἀποθνῄσκειν(#34)


ing evidence, #34a, in which the lifestyle and status of the sophists are contrasted with those of their opponents, #34b.

37C. J. Rowe, Plato (Brighton: Harvester, 1984), p. 158.

38These sophists argued, 'Are not eyes and ears and the band of other senses guards and courtiers of the soul?' D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), pp. 306-8, shows that this was an accepted canon of interpretation.

39Cf. Epictetus, III.22, 86-89, ἰδοὺ καὶ τούτου μάρτυς εἰμὶ ἐγὼ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τὸ ἐμόν.



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The sophists expounded thus on the witness of their wealth, glory, honour and authority, proclaiming themselves to be 'men of mark and wealth, holding leading positions, praised on all hands, recipients of honours, portly, healthy and robust, revelling in luxurious and riotous living, knowing nothing of labour, conversant with pleasures which carry the sweets of life to the all-welcoming soul by every channel of sense' (#34b).40 With a series of antonyms they argued that their opponents were 'almost without exception obscure people, looked down upon, of mean estate, destitute of the necessities of life, not enjoying the privileges of subject peoples or even of slaves, filthy, sallow, reduced to skeletons, with a hungry look from want of food, the prey of disease, in training for dying' (#34a).41

It is unclear whether the detractors are referring to the Jews in general or specifically to the Therapeutai community.42 If the former, then the 'almost without exception' acknowledges only a few notables, and may refer to Philo's family, who enjoyed wealth and influence in Alexandria.43 Certainly, when taken as a whole, the derogatory comments of the sophists describe a group without status.

If, alternatively, these words refer to the Therapeutai, then the transfer of property to their children upon joining the community and the general renunciation of material possessions could explain the language. Philo does speak of 'their longing for the deathless and blessed life', Contempl. 13. The fact that he discusses the activities of this community by means of a synkrisis with orators and sophists need not imply that his readers only knew of the activities of those he opposed. In fact, Philo may be engaged in a counter synkrisis in De vita contemplativa in response to the sophists' pillorying of the Therapeutai as the seekers of virtue as described in Det. 32-34. Self-control was the foundation of life for those whom Philo endorsed, and upon it they



40Cf. Aristides, Or. 33.19, where the benefits of engaging in oratory are outlined, namely 'wealth, reputation, honour, marriage, or any acquisition'.

41This last reference to 'training for dying' has been seen as an equivalent statement for ἐπιτηδεύει ἀποθνῄσκειν used of the philosopher in Plato, Phaedo 64a. See LCL, vol. II, pp. 493-94 and Simmias' response that 'this is exactly what my unphilosophical countrymen would say ot the philosophers'.

42Contempl. 14-17 where the Therapeutai gave away their possessions.

43On the question of the wealth and status of his wider family see I. Schwartz, 'Note sur la famille de Philon d'Alexandrie', Annuaire de l’Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 13 (1953), 591-602, and 'L'Egypte de Philon', in R. Arnaldez, C. Mondésert and J. Pouilloux (eds.), Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1967), pp. 35-45. But note also the reservations of S. Foster, 'A Note on the "Note" of I. Schwartz', SP 4 (1976-77), 25-32.



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'built other virtues', pressing on 'to reach the summit of virtue' which 'procured for them God's friendship', Contempl. 34, 72, 90.



Defeating the sophists


Philo maintained that those with a thorough training in 'the styles of rhetoric' (περὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων ἰδέας) will conquer the sophists, Det. 41. He as much as repeats this when he insists that one wins 'sophistic debates' (ἀγὼν σοφιστικός) by carefully attending to λόγοι, not only for the purpose of eluding an opponent's grip, but for taking the offensive and proving one's own superiority in artistry and power, Migr. 82.

While Moses initially excused himself from 'the well-worded and specious arguments' of the sophists, he did become acquainted with them 'with a view to getting the better of the sophists of Egypt', Migr. 76. He could never have defeated them if he had not been armed with λόγος; and it is by Aaron his mouthpiece, and by Aaron's rod, that 'all the arguments of the sophists are devoured and done away with by the "finger of God"'. This narrative functions as a divine rescript which declares that 'sophistry is ever defeated by wisdom'. So the sorcerers can no longer withstand Moses, 'but fall as in a wrestling-bout vanquished by the sturdy strength of the opponent', Migr. 85. Like Moses, Philo affirms, 'we shall no more sink to the ground through inexperience of the tricks of rhetoric, but we shall spring up and carry on the struggle and disentangle ourselves with ease from the grips which their art has taught them' (Det. 41). So the better can overcome the worse and not, as the title quod detenus potiori insidiari soleat implies, the reverse.

The 'ancient band' of Moses' disciples pursued 'a hard-fought contest', eschewing the paths of 'the present day sophists who have practised arts of speech against the truth', for a royal road, 'true and genuine philosophy' paved with ῥῆμα καὶ λόγος θεοῦ. They despised 'the soft enchantments of pleasure' and 'engaged with a fine severity in the study of what is good and fair', Post 101-2. Philo knew that the sophists of Egypt could only be overcome by those who had adequately prepared for such combat; hence in his own day, only those versed in rhetoric should ever do battle with the sophists.

His advice, then, as outlined in this chapter surely reflects his own methods of engaging the sophists. The manner in which he joined the fray, be it against the Alexandrian Greek delegation in Rome or in his philosophical works and his debates with his nephew, demonstrates both his careful approach to debating and his opinion on who is qualified for such an undertaking.



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General conclusions

In concluding this survey of Philo and the sophists it may prove helpful to consider the work of another Hellenised Jew, Caecilius of Calacte.44 A contemporary of Philo, he was a rhetorician during the reign of Augustus. His writings include How the Attic Style Differs from the Asian; A Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero; Essay on Lysias; On the Character of the Ten Orators; and a history of the Servile Wars in Sicily. This list of known works provides clues to his interests. The first essay attempts to overthrow the Asianic style in favour of the pure Attic to which he ardently adhered. The second work drew sharp criticism from Plutarch, who likened him to 'a dolphin on dry land [who] … never knew when to stop' in his criticism of the Latin style. His essay on Lysias sought to demonstrate that orator's superiority over Plato. His magnum opus described the ten Attic orators, and while we cannot be certain, he may well have been responsible for establishing the members of that canon.45

According to W. Rhys Roberts, Caecilius was one of 'the two leading critics in the literary world of Greece and Rome'.46 Many rhetoricians from the Greek tradition flocked to Rome at the invitation of Augustus and attached themselves to the great Roman houses, as Caecilius did.47 He, however, left a greater mark than most on the literary circles of Rome, being cited by Quintilian and Plutarch. Longinus' work on literary criticism, On the Sublime, clearly owes a debt to Caecilius.

The Suda records that 'in faith he was a Jew' (τὴν δόξαν Ἰουδαῖος), not an apostate like Philo's nephew. He stands then on the same ground as Philo, both in his training in rhetoric and in his faith. Yet there is no hint that he ever sought to integrate his training as a rhetorician and literary critic with his Judaism.

Philo, by contrast, went to Rome only briefly, and not to establish any reputation for himself. In terms of his literary output we have his extended



44E. Schürer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ, 2nd edn. (Edinburgh: Τ & Τ Clark, 1986), vol. III. 1, pp. 701-3; and G. A. Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), pp. 364-69 for a discussion of his works.

45W. Rhys Roberts, 'Caecilius of Calacte: A Contribution to the History of Greek Literary Criticism', AJP 18 (1897), 302-12. Although we know little about his historical work, his interest in that subject may have been sparked by his own servile origins and the fact that his home town, Calacte, had been founded by the rebel leader Ducetius.

46W. Rhys Roberts, 'The Literary Circle of Dionysius of Halicarnassus', CR 14 (1900), 44.

47See Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric, p. 337, for a description.



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exegetical work on the Pentateuch, his important philosophical treatises and his apologetic works. These were born of a desire to gather together such philosophical insights as he judged to be closest to the thought world of Moses so that he could, having 'discovered' the philosophy embedded in the Pentateuch, offer a sophisticated reading to a new generation.48 The contrast with Caecilius could not be sharper.

Moses was for Philo 'the wise man' (πάνσοφος), exceeding in age and wisdom even the Seven Wise Men of the Greeks who flourished as the pillars of civilisation in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.49 While Caecilius thought in terms of a canon of orators, Philo placed Moses at the head of a canon of wise men. As R. Mortley notes, 'the idea of antiquity implies superiority, once a culture has been demonstrated to be the most ancient, it has also been demonstrated to be the source of all others'.50 Clement of Alexandria,echoing Numenius the Pythagorean philosopher, asks: "What else is Plato, but Moses speaking Attic Greek (Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων)?'51 The same notion vivifies Philo's overall enterprise.

Philo's war against contemporary sophistic activity was an outworking of this perspective. He believed that conflicts in which noted OT characters engaged provided the paradigm for his evaluation of the sophists, with Plato's critique of them and their 'magic' presenting the key which enabled him to identify the magicians of Egypt with the sophists of Alexandria. Philo thus did not unthinkingly 'borrow' the ideas simply because he found them helpful.

Our chapters on Philo derive from his writings a description of the sophistic tradition which shows little variation in their activities from Philodemus' era to Philo's day and that reflected in Philostratus' Lives. Philostratus does not distinguish between the activities of first-century sophists during the Principate of Nero onward and those of great second-century



48Runia, Plato and the Timaeus, pp. 446-47. This methodological tool helped Philo to make 'a pivotal point in the history of thought'.

49Philo, Det. 126; Post. 28, 169; Gig. 24, 56; Agr. 20,43; Plant. 27, et al. For a similar argument see Eupolemus in V. B. C. Wacholder, Eupolentus: A Study of Judaeo-Greek Literature (New York: Hebrew Union College, 1974), pp. 76-77. P. Borgen, 'Prodamatio Graeca — Hermeneutical Key', Philo of Alexandria: An Exegete for His Time (Leiden: E. ]. Brill, 1997), on the importance of Moses for Philo, ch. 8.

50R. J. Mortley, 'The Past in Clement of Alexandria: A Study of an Attempt to Define Christianity in Socio-Cultural Terms', in E. P. Sanders (ed.), The Shaping of Christianity in the Second and Third Centuries: Jewish and Christian Self-Definition (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980), vol. I, p. 193.

51Clement of Alexandria, Str., I.150, cited in Mortley, 'The Past in Clement of Alexandria', p. 146.



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representatives such as Herodes Atticus. The evidence from Philo's corpus surely challenges the view of Philostratus that the Second Sophistic began in earnest in Nero's Principate. The same characteristics and trends which characterised the Second Sophistic are in fact to be found a century before Philo, if the evidence of Philodemus is accepted, and we have no reason to doubt its veracity when he discusses the sophists of his own day.

Philo has proved to be an important but largely neglected commentator on the social world of the first half of the first century,52 and a significant witness to, and critic of, the sophistic tradition in the East. In the second half of this book we will turn to Paul's interaction with, and assessment of, the sophistic tradition as he experienced it, before comparing and contrasting the ways in which both men confronted this exceedingly powerful movement in their day.



 

 

52For the most recent treatment see D. I. Sly, Philo's Alexandria (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), although there are substantial gaps in her treatment of Philo's evidence, including the sophists.



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