In 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 and 1 Corinthians 9 Paul defends his modus operandi in coming to Corinth to establish a Christian community. The apologia of these sections depends heavily on rhetorical language and allusions. It shows that his approach has been shaped by his message and that he rejects the conventions associated with public orators in that city.

Paul's anti-sophistic 'coming': I Corinthians 2.1-5

1 Corinthians 2.1-5 has been variously assessed as 'a digression' in the argument,⁴ a 'simple testimony',⁵ and 'the clearest and most detailed statement — both positive and negative — of the Apostle's manner of preaching to be found anywhere in his writings'.⁶ Munck argues that the Corinthians did not receive Paul's wisdom or man's wisdom and hence should not boast in their leaders.⁷ Others have designated this passage 'anti-rhetorical',⁸ or as indicative of the following: 'the commencement of Paul's theme of personal shame in socio-cultural terms';⁹ the renunciation of 'the grand style' of

rhetoric¹⁰ or of the epideictic branch of oratory;¹¹ his refusal to adopt the rhetorical practices of other Christian preachers in Corinth;¹² his renunciation of all technical rhetorical devices in his gospel presentation;¹³ the use of a Socratic-Cynic topos to establish the consistency of his method with a theology of a crucified Messiah;¹⁴ and the Pauline defence of conduct which placed him in a powerless position in relation to the status structure of Corinth.¹⁵

In order to establish that this explanation is framed in anti-sophistic language three issues need to be addressed. Firstly, what do we know about sophistic conventions regarding the initial visit to a city by an orator seeking to establish a reputation as a professional speaker? Secondly, is Paul alone in his concern for the appropriate correlation of message and method? Thirdly, is Paul not ultimately endeavouring to establish πίστις in his hearers, as he insists in verse 5? Rhetorical handbooks have much to say about this technical term as well as the other rhetorical language Paul uses or alludes to in these verses. That such technical language dominates the passage has been recognised even by those who reject a sophistic background to 1 Corinthians 1-4.¹⁶ An appreciation of these terms will help elucidate the nature of Paul's defence before both friends and critics in the Corinthian church.

The coming of a sophist

Extant sources allow us to reconstruct the conventions which surrounded the initial arrival of a sophist in a city. In the first and second centuries A.D. there

were high honours to be obtained by the sophist if he could successfully establish himself in both politeia and paideia. Naturally the citizenry expected the sophist to reciprocate by contributing to the welfare of the city; for example, he might provide benefactions and make himself politically useful by serving as a spokesman of an embassy to a proconsul or the emperor for obtaining concessions or resolving inter-city rivalry. Thus it was mutually beneficial for a city to grant citizenship to a sophist. The entire process, however, began with an initial visit during which the sophist gave a sample of his eloquence and, if he passed this preliminary test, ended when he received endorsement to the advantage of both sides. At the commencement of an oration Favorinus reminds the Corinthians of his initial visit to the city when he 'gave a sample' of his eloquence by which he established friendly, indeed intimate, terms with the δῆμος and the magistrates.¹⁷

D. A. Russell cites Aristides' initial visit to Smyrna in A.D. 176 to illustrate the conventions followed by sophists upon entering a city.¹⁸ The people came out to greet the orator, to whom 'the most distinguished' of young men offered themselves as students. A lecture was planned and an invitation to attend was issued which was 'exactly fulfilled in every detail'.¹⁹ However, before all these arrangements could be finalised, Aristides had 'a dream' telling him to declaim at the council chamber at ten o'clock on that very day. 'An advertisement was put out', and this 'impromptu' appearance was hastily arranged. Although 'most people knew nothing about it', the council chamber was tightly packed. The preliminary speech, delivered sitting down, was followed by the declamation, presented standing up. It was received by an enthusiastic audience held spellbound throughout. His concern that a rival sophist, 'an Egyptian' who happened to be declaiming in the Odeion on that day at two days' notice, might steal his thunder, may account for his sudden decision to declaim the same day. The result was an overwhelming victory by Aristides.²⁰ Of interest are (1) the advance publicity for the performance and (2) the proceedings which began with the introductory speech and were followed by the declamation. The sophists, always competitive, were anxious to impress. They wished to attract not only young men of the elite but also an invited audience, and ultimately an even wider group who might wish to hear the sophist declaim in a larger meeting, for which they would pay.

Philostratus records initial visits by three sophists intent on establishing their reputations in Athens. When Polemo first visited Athens, Philostratus notes with surprise, he broke with convention in that he did not give an encomium when 'there are so many things that one might say in honour of the Athenians'. He also 'did not make a long oration about his own renown', called the διάλεξις, which was customary and was intended 'to win favour for sophists in their public declamations'.²¹ This neglect was attributed to his arrogance,an assessment corroborated by the fact that he declaimed immediately after the topic had been agreed upon — by no means a universal practice.²² The thrust of Philostratus' account is that Polemo succeeded despite violating established conventions.

On the other hand, Philagrus of Cilicia, a sophist of considerable reputation, failed to impress because of his quarrel with Herodes Atticus. The audience became ill disposed towards him when he digressed to lament his late wife during his encomium to the citizens. Convention was further breached with humiliating results when his oration, which had been published elsewhere, was read aloud by the disciples of Herodes as he delivered it, as noted in chapter 7. Philagrus had dared repeat what custom decreed must be an original creation which would test his prowess in extempore oration. He subsequently declaimed in the theatre of Agrippa and the council chamber of the powerful theatrical artisans, but by then his reputation was irreversibly tarnished. Philostratus further observed his unbecoming appearance and a weakness of voice which was the 'result of his choleric disposition'.²³ This surely contributed to his failure before the Athenians, for to them 'presence' (ὑπόκρισις) was an essential criterion of a good sophist. Philagrus later held the chair of rhetoric in Rome, but even that glory could not erase the memory of his professional 'misconduct' and great humiliation in Athens.²⁴

If Philagrus failed in part because of his encomium, Alexander of Seleucia, the third newcomer to Athens, succeeded. This was because his διάλεξις was a panegyric of the city, and his ἀπολογία flatteringly explained why he had not visited even earlier. It was of 'the appropriate length, for it was like the epitome of a Panathenaic oration'.²⁵

Finally, Dio, in an oration delivered at the turn of the first century, gives a glimpse of the reception a famous speaker could expect when he visited 'the greatest cities' of the empire. He writes that he was 'escorted with much enthusiasm and éclat (φιλοτιμία), the recipients of my visits being grateful for my presence and begging me to address them and advise them (λέγειν καὶ συμβουλεύειν) and flocking about my doors from early dawn, all without my having incurred any expense or having made any contribution.'²⁶

Our brief survey reveals that upon a sophist's first 'coming' to a city he was expected to observe certain conventions and by such means establish his reputation as a speaker. There was the introduction — often an encomium to the city — which could colour the audience's response to the declamation as a whole. The performances, not restricted by custom to any one place, could be delivered in a large lecture room or a theatre. They could be initiated by a personal invitation to attend a private lecture or a general invitation to a public performance. In reality the sophist was on trial, for the citizens who heard him determined his success or failure in that city, the possibility of the latter being high. But those who met with success reaped its fruit: an enhanced reputation and pecuniary gain. Paul, on the other hand and for reasons to be explained below, rejected these conventions when he came to Corinth.

The relationship between method and message

There are parallels between Dio's apologia (Or. 47) and Paul's defence (1 Cor. 2.1-5) which help explain why the apostle might have adopted an unconventional stance. In an address to his native Prusa ca. A.D. 102, Dio begins by warning his audience not to expect, when he rises to speak, a discourse which is 'extraordinary' or 'remarkable'.²⁷ The words 'when I rise' indicate that Dio refers to declaiming, an observation further supported by the following statement in which he explains the type of discourse he will not be offering: 'one composed to produce a kind of pleasure or to exhibit beauty or σοφία'. He suggests ironically that this is beyond his capacity, indeed he has 'forgotten' how to declaim at this moment; he is not now equal to 'that sort of thing' and his past efforts are to be attributed purely to good luck. He had been able to deceive 'the public and all the cities' — but no longer.'²⁸ Later in the oration

he returns to this use of irony, instructing the audience not to expect any 'high-minded' (μεγαλόφρων) or 'sage' address, but an 'amateurish and commonplace' one which was appropriate to the concerns of the speech.²⁹

The issues to which Dio refers are by no means insignificant, for they relate to a scheme dear to his heart: the beautification of his home city. The project in the beginning had commended itself to the citizens, who had promised to help defray its cost.³⁰ He had canvassed the support of the assembly, the council and the proconsul, and subsequently addressed the citizens in the theatre in order to secure their backing for this important civic undertaking. But now opponents had persuaded certain benefactors to withhold promised support from the project, so Dio had to engage in 'a powerful apologia'.³¹

The purpose of this apologia determined the λόγοι that Dio would employ: 'For a man's words must needs be coloured by the nature of what he is doing and in which he is engaging.'³² His modus operandi could be defended in contrast to the 'pettiness' of his opponents and their inglorious behaviour. He says that his response will be commensurate with the actions and criticisms of his opponents and will therefore be 'amateurish' and 'commonplace'. It could not take the form of an eloquent declamation. Thus Dio's feigned loss of memory concerning declamation was a vital part of his invective, drawing attention to his adversaries' misconduct and denying the audience what they most desired from this golden-tongued orator: a declamation.³³ As will be shown, Paul's modus operandi likewise provided reasons for not dressing his message in rhetorical finery.³⁴

Rhetorical terms and allusions

Important rhetorical terms and allusions appear in 1 Corinthians 2.1-5. They must be understood in their own right before we can assess Paul's use of

them. In his extended treatment of rhetoric Aristotle connected πίστις, 'confidence' or 'conviction', with the combined and simultaneous application of three proofs: τὸ ἦθος τοῦ λέγοντος, τὰ πάθη, and ἀπόδειξις.³⁵ He argued: 'The orator persuades by ἦθος, when his speech is delivered in such a manner as to render him worthy of confidence … [it] constitutes the most effective means of proof.'³⁶ ἦθος has been summarised as 'establishing the persuader's good character and hence credibility'.³⁷ The speaker had 'to project a sympathetic image of himself as a likeable and trustworthy person. To make the necessary impression he had to 'identify and study the specific qualities of his audience' and be able to anticipate their response.³⁸ This particular πίστις, 'character', was thus an important means of swaying an audience.

The second πίστις, πάθος, refers to 'playing on the feelings' of an audience. Aristotle discusses the ten πάθη at length, first defining each one, then elaborating on the definition and outlining the circumstances under which they could be evoked, the type of person in whom they will be aroused, and against whom they could be directed.³⁹ Cicero endorsed Aristotle's view that one of the prime objectives of the rhetorician's activity was 'to play with the hearer's emotions' (τό εἰς πάθη ἄγειν τὸν ἀκροατήν κατεστήσαι).⁴⁰

The term ἀπόδειξις, used by Paul in verse 5, means, according to Quintilian, 'a clear proof, 'a method of proving what is not certain by means of what is certain'. Cicero defines it as 'a process of reasoning that leads from things perceived to something not previously perceived'.⁴¹ J. Wisse observed

that in broad terms ethos was bound up with the sender, pathos with the effect of the message on the receiver, and arguments with the contents of the message itself.⁴² These three πίστεις constituted the proofs or techniques by which an orator sought to persuade his audience.

Other rhetorical terms are used by Paul in verses 1 and 5, for example, the 'power' (δύναμις) of verse 5. Aristotle adopts Isocrates' definition of rhetoric as the 'power' (δύναμις) of discovering the possible means of persuasion, and 'eloquence' as the 'power of speaking' (δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν). Quintilian notes that a standard definition of rhetoric in his day was 'the power of persuasion', vis persuadendi. Standing behind 'power', as his text makes clear, is the Greek term δύναμις. Dio Chrysostom refers to the gift of eloquence simply as δύναμις.⁴³ The noun πειθώ (verse 5), an appellative which means 'persuasiveness', likewise often appears in definitions of 'rhetoric', for rhetoric is the art of persuasion.⁴⁴ The term ὑπεροχή, which also appears in verse 1, Aristotle uses to describe the superiority men feel based on γένος, δύναμις and ἀρετή, and he also observes the superiority of the eloquent over against the incompetent speaker in the matter of oratory.⁴⁵

1 Corinthians 2.1-5 reveals a distinct constellation of rhetorical terms and allusions, a point conceded even by those who ultimately neglect the sophistic background of the Corinthian situation.⁴⁶

Paul and his 'entry' to Thessalonica

Paul's explanation of his coming to Corinth in 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 was not the first time he described aspects of his ministry in a particular city. In 1 Thessalonians 2 he discusses what he himself designates as his 'entry' (εἴσοδος) to the city of Thessalonica in a letter written from Corinth after Timothy revisited the former place and reported on the Christian community there (Acts 18.5; cf. 1 Thess. 3.2, 6). He noted the report made by others outside Thessalonica of 'what manner of entry (ὁποίαν εἴσοδον) we had' and its results, that is, 'and how' (καὶ πῶς) the Thessalonians had turned to God

from idols and abandoned their view of the eternity of the world in order to wait for his Son from heaven, who would deliver them from the judgement at the great Assize (1.10). This report is linked to 1.5b where he refers not only to the coming of the message of the gospel, but also to the type of people he and Timothy had proved to be 'towards you for your sake' (ἐν ὑμῖν δι' ὑμᾶς). Here two things are reported on — the nature of Paul's coming and its effects on his hearers. It will be argued that Paul also took an anti-sophistic stance when he came to Thessalonica and worked there (1 Thess. 2.9).

The question of his 'professional' conduct alluded to in 1.5b is explicated in greater detail in 2.1ff. After he first records their response to the message (1.9-10), he concludes with an evaluation of the mission before proceeding to an explanatory statement of his 'entry', including his professional conduct (2.2ff.). He reminds them of the effectiveness of the former before discussing the latter, which he introduces with the use of 'for' (γάρ) (2.1). While other public speakers might measure their success by passing the magic audience number of seventeen, by the success of their pupils, and by their public following,⁴⁷ Paul assesses his coming to the Thessalonian brethren by also declaring that it had not been in vain, but for a different reason. His converts had changed their spiritual direction, their attitude to religion as service and their philosophical re-orientation of history, waiting for the coming of Christ (1.9-2.1).⁴⁸ His own coming had not been preceded by an easy mission in Philippi, for there had been much suffering and rebuff (2.2).

Paul describes his professional conduct with a number of contrasting positive and negative terms.⁴⁹ It is also clear that he explains his own entry in an antithetical way. The force of his feelings can be more clearly appreciated from an examination of the way particles are used in the structure of the passage. Succinct negatives are followed by two strong adversative statements referring to his own ethical conduct by contrast, as well as a series of negative comments exonerating his behaviour over against the conduct of others.

2.3-4a	'not' (οὐκ)…'nor' (οὐδέ)…'nor' (οὐδέ)…'but' (ἀλλά).
2.4b	'not as' (οὐχ ὡς) … 'but' (ἀλλά).
2.5	'for neither' (οὔτε γάρ)…'nor'… (οὔτε).
2.6	'nor' (οὔτε), 'neither from you' (οὔτε ἀφ' ὑμῶν), 'nor from others' (οὔτε ἀπ' ἄλλων)

In 2.3 the 'exhortation' or 'encouragement' (παράκλησις) is how Paul describes the effect of the gospel which he preached. It did 'not arise from error' (οὐκ ἐκ πλάνης), for it was God's gospel, nor were there impure or immoral motives on his part (οὐδὲ ἐξ ἀκαθαρσίας),⁵⁰ nor did he aim to beguile his audience with trickery (ἐν δόλῳ). Using a positive statement, he asserts 'but' (ἀλλά) he was a tried and trustworthy servant declaring this authoritative message (εὐαγγέλιον) of God (2:4).

Furthermore, as he made known his message his intention was to please God and not his audience (2:4b), for this God is the one who judges the motives of his messengers — 'he tests their hearts'. There are three ways in which Paul believed he did not displease God, all of which are stated in negative ways.

He further declares that neither he nor his fellow workers were engaged in a flattering encomium, 'for neither at any time did we engage in the word of flattery' (οὔτε γάρ ποτε ἐν λόγῳ κολακείας ἐγενήθημεν), as you know' (2.5a). The reference to 'at any time' (ποτε) points not only to the actual entry (εἴσοδος) in which his initial preaching contact did not follow the flattery convention associated with the encomium of the speech, but also to his motivation in subsequent preaching and teaching. While it is usual to translate the term λόγος as 'word', the rendering of the term as 'rhetoric' is just as plausible, if not preferable, for Paul appears to have in mind the idea of the encomium which required flattery of the audience.

While Paul makes only a succinct reference to the issue of flattery, a near contemporary, Dio Chrysostom, in his encomium in the third oration on kingship delivered before the emperor Trajan soon after his accession to the throne contains a lengthy condemnation of its role, Or. 3.1-25. There he contrasts 'truth' (ἀλήθεια) and 'frankness' (παρρησία) with 'flattery' (θωπεία) and 'deceit' or 'guile' (ἀπάτης) (3.12-13), being concerned that he himself might be open to a charge of flattery by his would-be detractors, and the emperor also accused of wanting to be praised, Or. 3.25. In an early oration on kingship he was to conclude the end of his encomium with the comment that this discourse of his oration (λόγος) will be delivered in all simplicity (ἁπλῶς)

without any flattery (κολακεία)…', Or. 1.15. Dio Chrysostom points out that 'the flatterer outdoes all, since he is the only perverter of truth', Or. 3.19.

However much Dio might denounce flattery, it was an established convention for an orator on entering a city to begin his speech with an encomium on that city and its inhabitants. Attention has been drawn to the διάλεξις of Alexander on the city of Athens, and the breach of it by the famous sophist, Polemo, by his failure to do so to the inhabitants of the same city on his 'entry'. Philagrus of Cilicia inappropriately digressed during his encomium to the same city by introducing a lament to his deceased wife.⁵¹

Paul also contended that he and his fellow-workers' aim was to please God by not using the gospel (εὐαγγέλιον) as a 'cloak of covetousness (ἐν προφάσει πλεονεξίας) — God is witness'. Orators came promising to benefit their hearers culturally with public declamations or by educating their sons, to promote the welfare of the city with their benefactions and advice. There were, however, very substantial pecuniary advantages for the orator from teaching pupils and from public lecturing. The term 'cloak of covetousness' was an apposite description. Their intention was to secure money from the hearers by means of flattery which ingratiated them with their audience. Paul could affirm, like Polemo, that he did not engage in the flattering of his audience.⁵²

He did not seek 'praise' or 'glory' (δόξα) from the Christians or indeed from Others'. The importance of praise is best instanced in the case recorded by Epictetus of the orator who, when some of his audience asked questions after his declamation, responded with the words 'But praise me!' It was also said of one orator that when he was praised his liver swelled up, and when his audience failed to praise him he was emotionally upset.⁵³ Given that the first requirement of the orator was to deliver as an encomium of the audience as the initial speech, it is suggested that the seeking of 'praise and honour or glory' by a speaker from non-Christian inhabitants of Thessalonica was the hoped-for response of orators and sophists. Paul argues that those who responded positively to his message should know that he had not sought the conventional praise from his hearers. Furthermore, Paul asserts that speaking for the sake of personal glory and advancement would not be the way to please God (2.6a), whose glory he had come to declare in his message.

Paul continues his argument with the succinct statement that he can give

proof of his genuineness.⁵⁴ He did not 'exercise his apostolic right' even though he had power to do so (δυνάμενοι ἐν βάρει εἶναι ὡς Χριστοῦ ἀπόστολοι) (2:7). As a child among the guileless, as a nurse cherishing her own children, he shared both the gospel and himself with the community — the message and the non-status messenger could not be separated (2.7-8). That Paul sought only their welfare and not his own is further demonstrated by him. He engaged in labour and travail, working day and night so as not to impose on them as they preached the gospel of God (2.9). Unlike the sophists who boasted that 'their hands had never known labour',⁵⁵ Paul demonstrated that he had, even though he was to write to the Corinthians of an apostolic entitlement that would have precluded him from so doing (cf. 1 Cor. 9.2,14).

His conduct in Thessalonica was described by him in three succinct words, 'holy', 'righteous' and 'blameless' (2.10).⁵⁶ That was how he operated in their midst, as both they and God knew. He further describes in warm filial terms this relationship with each one of them, as that of a father to children, exhorting, encouraging and testifying so that they would walk worthily of God (2.10-11).

The term 'entry' (εἴσοδος) is then something of a technical term for Paul, in that it refers not to his physical coming to the city, but to his reception as a gospel messenger and to his professional conduct amongst those who accepted his message as the λόγος of God. The above examination of how Paul described his 'entry' helps answer the question — 'With whose behaviour does he contrast his own?'⁵⁷

The text of 1 Thessalonians 2 indicates with whom the comparison is being made. While he uses positive functional analogies of a mother caring for her offspring and a father nurturing and teaching his own children (2.7, 11), there is no evidence that Paul is contrasting himself with other Christian missionaries or teachers. Rather, he is drawing a distinction between his ethical conduct and that of other teachers who were already living in Thessalonica when he arrived there. Various proposals have been made that they were Gnostics or other Christians,⁵⁸ or that the passage suggests that Paul was

cloaking himself in the guise of the ideal philosopher.⁵⁹ From an examination of the above, a more specific conclusion can be drawn: that such teachers by implication sought glory and honour and praise as well as financial gain, and did so by deceptive means such as flattery. This description fits well the characteristics and the lifestyle not of the first-century philosophers but of the public orators and sophists. Paul had adopted an anti-sophistic stance when he undertook his mission in Thessalonica. The issues he discusses concerning his coming to Corinth are not dissimilar, and it is to that entry that we turn to examine his self-description of his Corinthian 'coming', his topic, his demeanour, his presentation and the reason for his modus operandi.

Paul and his coming to Corinth

The survey has shown that standardised conventions controlled the initial arrival of sophists who sought recognition by a city's elite.⁶⁰ Is Paul in 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 contrasting his coming to Corinth with established sophistic conventions? If he is, does his choice of rhetorical terms and allusions show that his modus operandi was a calculated anti-sophistic stance adopted to replace conviction derived from sophistic rhetorical wisdom with confidence in the power of God? A number of observations suggest an affirmative answer.

1 Corinthians 2.1-5, in referring back to Paul's 'coming' to Corinth,⁶¹ divides into two subsections, each introduced by κἀγώ (vv. 1,3). The autobiographical κἀγώ), Ί for instance' or Ί also' introduces the evangelistic method which he adopted upon his arrival and used throughout his visit (vv. 1-4), and points to his overall purpose as stated in the final clause (v. 5). It is an autobiographical account of why he will not preach the message of the cross us-

ing 'the wisdom of words' (cf. 1 Cor. 1.17) and why the one who glories should glory only in the Lord, citing Jeremiah 9.23-24.⁶²

Verse 1 is constructed in such a way as to focus not on the fact of his physical arrival but on the stance he adopted when he arrived, κἀγὼ ἐλθὼν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, ἦλθον οὐ καθ' ὑπεροχὴν λόγου ἢ σοφίας καταγγέλλων ὑμῖν τὸ μυστήριον τοῦ θεοῦ. He wishes to inform the Corinthians that he did not come καθ' ὑπεροχήν λόγου ἢ σοφίας.⁶³ The sentence has been translated either, Ί did not come proclaiming to you the testimony⁶⁴ of God in lofty words or wisdom', or as 'When I came to you I did not come in such a way as to distinguish myself in eloquence or wisdom.'⁶⁵ In the latter rendering καθ' ὑπεροχήν is connected with ἦλθον and not καταγγέλλων. The preposition κατά is taken as a reference to the manner of Paul's coming, that is, 'not with the superiority of eloquence or wisdom'.⁶⁶ It was Aristotle who drew attention to the superiority felt by those trained in oratory because of their eloquence. It is suggested that Paul is not simply rejecting the 'grand style' of oratory but rhetoric as a means of gospel presentation. Judge notes that Paul 'is ostensibly in conscious reaction against all rhetoric', although he wonders whether Paul's forceful rejection of it reflects his ability to use it against itself. In a later discussion of 1 Cor. 2.1 he translates ὑπεροχήν as 'excessive' rather than 'superior'.⁶⁷ With the stress on ἐλθών/ἦλθον and the use of κατά to describe his manner, it appears that the emphasis rests on Paul's conscious rejection of the superiority of rhetoric in the modus operandi of his gospel and not the fact that he simply arrived in Corinth. Dio comments that Corinthian

orators 'wanted to be looked up to and thought they knew more than other men', and he derides the deference they sought and the self-importance they exhibited.⁶⁸ Paul has no interest in winning adulation for himself.

The use of καταγγέλλειν together with the content of his proclamations as stated in verse 2 explains why Paul adopted the stance he did: his task was to proclaim Jesus the Messiah,⁶⁹ and, he adds with an epexegetical καί, a crucified Messiah at that.⁷⁰ The message Paul brought did not require a διάλεξις concerning himself or an encomium on the greatness of Corinth. He needed no topic to be suggested by a critical audience on which to declaim in order to gain the Corinthians' approval. Indeed, he found no reason to alter his message when he contemplated his visit (v. 2), for the 'topic' had been determined long before his arrival;⁷¹ and no other subject would distract him. All grounds for a sophistic attitude of superiority were removed by the predetermined topic, for he had not come to establish his own reputation but to declare Jesus, the crucified Messiah.

If verses 1-2 explain why Paul repudiated the sophistic method of 'presenting himself when he came to Corinth, verses 3-5 reveal that he also rejected the three traditional means (that is, rhetorical proofs) of persuading his hearers that his message was true. The Corinthian audience were accustomed to public speakers who treated their own trustworthiness as a preliminary to conviction. The orator laboured at projecting (or manufacturing) an image of himself as likeable and trustworthy — someone who could identify with their feelings — thus putting them in a receptive state.⁷² Philostratus describes the late first-century sophist Scopelian as one who argued 'with great skill' in his διάλεξις, and then was 'even more impressive and vigorous' when he stood to declaim. He did not need time to compose the suggested topic but began immediately in an 'extremely melodious voice' with 'charming pronunciation' and excelled in 'covert allusions'. He did not have the bearing of 'a timid speaker' but 'entered the lists to win glory for himself'.⁷³

In contrast Paul describes himself in Corinth as 'with you in weakness

and fear and much trembling' (κἀγώ ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρομῷ πολλῷ ἐγενόμην πρὸς ὑμᾶς), verse 3. Numerous attempts have been made to explain this verse. Some have argued that it concerns a lack of resources for the task, others that it implies a physical or psychological disability, others that it describes a socially disadvantaged and humiliated person.⁷⁴ Still others suggest that Paul refers to being struck by the awe of God.⁷⁵ P. Marshall sees these terms as a 'trilogy of shame' and the antithesis of the persuasive, forceful and eloquent orator. He aligns these terms with those used of Paul by his opponents in 2 Corinthians 10.1 and 10, where the apostle is described as 'servile', 'weak' and 'contemptible'.⁷⁶ While A. D. Litfin states that we lack a basis for precisely defining these three terms, he suggests that the weakness is of a sort which may be juxtaposed against rhetorical skills and power.⁷⁷ It seems that Paul portrays himself as one who is anti-ἦθος and anti-πάθος by describing himself as 'weak', 'fearful' and one who 'trembled much'.⁷⁸ He did not project 'the character' or 'characteristics' expected of an orator. From his description of himself he certainly would not have enticed the audience by playing on their feelings, nor would his preaching have evoked shouts of 'Bravo' or 'Marvellous'.⁷⁹

If verse 3 represents Paul's failure to be the persuasive orator because he did not use ἦθος and πάθος, how did he fare with the remaining proof, that is, ἀπόδειξις? In verse 4a he continues his autobiographical account — 'and my "rhetoric" and my preaching were not in the "persuasiveness of rhetoric" but in "clear proof" of the Spirit and "power"’ (καὶ ὁ λόγος μου καὶ τὸ κήρυγμά μου οὐκ ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις, ἀλλ' ἐν ἀποδείξει πνεύματος καὶ δυνάμεως).⁸⁰ The terms πειθώ, ἀπόδειξις and δύναμις have, as was noted previ-

ously, rhetorical connotations, namely, respectively, 'the persuasiveness of rhetoric', 'clear proof and 'powerful eloquence'. Paul's selection of these terms is important, for they serve a crucial function in driving home his point. His preaching did not achieve results through the persuasiveness of wisdom, that is, the art of persuasion, which was rhetoric.⁸¹ There was an ἀπόδειξις, but it was not that πίστις recommended by the works on rhetoric. Instead, the Corinthians had witnessed incontrovertible evidence of the Spirit's work and power. Paul indicates subsequently in 2 Corinthians 12.12 that the signs of apostolic ministry were manifest in Corinth ἐν ὑμῖν. C. Κ. Barrett, commenting on 1 Corinthians 2.4, states: 'the supernatural conviction and force that accompanied the preaching furnished a better proof of its truth than any logical process'.⁸² Weiss wrongly suggests that in proscribing ἀπόδειξις in its rhetorical context, Paul simply rejects 'epideictic style' — that he prefers the Stoic and Cynic diatribe. But Paul does not merely substitute one form of oratory for another:⁸³ the concluding ἵνα clause shows that where preaching was concerned, his overall strategy left no room for confidence in technical rhetorical devices.

Paul states in verse 5b his motivation for adopting a method of preaching which would have been unacceptable to those Corinthians who delighted in public declamations and orations. He says it was so that their πίστις would be in God's power rather than man's wisdom (σοφία). Paul's anti-ἦθος, anti-ἀπόδειξις and anti-πάθος argument, as well as his unconventional 'coming' to Corinth, it will be argued in the following chapter, illustrate his anti-sophistic thesis of 1 Corinthians 1.26-31 concerning God's calling of his people, 1.31. Thus once again Paul is seen to repudiate ingratiation, a favourite strategy of the sophists, so that the church's πίστις might have a firm foundation.

How should we understand πίστις in this context? Does Paul use the term in the rhetorical sense of 'proof'?⁸⁴ This meaning would have occurred to the educated first-century reader given its use in rhetorical handbooks, the cluster of rhetorical terms already encountered in verses 1-5 and the preceding

context of the sophistic tradition in 1 Corinthians 1. While such a use of πίστις would be unique in the Pauline letters, that does not constitute sufficient grounds for rejecting it. The semantic field of rhetoric from which a particular meaning is attached to this term is the setting in which Paul discusses his entry and method of operating.

In support of rendering πίστις as 'proof, the term ἀπόδειξις implies for Aristotle that an argument's premises are known to be true and the conclusion is not only logical but certain. This he compares with the syllogism where the premise may be untrue. Aristotle held that demanding 'rigid demonstration', ἀπόδειξις, of a rhetorician is as unreasonable as allowing a mathematician to deal in 'mere plausibilities'.⁸⁵ Paul's use of ἀπόδειξις in verse 5 refers to a demonstration by the Spirit and power that gives absolute certainty, thereby involving an important change in significance of the word. If Paul adopts this term to indicate what is certainly true, then it is possible that he also uses the rhetorical πίστις to indicate the 'proof God gave to the Corinthian converts.⁸⁶

R. D. Anderson has rejected my interpretation of 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 where I argued that it contained rhetorical terms or allusions in it. He gave three reasons for this, two of which are examined here.⁸⁷ He concedes that 'whilst Winter is able to show indeed there were several of the words Paul uses in this passage are also used in rhetorical treatises (e.g., πίστις, ἀπόδειξις, δύναμις, ὑπεροχή), he does not show that they are technical rhetorical terms, nor that the context of the passage requires this otherwise standard vocabulary to be read in terms of rhetorical nuances'.⁸⁸

How does one go about determining the semantic domain from which terms such as these are drawn? First it is necessary to take cognizance of the Sitz im Leben and to seek information from it that might throw light on the context and thereby help to determine the meaning to be attached to particular words. There are issues to be explored in weighing the language used in this passage: conventions by which public speakers secured an audience on coming to a city; pupils for their school; and what governed their professional

(and sometimes their unprofessional) activities — a matter that Philo and others before him discussed at length. It is a basic rule in philology that in seeking to locate the meaning attached to words in a given passage due cognizance is taken of the semantic domain, determined in part from the social setting of the passage. The Sitz im Leben of this passage was explored and, in this second edition of the book, has been further confirmed in a discussion of an identical situation in 1 Thessalonians 2 with the entry and ethics of orators whose whole modus operandi Paul categorically rejects.⁸⁹ A Greek reader of the first century would have been influenced in his reading of this passage by the opening emphasis in 2.1 on Paul's 'coming' — 'And I when I came to you, brothers, I did not come…proclaiming…' (κἀγὼ ἐλθὼν πρὸς ὑμᾶς, ἀδελφοί, ἦλθον…καταγγέλλων), 2.1. The significance attached to the terms Paul uses subsequently would be coloured with its opening signal of a particular context Paul had in mind.

Second, Anderson notes my use of Aristotle's treatise on rhetoric and my argument that the three methods of proof are alluded to in 2.1-5. He rejects this on the grounds that he believes that he has demonstrated that as 'Aristotle's treatise (including his three methods of proof [ἦθος, πάθος, and ἀπόδειξις]) had virtually no influence on the Graeco-Roman school of rhetoric on this period, such proposed allusions must be discounted'.⁹⁰ Earlier he argued in his book that 'Aristotle's triad of proofs through emotion, through character, and through the matter itself, is not reflected in later tradition'.⁹¹ However, in his helpful Glossary of Greek Rhetorical Terms Connected to Methods of Argumentation, Figures and Tropes he notes, 'The terms ἦθος and πάθος can be found throughout the rhetorical treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus who adopted them along Aristotelian lines', citing Lysias 19 as an example 'based on the Aristotilian scheme'. He adds in a footnote thatDionysius is One of the few authors from the first century B.C. of whom wecan be sure that he personally studied the treatise of Aristotle on rhetoric'.⁹² Dionysius arrived in Rome from Halicarnassus in the East in ca. 30 B.C, spent a long period studying Latin language and literature and published in Greek the first book of his multi-volumed work, Roman Antiquities, some twentytwo years later in 7 B.C. during the consulship of Nero and Piso. He was therefore a late-first-century-B.c. and possibly early first-century-A.D. writer.

M. Alexandre has demonstrated that Philo was indebted to Aristotle's

'proofs'. For example, in his analysis of De Plantatione he observes, 'The πίστεις [proofs] that sustain the first thesis consist of five arguments grouped in a natural increasing order, in accordance with Aristotelian theory.' Again he subjects the letter of King Agrippa to Gaius in Legatio ad Gaium 236-329 to a careful analysis and concludes that in the peroratio 'the argumentative tension keeps in balance ἦθος, πάθος and λόγος.⁹³ Whether one holds that the letter is a genuine copy or a literary composition, it is a first-century-A.D. composition and provides further evidence of the continuing indebtedness to Aristotle's 'proofs'.⁹⁴

Compared with other centuries extant first-century literary sources are not as prolific,⁹⁵ and caution must be exercised in making a judgement that someone is 'one of the few authors' who may, or may not, have used a term or discussed issues. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the period when Dionysius was writing was at the beginning of the Julio-Claudian era at a time when Augustus himself had invited many Greek orators from the East to reside in Rome.⁹⁶ Anderson himself notes that Quintilian, who wrote in the reign of Domitian ca. A.D. 90, offered three kinds of proof, and 'it is possible that one of Quintilian's sources understood Aristotle in this way and hereby influenced Quintilian'.⁹⁷ Anderson's conclusion that the three proofs are not reflected in later tradition, and especially in the early empire is, therefore, rejected.

Anderson suggests that the use of the term 'demonstration' (ἀπόδειξις), which is one of the three proofs argued for by Aristotle and is actually used by Paul in 1 Corinthians 2.5 has not been shown to be used in a rhetorical sense. Aristotle is again cited by me and supported by Solmsen's important article and G. A. Kennedy's full discussion.⁹⁸ Anderson's Glossary in its short entry

says it is 'usually used in the general sense of "proof" and cites Quintilian who wrote in Latin, 'An ἀπόδειξις is a clear proof… But all the authorities, however much they may differ on other points, define both in the same way, in so far as they call both ['reasoning' (ἀπιχείρημα)] a method of proving what is not certain by means of what is certain', 5.10.7.⁹⁹ Paul in this passage has put rhetorical terms to a particular use for the purpose of his own argument. He is telling the Corinthian community that it was not the 'demonstrations' that the orators bring with their rhetorical proofs that were to regarded as being critical to any presentation to the audience, especially one gathered to hear the orator at his 'coming'. Rather it was a demonstration of the Spirit and of power that resulted in the 'proof or 'faith' — a double entendre may well have been in his mind¹⁰⁰ — of those who received his message. The end result was not the 'proofs' offered by Aristotle and his band of successors. In fact, he states that his modus operandi was that their proof/faith would not reside in the wisdom of men, that is, the presenter, but in the power of God confirming the truth of the message. The terms are clearly rhetorical ones, and it would seem that Anderson has not sufficiently grasped Paul's skilful use of them in his argument. They are clearly not 'standard vocabulary', to quote him.

E. A. Judge observes that Paul in 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 'was not willing to concede terms to his opponents. He stigmatises what is invalid.' He suggests that Paul 'plunders the Egyptians', using important terms and proofs but evacuating them of their rhetorical meaning,¹⁰¹ and in so doing, reinforcing the importance of trusting the gospel rather than persuasive wisdom.

Anderson correctly observes, 'A major argument undergirding this interpretation of the background to Paul's comment is Winter's conclusion that many of the terms Paul uses in 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 are rhetorical or contain rhetoric'.¹⁰² The preceding discussion suggests why this is still to be maintained, and even more so in light of the setting of Paul's 'coming' to Thessalonica and Corinth.

L. Hartman, in a discussion of 1 Corinthians 2.1-5, comments that this passage 'provides a theological interpretation of his behaviour when defending himself in the first chapters of 1 Corinthians he became a kind of "antirhetorician" in order that it might be evident from whence came the power and the effect'.¹⁰³ By flouting accepted sophistic conventions and with the skilful use of terms wrenched from the semantic field of rhetoric, Paul aimed to further his central thesis, disclosed in 1 Corinthians 1.18, that the sophistic means of persuasion are unsuitable for securing belief in the gospel — a matter which we examine in detail in the following chapter.

The recent proposal that Paul opposed other preachers who had adopted rhetorical devices does not fit well with the text of 1 Corinthians. In fact, it seems a more plausible scenario for 2 Corinthians, though the description of the ministry of Apollos in Acts 18.24-28 must be taken into account.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, Paul's apologia explained his adoption of an anti-sophistic stance the first time he came to Corinth. He refused to anchor the confidence of the Corinthian converts in the persuasiveness of rhetorical argumentation; therefore he adopted an anti-sophistic posture to eliminate any confusion of his message with that of the sophists. The Corinthian response to his person did not concern him as it did the orators. Thus he would not modify his 'plain' style to elicit praise, instead striving to highlight the message rather than the messenger.

Similarities between Paul's and Dio's attitude towards their audience have already been noted.¹⁰⁵ There were, however, marked differences in intention. Dio withheld what his audience desired most — an 'extraordinary' or 'remarkable' discourse — to punish them. Paul on the other hand sought not to punish his audience but to adopt a method appropriate to his message of the humiliated crucified God in order to bring the blessings of the gospel to them.¹⁰⁶

Paul's work in Corinth: 1 Corinthians 9

Sophists were meant to observe yet another convention when they settled in a city: the promise to undertake public benefactions.¹⁰⁷ Corinth greatly bene-

fited from the coming of Herodes Atticus in the following century. Archaeological evidence from Corinth indicates that benefactors undertook major building projects during the reigns of all the first-century emperors.¹⁰⁸ In the second century Aristides commented that an Egyptian sophist visiting Smyrna led some councillors and ordinary people to believe not only that he would participate in civic affairs, but that he would also 'with his money exercise his wonderfully great ambition', presumably to beautify the city.¹⁰⁹

In contrast, when Paul arrived in Corinth, not only was there no rush of young men eager to be his disciples as there was for Aristides, but he offered no promise of material benefactions for their city. He thereby deprived himself of the entrée which such promises would have won for him.¹¹⁰ Instead he indicates in 1 Corinthians 9 that he worked at his craft! Plutarch well expressed the indignation felt by citizens of social status towards craftsmen:

While we delight in the work [of craftsmen artisans], we despise the workman. …Labour with one's hands on lowly tasks gives witness, in the toil thus expended on useless things, to one's own indifference to higher things…it does not necessarily follow that, if the work delights you with its graces, the one who wrought it is worthy of your esteem.¹¹¹

Manual labour would cost Paul credibility with many, presumably at least with those converted subsequent to his departure who did not wish to have a 'working-class' apostle back in their midst. Furthermore, it may be that Apollos, in contrast, had exercised his right to financial support, for only Barnabas is mentioned with Paul as not having used it (1 Cor. 9.5). The prospect of Paul, not Apollos, returning would be seen as a social step backwards and a source of acute embarrassment for members of the social elite in the church (1 Cor. 1.26, 3.18, 16.12).

1 Corinthians 9 helps explain the enigma of why Paul undertook the drastic step of working in Corinth. It is clearly his apologia in the face of criticism for so doing, for he states emphatically: 'my ἀπολογία to those who accuse me is this' (v. 3).¹¹² From verses 1-11 he poses a series of fifteen questions proving the right of an apostle to derive financial support from his hearers. The climax to these questions comes in verse 12b: 'but (ἀλλά) we did not exercise this right over you'. With another strong adversative he then affirms, 'but we have endured everything', and explains why he endured the extra self-imposed burden: so that (ἵνα) nothing would hinder his preaching Christ. On the basis of this purpose clause we must ask: How could making use of apostolic rights to financial support hinder the furtherance of the gospel in Corinth? In the light of our conclusions concerning 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 we might also ask: If Paul entered Corinth and conducted his ministry there as an 'anti-sophist', did he take a further anti-sophistic step by earning his living in order not to impede the progress of the gospel? The two issues are interrelated, for the nexus between the reception of a speaker and financial gain would have been clear to the sophists.

The financial precedent

Our portraits of sophists in both Alexandria and Corinth reveal their insatiable appetite for wealth. Indeed, their credibility as teachers of civic virtue was all too often undermined by this preoccupation. Neilus complained to his father that the untried and boastful 'country sophist' Didymus had established a school charging exorbitant fees. He thus was forced to pay for his private tuition as well as for the public declamations of other sophists whom he heard perform.¹¹³ Dio, we have seen, laments the Alexandrian orators' and sophists' consuming interest in 'gain and glory'.¹¹⁴ Philo presents a more detailed criticism of greed, exposing the strategy of extending their lecture series in order to acquire more fees.¹¹⁵ All testify to the sophists' potential for wealth; and what was said of the sophists in Alexandria was certainly true elsewhere. Dio's

reference to 'disposing of their catch' lampoons their proverbial greed in the eyes of philosophers and others.¹¹⁶

This hallmark of the sophists was not simply a first-century phenomenon. From the second half of the fifth century B.C. onwards the distinguishing mark of the sophists was their 'professionalism', reflected in fees charged for instruction. G. B. Kerferd's analysis of evidence from that period shows that the income of sophists was derived primarily from the high fees charged in their schools, with public display lectures (ἐπίδειξεις) providing a secondary source of revenue.¹¹⁷ Philostratus mentions the charging of fees for lectures, a custom which he believed was introduced by Protagoras. The sophists whom he discusses from the mid-first century A.D. onwards charged fees, and his defenceof the practice surely responds to ongoing criticism.¹¹⁸ This issue formed the crux of the complaints against them from Plato's time to the end of the second century and early third century A.D.

The objection to the sophists by the philosophers of Plato's day was that they 'sold' the truth to all paying customers — which was seen as abhorrent. 'Can it be…that the sophist is really a sort of merchant or dealer in provisions on which the soul is nourished …? And in the same way, those who take their doctrines the round of the cities, hawking them about to any odd purchaser who desires them'¹¹⁹ Two widely held perceptions circulated by the first century A.D. Firstly, only the wealthy could afford instruction in the sophists' schools. Secondly, the sophists were impostors and flatterers motivated by love of glory and money.¹²⁰

Paul's financial strategy: 1 Corinthians 9.1-23

Did Paul fear that 'living off the gospel would have led to his identification in the eyes of a potential audience with the commercialism of the sophists — an identification he had already anticipated in his anti-sophistic stance when he

came to Corinth (1 Cor. 2.1-5)? 1 Corinthians 9 provides the answer to this question, but before it discloses its message we must determine how the Corinthians' financial provisions could have created a 'hindrance' or 'obstacle' (ἐγκοπή) to his message (9.12).

A cognate of καπηλεύω appears in the passage already cited from Plato concerning the sophists, as well as Dio Chrysostom's discussion of the sophists and orators at the Isthmian Games.¹²¹ In 2 Corinthians 2.17, Paul, in a comment on his Corinthian mission and money, explains: 'for we are not among the many who "hawk around" the word of God'.¹²² According to R. P. Martin, Paul actively strives to distance himself from his opponents' activity, the group in question he sees as the evangelists and teachers of 9.12.¹²³ Paul's Corinthian audience might identify him with the sophists and orators who charged willing students for the truth. To correct this misconception of his ministry Paul replaces the sophists' boast that they 'knew nothing of labour' with his own: he charges nothing for his message (9.15) so as 'not to use to the full my right in the gospel' (9.18).¹²⁴

Paul carries into verses 19-23 the argument of verse 18 as he seeks to justify this course of action. His adaptability to a variety of ethnic, religious and perhaps economic groups sprang from a desire to remove any obstacles which might hinder others from listening and responding to his message. He refused to have his message rejected out of hand because of an inflexibility on his part towards financial support in cross-cultural situations.¹²⁵ On the con-

trary, 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 reveals that he was constrained to choose methods of communication appropriate to his message, for he did not wish 'to become all things to all men' to gain honour and wealth, but in order 'to save some', verse 22.¹²⁶

To summarise thus far: the sophists boasted that they 'did not know hard work', while Paul boasted that he renounced his right not to work, thus 'enduring all things' for the good of his hearers. Messengers and money were synonymous in the sophistic tradition. Thus 1 Corinthians 9.1-23 suggests another expression of Paul's anti-sophistic stance — this time bound up with his desire to support himself in order to avoid any identification with the sophists in the crucial issue of money.

Paul's self-discipline and the sophists: 1 Corinthians 9.24-27

Can the issue of self-discipline discussed in 1 Corinthians 9.24-27 be related in any way to this ongoing anti-sophistic portrayal of Paul's conduct? It has been argued that verses 24-27 fit well with 1 Corinthians 10.1-23 and 6.1-20, tolerably with 9.1-18 but very badly with 9.19-22.127 Although H. Conzelmann feels that it 'stands out' of its context, he notes the ties with 9.1-23 created by the correspondence between verses 23 and 27.¹²⁸ Verses 23-27 appear to be a continuation of Paul's anti-sophistic stance. The sophists boasted that they were those 'who take care of themselves…[and are] stout, sleek, robust, living luxuriously, proud, knowing nothing of labour, conversant with pleasures which carry the sweets of life to the all-welcoming soul by every channel of sense'.¹²⁹ Furthermore, they despised their opponents — the 'so-called' lovers of virtue — and applied contrasting terms to them. Their adversaries they described as 'destitute of the necessities of life…sallow, reduced to skeletons, with a hungry look for want of food, the prey of disease',¹³⁰ engaged in 'training for dying' and 'from first to last' studying 'to die to the life in the body'.¹³¹

The adversaries of the sophists in Alexandria, on the other hand, counter that they only fight 'in the shade', that is, the school, 'beating the air', declaiming powerfully (ἐπιδείκνυσθαι δύναμιν), winning admiration in their mock encounter, but accomplishing little of consequence when engaged in real combat. Dio asserts that Alexandrian philosophers who refuse to appear before the people are like 'degenerate athletes who are a nuisance to the wrestling-schools and gymnasia with their make-believe sparring and wrestling, but refuse to enter stadium, viewing with suspicion the sun's heat and the blows'.¹³² Philo's notion of 'real combat', as we have seen, is debating.¹³³ But Paul does not box 'in the air'. He controls his body lest having preached to others he be rejected because of lack of control over his appetites (v. 27).¹³⁴ Surely this passage amounts to more than simply 'an injunction to self-discipline'.¹³⁵ Although Paul relates it to what follows, it also functions as part of his apologia. The sophists boast about their lifestyle, justifying it philosophically as a logical consequence of the senses as the allies and friends of the soul.¹³⁶ Paul, as the anti-sophist, describes his own conduct as a buffeting of the body, a term not dissimilar to that used by genuine philosophers in Plato's time and also reflected by 'the lovers of virtue' in their anti-sophistic stance in Philo's Alexandria.¹³⁷

The discipline and self-control which Paul exercises over his own appetites in verses 24-7 contrast starkly with the self-indulgence of the sophists, whose own lifestyle they attempt to defend on philosophical grounds. As noted previously, Philo calls them 'lovers of themselves' and likens them to pigs. They lecture ad nauseam as experts on the classical virtues and the self-defeating nature of the corresponding vices but their behaviour denies the very virtues they espouse.¹³⁸ Thus Paul goes beyond manual labour to a thoroughly anti-sophistic lifestyle in order to decrease further any possible connection with the sophists. He likens himself to a well-disciplined athlete (vv. 24-26a): he is not what Philo calls a 'shadow boxer'.¹³⁹

Paul's defence: conclusion

Paul's apologia in 1 Corinthians 9 views his apostolic ministry in terms of his rights as part of his criticism of those who are determined to exercise 'this right of yours' (ἐξουσία), 8.9.¹⁴⁰ It supplements the discussion of 1 Corinthians 2.1-5, for in both passages Paul confronts the matter of his coming to Corinth as an anti-sophist. He adopts this modus operandi in order to remove any obstacle to his message which might arise from his being identified — by his preaching or his lifestyle — with the sophists. The theological reasons for this choice revolve around the need to adopt methods, however costly to Paul, which further his message and protect him and his gospel from any suggestion that he is simply like the sophists. This is not the first instance of Paul resorting to working for theological reasons. Writing from Corinth to the Thessalonians he reiterates aspects of his 'coming' (εἴσοδος), the fact that he did not depend on 'guile' (δόλος), 'flattering words' (λόγοι κολακείαι) or a 'cloak of covetousness' (πρόφασις πλεονεξίας), nor did he seek 'glory from men' (δόξαν ἐξ ἀνθρώπων), but he worked day and night to avoid burdening them.¹⁴¹

This reading of 1 Corinthians 9 does not endorse R. F. Hock's suggestion that the paradigm for Paul's ministry is the Cynic tradition and its working philosopher,¹⁴² though it agrees with his conclusion that Paul's labour policy was not related per se to the rabbinic tradition, for the text reveals much more than that behind the intense self-defence. Hock does not satisfactorily explain how Paul avoided ἐγκοπή in 1 Corinthians 9.12 by working, and says, 'The argument at this point [vv. 15b-18] becomes difficult to follow, but its conclusion is clear. By not accepting support Paul could affirm he was free.'¹⁴³ He does not allow verses 23-27 their full impact within the argument of chapter 9. He himself acknowledges the preliminary and tentative nature of his conclusions, which were an attempt to work out a possible Cynic precedent for understanding Paul and his intellectual milieu.¹⁴⁴ If Paul is anti-sophist, why would a pro-Cynic stance be any less a stumbling block in the light of the argument of 1 Corinthians 1-4 and 9? The sophistic background is far more

convincing as the explanation for Paul's apologia. S. K. Stowers' view that Paul resembled the Cynics 'in stressing the continuity between his preaching activity and everyday life' likewise does not adequately account for the intensity of the language of 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 and 9.¹⁴⁵ It is certainly not the case that Paul unthinkingly followed the Cynics. Instead Paul took great pains to emphasise he supported himself, for this was crucial to his message although costly to himself— a cost felt immediately in terms of the distraction of daily work in Corinth.¹⁴⁶ As 1 Corinthians 9 shows, the labour he undertook meant anguish for Paul in the form of the resulting strain on his relationship with the church after his departure (1 Cor. 9.3). It may even have occasioned the resistance of some Corinthians to the thought of his return (1 Cor. 4.18-19) — hence the request for Apollos instead (1 Cor. 16.12).

When the sophist Aristides arrived in Smyrna, the response was overwhelming. He boasted that people came out to meet him even before he came to the city gates, and proudly recalled that 'the most distinguished young men offered themselves [as students].'¹⁴⁷ This was no isolated incident, for Dio Chrysostom records that in the great cities of the empire famous orators were guaranteed an enthusiastic reception and a loyal personal following.¹⁴⁸ It has already been noted that young men who enrolled in sophists' schools were called μαθηταί.¹⁴⁹ They were also described as ζηλωταί, because they gave exclusive loyalty to their teacher and were zealous for his reputation.¹⁵⁰ Such loyalty often resulted in strong competition between the disciples of different sophists in the cities of the East.¹⁵¹ This rivalry was described as ἔρις or ἐριστός.¹⁵²

Does our evidence suggest that some Corinthian converts had begun to perceive themselves as 'disciples/zealots' (μαθηταί/ζηλωταί) of their Christian teachers according to the sophistic understanding of the term? Had Paul begun to fear that their attitude to Apollos and himself was not all that different from that of disciples to their sophists? He describes their conduct in sophistic terms, that is, as ἔρις and ζῆλος. Does this explain their behaviour as recorded in 1 Corinthians 1.11 and 3.3?

The Corinthian perception of their relationship to Paul and others is recorded in two instances. 'I say this because each of you is saying' (Ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου, Ἐγὼ δέ…, Ἐγὼ δέ…) (1 Cor. 1.12). Later Paul asks, 'When anyone says, Ἐγὼ μέν εἰμι Παύλου and another says, Ἐγὼ Ἀπολλῶ, are you not ἄνθρωποι?' (1 Cor. 3.4). Ἐγὼ εἰμι should be translated 'I myself belong to', for elsewhere in 1 Corinthians Paul uses the copula followed by the genitive to indicate origin or relationship. In 3.21 he states πάντα ὑμῶν ἐστιν, and in 6.19 οὐκ ἐστὲ ἑαυτῶν. Therefore it is best translated 'belong to'.¹⁵³ Thus the polarity of loyalties is suggested by Paul's use of ἐγὼ μέν…ἐγὼ δέ…ἐγὼ δέ, which is preceded by the report from those of Chloe's household that ἕκαστος ὑμῶν λέγει (1.12) and repeated in 3.4: ἐγὼ μέν … ἕτερος δέ.¹⁵⁴ The sentiments behind the comment of Aristides that the young men 'gave themselves' to him resemble those expressed in these two passages in 1 Corinthians. Perhaps Christians considered themselves exclusively committed to one of the 'itinerant' teachers who had visited Corinth, following the sophistic precedent.¹⁵⁵

Can we place alongside this verbatim report of the Corinthians' perception of their relationship to their evangelists other evidence that their attitude corresponded to that of the sophists' μαθηταί and ζηλωταί? Paul describes them as κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατεῖν, and in the following verse as ἄνθρωποι (1 Cor. 3.3, 4). When Paul so characterises Corinthian behaviour, he means that they are behaving in a thoroughly secular fashion. The preposition κατά, here meaning 'after the fashion', denotes the measure or standard by which their conduct is to be assessed¹⁵⁶ — in keeping with Paul's use of κατά with

περιπατεῖν to categorise behaviour.¹⁵⁷ That he here refers to 'secular' behaviour is confirmed by his explanation: ὅταν γὰρ λέγῃ τις· ἐγὼ μέν κτλ.; and the question which follows οὐκ ἄνθρωποι ἐστε; (v. 4).

The constellation of terms in 1 Corinthians 3.1-3 further supports the view that Paul accuses the Corinthians of operating in a secular fashion, for it links σάρκινος, νήπιος, and σαρκικός with κατὰ ἄνθρωπον and ἄνθρωποι to charge that they are not πνευματικοί. In 3.3 they are said to be σαρκικοί and to behave in a 'secular' fashion. Paul uses the term σάρκινος in a comparable way elsewhere with respect to his own ministry. He declares that he has acted 'by the grace of God' and not by the σοφία σαρκική of the world (2 Cor. 1.12). Later he contends that the methods, that is, 'weapons' (τὰ ὅπλα) of his ministry are not σαρκικὰ ἀλλὰ δυνατά, contrasting his methods with those of his sophistic opponents (2 Cor. 10.4). The first reference to sophistic preachers is implicit, while the second is explicit, as subsequent discussion will show.¹⁵⁸ In 1 Corinthians 3.1, 3 Paul uses both σαρκικός and σάρκινος to describe the Corinthians' past and present condition: 'It was not possible to speak to you as spiritual but as σάρκινοι, and it is not yet possible, for you are still σαρκικοί', verses 1-3. In fact, σάρκινοι in verse 1 combines with ὡς νηπίοις to express their ongoing immaturity toward himself and Apollos, an attitude evident from the very beginning of their relationship with Paul.¹⁵⁹ These two

terms serve as antonyms to πνευματικός. Within the context of 1 Corinthians 3.1-4 the former are to be understood as the reason for the existence of ἔρις and ζῆλος. The presence of contention and emulation is seen in the explanatory statement in verse 4, 'For when one says, "I belong to Paul" and another says, "I belong to Apollos", are you not ἄνθρωποι?' Paul has therefore used a set of categories as antonyms for the spiritually mature, πνευματικός, in order to explain his accusing them of operating κατὰ ἄνθρωπον and being nothing more than ἄνθρωποι.¹⁶⁰ In conclusion, the essence of the charge levelled against the Corinthians is that they behave in a secular fashion, that is, they measure their instructors by the same canon as do the secular Corinthians.

It remains for us to investigate whether chapters 1-4 as a whole support the contention that sophistic perceptions lurk behind Paul's indictment of secular attitudes towards himself and Apollos (1 Cor. 3.1-4). Paul uses two sophistic terms, ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις, to describe the Corinthians' conduct. Philo in like fashion applies the latter term to sophists who love wrangling in debates, and the cognate ἐριστός to those who are 'seeking victory in argument',¹⁶¹

thereby with one stroke epitomising the sophist's 'excessive open-mindedness' and 'love of arguing for arguing's sake'.¹⁶²

Dio Chrysostom describes the μαθηταί of the sophists as ζηλωταί, as already seen. The importance of this discussion is that it delineates a disciple's responsibilities: by imitating his teacher's actions and his λόγοι the student could acquire the sophist's art, τέχνη. While Dio does not endorse the verbal sparring among disciples of competing sophists with their 'wrangling', 'disputing' and 'arguing', he does recognise an appropriate commitment by a disciple to his sophist.¹⁶³

Aristotle in his Rhetoric treats ζῆλος as a positive virtue and contrasts it with φθόνος (envy). For him it means 'emulation', and he notes that the young and high-minded are 'emulous', as are also those who possess such advantages as wealth, numerous friends and positions of office. The Objects of emulations' in Aristotle are those who possess courage, wisdom and authority, and of those in authority he specifically mentions orators and 'those who desire to be like [them]'.¹⁶⁴

Paul sometimes uses ζῆλος positively, but when combined with ἔρις, negative connotations predominate.¹⁶⁵ He denounces any improper 'emulation' of himself by which anyone on his behalf is 'puffed up' against a supporter of Apollos (1 Cor. 4.6c).¹⁶⁶ The terms thus connote 'strife' (between contending groups) and 'emulation' in the sophistic sense of the word. Philo's choice of ἐριστός and ἔρις and Dio's use of ζηλωτής convey a concern remarkably similar to Paul's.¹⁶⁷

Furthermore, it should be noted that in 1 Corinthians 3.4 the focus is on Paul and Apollos. There ζῆλος καὶ ἔρις clearly relate to matters of loyalty, μέν…ἕτερος, and ἕτερος appear again in 4.6 as the discussion turns to present disturbances in Corinth specifically linked to these two teachers. The classical use of ἕτερος in the sense of 'a division into two parts' supports this reading.¹⁶⁸ In 1 Corinthians 1.12 Paul uses ἕκαστος to describe the groupings, but

his choice of ἕτερος δέ in 3.4 and his inclusion of the additional term ζῆλος could suggest that the allegiance of members of the church is now in effect divided between two former teachers, himself and Apollos, The church's request 'concerning Apollos' (Περὶ δὲ Ἀπολλῷ) and his return to minister to the congregation (1 Cor. 16.12b), and the obvious relief and subsequent assertiveness on the part of some in the church because Paul's promised return had not eventuated would support this (1 Cor. 4.18).

Is there evidence from the background and the modus operandi of Apollos to confirm that the congregational party spirit and desire to emulate former teachers had been culturally determined by the sophistic movement in that city? Acts 18.24-28 contains important biographical information concerning Apollos.¹⁶⁹ First, he was a Jew described as 'Alexandrian by birth'. While Luke's wording does not demand that he was a full citizen of the Greek πόλις,¹⁷⁰ Jews

did occasionally hold multiple citizenship at that time. More important for our purposes, he is described as ἀνὴρ λόγιος in verse 24, a collocation clearly connected with rhetoric.¹⁷¹ Philo uses the identical phrase to refer to those with rhetorical training.¹⁷² Regarding Apollos, still other sophistic terms are used of his modus operandi which throw light on his background. In his handling of the OT scriptures his method is described as δυνατός (18.24), and he also powerfully refuted the Jews in public, 'demonstrating' (ἐπιδείκνυμι) by means of the Old Testament that Jesus was the Messiah (Acts 18.28).¹⁷³ The three terms have rhetorical connotations, so that the Acts account of Apollos would have conveyed to the readers that this Christian Jew from Alexandria depended on his rhetorical skills in his open συζήτησις with the Jews (v. 28).¹⁷⁴ Thus the rivalry in the congregation — which pitted Paul against Apollos — and Apollos' rejecting the request for his own return (καὶ πάντως οὐκ ἦν θέλημα, 1 Cor. 16.12b) become clearer when seen against the latter's background.

It is therefore concluded that not only does Paul decry the secular conduct of the Corinthians, but we can be more specific and state that it was sophistic in

its nature. The Corinthian Christians' perception of a μαθητής and a ζηλωτής has been contaminated by a culturally determined understanding of the terms drawn from the sophistic movement in Corinth. It was Isocrates who commented, 'I suppose all men are aware that a sophist reaps his finest and largest reward when his pupils prove to be honourable and intelligent and highly esteemed by their fellow-citizens, since pupils of that sort inspire many with the desire to enjoy his teaching.'¹⁷⁵ Certain Corinthians enjoyed the ministry of Apollos and persuaded the church, in spite of a commitment on the part of some to Cephas, to invite Apollos to return even though some had supported Paul (1 Cor. 3.18, 16.12).

Despite the financial hardships which Paul endured in order to avoid misconceptions about ministry, some in the church continued to misconstrue either the theological motivation behind his Corinthian activity or the nature of Christian discipleship. He had seen, to be sure, storm clouds on the horizon during his initial ministry in Corinth, for he says that even then he needed to treat them as infants (1 Cor. 3.1-2). There was a wholehearted commitment by the Corinthian converts to Paul which he found disturbing but which remained uncurbed whilst he was among them. The subsequent preaching by one trained in rhetoric only heightened their predilection for secular perceptions of teachers. Even the discussion of the problem in 1 Corinthians 1-4 and 9 did not result in the eradication of this culturally conditioned response to teachers, as will be argued in the final chapter. The proposal of the congregation to invite Apollos back provided the opportunity to signal to Paul that he was not welcome. This appears to have been the catalyst which brought the divisions into the open, although they had existed in nascent form from the beginning of Paul's ministry.

Finally we note the wild enthusiasm with which the orators of Corinth responded to the oration of another visitor to that city, Favorinus. Recording that even 'the women and children' listened to him, Favorinus affords us a glimpse into the zealousness and commitment which had characterised the Christians in response to their religious teachers.¹⁷⁶ Favorinus, like Paul, also illustrates how easily the same Corinthian enthusiasm could wax and wane and even turn to opposition after he 'sailed away', for he discerned on a return visit that 'his statue' had been 'thrown down' as a sign of their rejection of him.