CHAPTER 6
Epictetus and the Corinthian
Student of the Sophists
Epictetus and the sophists
Epictetus (A.D. 55-ca. 135) in his discussion, 'On personal adornment' (Περὶ καλλωπισμοῦ), ΙΙΙ.1, deals with issues relating to the personal appearance or public 'presence' and career expectations of a young student of rhetoric, a citizen of Corinth who visited the noted Stoic philosopher in Nicopolis. This discourse is relevant to our study in that it includes a lengthy discussion of sophistic and declamatory activities.1 The very dedication of his discourses by his pupil, Flavius Arrianus, to the well-known aristocrat of Corinth, L. Gellius Menander, would suggest that, at the very least, the reputation of Epictetus had reached that city.2 His knowledge of liturgies indicates the familiarity of one who had done more than simply visit the city. These speeches, reconstructed from shorthand notes made ca. A.D. 108 by his pupil, aim accurately to portray Epictetus.3 F. Millar, in assessing the reliability of his witness, acknowledges 'the considerable quantity of factual range of topics, from the workings of the
1His value as a commentator on rhetoric and declamation has not been noted in recent works, e.g., G. A. Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), and D. A. Russell, Greek Declamation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) nor are his comments on Corinth included by J. Murphy-O'Connor in his documents on Corinth, Si Paul's Corinth: Texts and Archaeology (Wilmington: Glazier, 1983).
2See G. W. Bowersock, 'A New Inscription of Arrian', GRBS 8 (1967), 279-80.
3F. Millar, 'Epictetus and the Imperial Court', JRS 55 (1965), 142. For the evidence cited in support of an A.D. 115 date see F. H.Sandbach, The Stoics (London: Chatto & Windus, 1975), p. 164.
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Court to the life of the Greek cities. He should thus take his place as a historical source alongside his two direct contemporaries, Plutarch and Dio of Prusa.'4
When Epictetus was visited by 'a student of rhetoric' (ὁ νεανίσκος ῥητορικός) from Corinth, he described the young man as 'somewhat too elaborately dressed' and as someone 'whose attire in general was highly embellished', III. 1.1. We know that this was not atypical, for elsewhere remarks allude to the elaborate dress of sophists and their followers, who imitated them even in this detail. Philostratus notes that the sophist Hadrian, a former pupil of Herodes Atticus, who held the chair of rhetoric at Athens, wore very expensive clothes. His followers not only imitated his accent and his walk, but also 'the elegance of his attire'.5
This young Corinthian not only 'set' his hair and wore jewellery, but also plucked the hair from his body to enhance his appeal to the audience. This latter practice drew strong censure from Epictetus, #14,26-7,32. Epictetus regards this practice as highly effeminate, #32. He does not promote neglect of appearance, for elsewhere he expresses preference for young students of philosophy to have their hair 'carefully dressed', IV.2.25. The Corinthian student had overdone it. Again, Philostratus records how Scopelian, the sophist, regularly used pitch-plaster to remove hair from his body.6 Sophists and their pupils were concerned with personal adornment, hence the title of this discourse 'On personal adornment'.
These idiosyncrasies were only part of the wider issue of personal appearance or image, a matter discussed by Epictetus, #7. Sophists and their pupils, as well as the former's audiences, paid attention to the physical attributes of those who declaimed, as noted by Philostratus: when Alexander of Seleucia came to Athens his 'perfect elegance' sent an 'appreciative murmur' through the audience and he was described as 'godlike'.7 This preoccupation with natural attributes was not only a feature of the Second Sophistic but was likewise discussed by Philodemus before the first century A.D.8
4Millar, 'Epictetus and the Imperial Court', 147-48.
5Lives of the Sophists, 586-88. He also notes that Aristides of Pergamon, when he converted from being a philosopher to a sophist, began to be fastidious whereas previously he was 'slovenly in appearance, unkempt and squalid in his dress', #567.
6Lives of the Sophists, 536.
7'For his beard was curly and of moderate length, his eyes large and melting, his nose well shaped, his teeth very white, his fingers long and slender, and well fitted to hold the reins of eloquence', Lives of the Sophists, 572, 570, discussed by Russell, Greek Declamation, p. 85, n. 52 as a comment on the audience's positive response.
8Ca. 110 B.C.-ca. 40/35 B.C. For evidence and for discussion in relation to 2 Corinthians 10.10 see pp. 218-25.
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To help the student understand the true beauty of man Epictetus asks a series of questions to which the student replies.
'What, then, makes a man beautiful other than just that which makes a dog or a horse beautiful in its kind?' 'Just that,' he said. 'What is it, then, that makes a dog beautiful?' 'The presence of a dog's excellence (ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ κυνὸς παροῦσα).' 'What, then, makes a man beautiful? Is it not the presence of a man's excellence?' 'Very well, then, young man, do you too, if you wish to be beautiful, labour to achieve this, the excellence that characterises a man (ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἀνθρώπου παροῦσα).' (#6-7)
The next step in this argument is not difficult as Epictetus seeks to help the young man see what 'supreme excellence' means for some men, #1,3. The student is asked whether people praise injustice, intemperance or lack of control, that is, the cardinal Greek vices. Epictetus argued that the possession of their opposites, namely the cardinal virtues, would make the student beautiful. The emphasis on cardinal virtues is conventional. Philo stated that the sophists themselves taught their importance ad nauseam, and also notes the failure of these teachers and their students to possess these virtues, Det. 72. The irony in the comments of both men is that the sophists were regarded as masters of ἀρετή and claimed to impart virtues to their disciples. Their neglect would of course make him ugly regardless of any cosmetic attempts to look beautiful, #9.9 He thus in effect argued that these virtues make the bodily presence of a man beautiful, while elaborate hair styles, jewellery, expensive clothing, and even natural attributes such as smooth skin do not.
To downgrade further any preoccupation with his appearance, Epictetus refers contemptuously to 'the paltry body', #31,43. He confesses to the student that he almost lacks the courage to tell him he is 'ugly', a slander which reinforces the whole discussion about the unimportance of personal adornment, #41. He also contrasts his own grey beard and rough philosopher's cloak with the cultivated appearance of the student and notes that people still, regardless of his lack of finery, seek his advice, even as this Corinthian has done, #24.
A Socratic path is recommended. The student must 'know himself, adorn himself with reason, and leave his hair 'to Him who fashioned it as He willed', #16, 42, 24-26.10 'Make beautiful moral purpose, eradicate worthless opinions', #43.
9For discussion see pp. 85-88. M. Untersteiner, The Sophists, English translation (Oxford: Blackwell, 1954), p. xv.
10Epictetus followed his teacher, Musonius, who said that hair should be trimmed solely to avoid discomfort and inconvenience, Sandbach, Stoics, 163.
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Epictetus thus reveals how far at least one student of rhetoric in the first century had extended the concept of ὑπόκρισις to personal adornment. He also conveys the way sophists pandered to the wishes of the audience, even to the point of attempting to look 'smooth'; for the student acknowledges that the practice of removing hair is a sign of effeminacy but adds, 'Yes, but they like smooth men', #42.11
This same encounter also provides an insight into the rank and status that a Corinthian student of rhetoric might expect to achieve later in life, #34-36.12 A citizen trained in rhetoric could be elected to the following positions in the city: 'administrator of the city' (ἀστυνόμος), 'the superintendent of the ephebi (ἐφήβαρχος), 'a magistrate' (στρατηγός), or 'superintendent of the games' (ἀγωνοθέτης). Epictetus also reminds him that his son could become 'a fine citizen' (καλὸς πολίτης), 'a senator' (βουλευτής) and 'an orator' (ῥήτωρ).
Extant evidence corroborates the positions outlined by Epictetus and indicates that the list presents an ascending hierarchy of status positions.13 The
11See pp. 213-15 for a discussion of ὑπόκρισις. Epictetus' comments in this discourse more adequately demonstrate what he means by 'bodily presence' than the evidence H. D. Betz draws from this corpus to support the meaning of σχῆμα as a synonym for the term. In his Der Apostel Paulus und die sokratische Tradition: eine exegetische Untersuchung zu seiner 'Apologie' 2 Korinther 10-13 (Tübingen J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972), pp. 53-54, H. D. Betz ignores this discourse 'On personal adornment' and wrongly parallels III.22.86-89 with 2 Corinthians 10.10. S. K. Stowers, 'Social Status, Public Speaking and Private Teaching: The Circumstances of Paul's Preaching Activity', NovT 26 (1984), 75, n. 92, mentions III.l as evidence of 'showy costumes' and 'elaborate hairdos' and wishes to use it to support his argument of clear distinguishingmarks between philosophers and sophists contra G. P. Stanton, 'Sophists and Philosophers: Problems of Classification', AJP 94.4 (1973). Epictetus, as subsequent discussion will show, sees an overlapping between philosophers and sophists in their use of oratory. Stowers cites evidence from Dio Chrysostom, who 'makes it clear how crucial dress and lifestyle were for the distinction of the two'. However, the evidence from Dio does not support his conclusion. In Or. 12.15 Dio refers not to dress or hair style when he refers to a sophist who is 'handsome in appearance and strong'. Καλοῦ τὸ εἶδος clearly refers to physical attributes. While Dio mentions the sophists in Or. 35 engaging in a comparison on rhetorical presentation, he is not contrasting lifestyle or dress when he refers to the wearing of 'long hair' as a sign per se that one is really a philosopher. Likewise in Or. 72 which is specifically about 'personal appearance', σχῆμα, Dio makes no mention of sophists, only philosophers. Stowers cites Or. 70.7-9 as a specific example of the contrast, but Dio clearly states the contrast is between the philosopher and the layman (ἰδιώτης).
12On rank and status see pp. 34-38. 'Making a citizen of Corinth' refers to the procedure by which citizenship is recognised and does not mean the conferring of Corinthian citizenship upon a foreigner. Otherwise πολιτεύειν, which means to be made a citizen, would have been used. W. A. Oldfather, LCL, vol. II, p. 16, n. 2 rightly concludes that the interlocutor must have been a citizen.
13See J. Wiseman, 'Corinth and Rome I', ANRW II.7.1 (1979), 498-515 and epigraphic
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superintendent of the games occupied a position of great prestige because, along with a board of ten Hellanodikai, he was responsible for 'the biennial Isthmian games, the quadrennial Caesarean, and a third series of imperial contests named after the reigning emperor. As president of the games he was responsible for most of the expenses and was expected to provide the extensive hospitality himself.'14 The reference by Epictetus reflects an intimate knowledge of the political structures of the city, especially that of the aedile (ἀστυνόμος) who in other circumstances would have also run the Games. However, the importance of the Isthmian Games and the enormous cost incurred by the holders of this office in running them saw the creation in Corinth of a separate office of President whose status superseded that of the magistrates.
The στρατηγός convened the council and the assembly, and presided over meetings and elections. Until A.D. 69 his name appeared on the Corinthian bronze coins.15 This magistrate held the highest rank, though the great importance of the Isthmian Games during the first century meant that the status of the ἀγωνοθέτης outweighed the rank of the στρατηγός. The liturgy attached to this position demanded great wealth and was rewarded with correspondingly great honours.16 Wiseman remarks that 'The honour was considered the highest that the city could bestow, to judge from its prime place in most of the texts preserving a cursus honorum in ascending order.'17
The ἐφήβαρχος was responsible for the ephebeia whom they trained in the gymnasium. Least important of the four offices, the ἀστυνόμος (the aedile) was responsible for the upkeep and welfare of city property, the collection of public revenue, and financial and judicial jurisdiction.18
evidence cited. See also G. Theissen, 'Social Stratification in the Corinthian Community', in The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity: Essays on Corinth (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982), pp. 79-80.
14Wiseman, 'Corinth and Rome I’, 499-500. Plutarch notes that 'he entertained a great many foreign visitors at once, and several times entertained all the citizens' and in addition to men of learning who were his close friends as was the case with Antonius Sospis, Moralia, 723.
15Wiseman, 'Corinth and Rome I’, 498; and Theissen, Social Setting, p. 79. LCL's translation of the term as 'general' is inadequate.
16Sospis was president three times during Trajan's reign, J. H. Kent, Corinth: Inscriptions 1926-1960 (Princeton: The American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1966), pp. 78-79.
17Wiseman, 'Corinth and Rome I’, 519. See also D. J. Geagan, 'Notes on the Agonistic Institutions of Roman Corinth', GRBS 9 (1968), 69-80.
18F. E. Peters, The Harvest of Hellenism (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1970), pp. 197-98; for a full discussion of the duties of ἀστυνόμοι see my Seek the Welfare of the City: Christians as Benefactors and Citizens, Early Christians in the Graeco-Roman World (Grand Rapids and Carlisle: Eerdmans and Paternoster, 1994), pp. 185-93.
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Epictetus also mentions that the son of a respected citizen could become a council member (βουλευτής), which required citizenship and experience in a number of public offices. The mention of 'orator' suggests a role in the assembly or council addressing civic concerns.19 It would seem that the final three positions — good citizen, senator, that is, member of the council, and orator — are arranged in ascending order of importance, #35. Epictetus wishes to confront the student with the notion that one's appearance, especially a 'smooth' body, could prove a liability should one pursue public office as was expected of this young man from the elite circles of Corinth. This appeal to rank and status supports E. L. Bowie's contention that sophists emerged from the powerful and wealthy families of their cities.20
Epictetus and sophistic declamations
Epictetus devotes a discourse to the subject of declamations entitled 'To those who read and discuss for the purpose of display' (Πρὸς τοὺς ἀναγιγνώσκοντας καὶ διαλεγομένους ἐπιδεικτικῶς)', III.23. This speech yields much to supplement our picture of sophistic activity on the Greek mainland at the turn of the century, but it has been largely overlooked in standard treatments of rhetoric. This is because, firstly, it is not immediately obvious that Epictetus refers to declamations by sophists, for he never mentions any by name, even though he does cite philosophers and orators.21
Secondly, the Loeb translation by W. A. Oldfather obscures the thrust of this discourse by rendering ἐπιδεικτικός as 'display' rather than the more technical term 'declamation', and 'discussion' instead of 'discourse' — or, even better, 'lecture' — for it is to these activities that Epictetus refers.22
Thirdly, because of the deliberate distancing of the philosophers from the sophists, one easily overlooks the fact that philosophers did not disparage rhetoric even if they did criticise its misuse by their opponents. Epictetus
19ἀγοραῖοι ῥήτορες such as Dio refers to in Or. 34.1 where in Tarsus they may also have delivered an encomium on official occasions.
20E. L. Bowie, 'The Importance of the Sophists', Yale Classical Studies 27 (1982), 30; G. W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), pp. 21-23.
21#5, 20, 27, 30, 38. Stanton, 'Sophists and Philosophers', 358, notes that in the first two centuries A.D. epigraphic and literary evidence shows that philosophers may also be referred to as 'orators' but not as 'sophists'.
22For example, Epictetus uses διαλέγειν, 'to discuss', see #23, when it is explained in the following section as ἐπιδείκνυμι. Philostratus uses διαλέγειν with reference to the delivery of a formal διάλεξις, Lives of the Sophists, 604.
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reflects this dichotomy, II.23.46. Cicero encourages the philosopher to derive all the benefit he can from oratory and orators/sophists from philosophy. Seneca the Elder advances this same position especially with respect to the value of declamation, arguing that audiences had grown accustomed to ornate rhetoric in Rome.23 This undoubtedly arose from the influence of Greek sophists who had gravitated to the capital with imperial blessing during the age of Augustus. Even philosophers were forced to respond to audience demands.
It has to be said that Epictetus, in this work, accurately depicts the sophists' activities, in particular declamation. Epictetus is either laying down the parameters for declamation by philosophers or this discourse constitutes an anti-sophistic attack aimed at convincing philosophers of the inappropriateness of the sophists' methods for their discourse. If it is the latter issue then the rhetorical questions Epictetus directs at the activities of the philosophers will also unlock important information (#27,38).
In referring to four 'styles' (χαρακτήρ) Epictetus discusses alongside 'exhortation', 'refutation' and 'instruction', a fourth style: ἐπιδεικτικός, 'display', or better, 'declamation', #33-34.24 After defining 'exhortation', he notes that both the individual and the crowd pay little attention, for they seek happiness 'in the wrong place', and then he moves on to discuss public declamations by asking: 'To achieve that [happiness] must a thousand benches be placed, and the prospective audience be invited, and you put on a fancy cloak, or a dainty mantle, and mount the speaker's stand, and paint a word-picture of how Achilles died?' (#35). If the declaimer makes 'an unusually fine impression' one listener may say, 'That was beautiful diction in the passage about Xerxes' and the other answers, 'No, I preferred the one about the battle of Thermopylae.' Epictetus concludes his discourse by asking: 'Is this what listening to a philosopher amounts to?' #38.
Several factors again suggest that Epictetus envisages sophists rather than philosophers, and that 'the wrong place' refers to the declaimer's large lecture-hall.25 Philosophers did not send out invitations (as Epictetus observes,
23J. Fairweather, Seneca the Elder (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 118-19,320-23.
24ὁ προτρεπτικός χαρακτήρ, ὁ ἐλεγκτικός, ὁ διδασκαλικός and ἐπιδεικτικός. For discussion see S. K. Stowers, The Diatribe and Paul's Letter to the Romans, SBL Dissertation Series 57 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1981), p. 57. Stowers, however, does not discuss the context of the declamation in this passage from Epictetus, and his conclusion that the reference is to 'philosophical method' is incorrect.
25Russell, Greek Declamation, p. 76, n. 14 draws attention to audiences of one thousand or more seated in large and splendid halls, citing Lucian, De domo, 1.58. See also Dio, Or. 32.8-9.
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#27), but the sophists did.26 Elaborate clothing was characteristic of sophists, as we have seen.27 And the performance did not result in the audience resolving to change their conduct: they simply measured the relative merits of the declaimer in handling this or that section. The question which concludes the discourse confirms the view that this is an anti-sophistic discourse. 'Is this what listening to a philosopher amounts to?' asks Epictetus. The whole of his discussion demands the answer 'No!' However, the discourse clearly shows that this was the sum total of what listening to a sophist declaim meant!
If our interpretation is correct, then this discourse is a highly anti-sophistic polemic. Does this reading find other corroborative evidence? There is the invitation to the house of Quadratus to deliver a 'discourse' which is described as ἐπίδειξις. When Epictetus asks why he should listen to the declaimer, for 'What good will it do?', the question receives no answer. All that is said is 'but praise me' (ἀλλ' ἐπαίνεσόν με). When Epictetus asks what 'praise' means, the response is: 'Cry to me "Bravo!"' or 'Marvellous!', #23-34. Pupils described as 'young men' who have left home, family, friends and relatives likewise listen simply to cry 'Bravo!', #32. This implies that the disciples or pupils of the sophists are being discussed. The solicitation of praise after a declamation is described in a telling manner:
The other day, when your audience gathered rather coolly, and did not shout applause, you walked out of the hall in low spirits. And again the other day, when you were received with applause, you walked around and asked everybody, 'What did you think of me?…How did I render that particular passage? Which one? When I drew a picture of Pan and the Nymphs?'(#10-11)
Epictetus has already mentioned this preoccupation with 'praise', #7. In contrasting declamatory activity with forensic activity by an orator, he notes the anxiety orators feel in spite of having composed a good speech, memorising it and having a pleasing voice. The anxiety arises from the rhetor's dissatisfaction with the mere practice of quality oratory, for 'he wants to be praised by his audience'. He notes that in spite of all his training, the rhetorician has not learned to handle 'praise and blame', II.16.4ff. In the discourse on declamation there is a graphic description of declaimers who 'grasp for men to praise' them.28 This clamouring for the praise of the
26Aristides, Or. 51.29.
27See p. 114.
28He cites his teacher, Musonius Rufus, who said, 'If you have nothing better to do than to praise me, then I am speaking to no purpose', #29.
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audience and pupils became a constant refrain in critiques of the sophistic
movement, #9.29
Closely linked with the audience's response is a discussion of its size. After declaiming the speaker notes, 'Today I had a much larger audience', with five hundred suggested as the number attending. 'Nonsense,' the speaker replies, 'make it a thousand.' 'Dio never had so large an audience.' 'How could you expect him to?' There is also a comparison of abilities. Of one declaimer it was said, 'This fellow has a most artistic style; it is much finer than Dio's', #17-19.30
Epictetus adds the audience's lack of interest in self-examination to his criticisms, for the hearers gather to learn to deliver a speech and not 'how one ought to live' (πῶς δεῖ φράζειν); and not as the philosophers urge, #17. The audience's ability to 'catch the points' is what is noted in the post-mortem conducted on the declamation of the day, #19. The desired response — Ί must not act like this any longer' — is not forthcoming. Instead one finds an exchange of views on the declaimer's diction and handling of stock subjects such as Xerxes or the battle of Thermopylae.31
As activities such as grasping for praise from audience and pupils and discussing audience size stand alongside the lack of concern for genuine virtue,32 they conspire to demonstrate that Epictetus clearly engages in an antisophistic polemic which attacks this form of hollow oratory. He appears to be intent on steering philosophers away from it, for his questions suggest that he strongly opposes the inroads made by declamation into his profession. He is not, moreover, the first to criticise the art.33
Conclusion
Evidence from this discourse and from that on personal adornment throws further light on what Millar calls 'life in the Greek city',34 and as a result of
29See pp. 125-27 on Dio.
30The reference is apparently to Dio of Prusa, LCL, vol. II, p. 174.
31W. A. Oldfather, LCL, vol. II, p. 183, n. 3 notes that this is what Cicero called a typical rhetorum campus, De officiis I.61.
32Untersteiner, Sophists, xv on the sophists as specialists in teaching ἀρετή and the discussion on pp. 86-89.
33Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric, pp. 330-37. Like Seneca and Quintilian, Epictetus was critical of declamation not as a classroom exercise but rather in its failure to persuade. It had become an art form by which the declaimer promoted his ability; see especially p. 337.
34Elsewhere Epictetus mentions aspects of the movement. In III.8.1 he speaks of 'exercis-
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this discussion the nature of sophistic activity in a city in the East. Epictetus highlights the rank and status expectations of those sufficiently wealthy, especially within the life of the Corinthian polis. For this reason, we agree with Millar that Epictetus should take his place as a source alongside Dio and Plutarch. Nowhere is his usefulness better demonstrated than in the case of this lively critique of the sophists' preoccupation and those of their pupils, with personal adornment, and of the sophists engaged in declamation.35
ing ourselves to meet sophistic interrogations'. For a discourse involving a forensic rhetorician passing through on his way to Rome and a reference to attending lectures and declaiming, see III.9.8. Another concerns 'those who enter light-heartedly upon 'the profession of the sophists' (τὸ σοφιστεύειν)', ΙΙΙ.21. He certainly sides with the philosophers against the sophists, Stanton, 'Sophists and Philosophers', 357. For derogatory connotations given by him to the sophists see III.2.11, where he notes Diogenes' insult to the sophists, and I.27.6, I.7.11, II.25.2, I.27.2, II. 16.3, II.18.18, III.26.16, for use of cognates.
35Millar, 'Epictetus and the Imperial Court', 148.
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