Richard Parry, Agnes Scott College, Professor, PhD
Fuller E. Callaway, Agnes Scott College, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, PhD

Deceptive Pleasures in Repubic 9

In Republic 9, Socrates gives two arguments for the superiority of the philosophical life, using the basis of pleasure. This paper focuses on the second (583b-586c). Its opening statement is quite bold: observe that pleasures other than those of the intelligent person are not wholly true nor pure but are shadow-painted (skiagraphêmenê) (583b3-5). Shadow-painting creates a visual illusion, e.g., depth, by contrast between light and dark colors. By this means, Socrates is opening the topic of deception in pleasures, which he will develop in the rest of the passage. Accordingly, the problem for this paper is to understand how these pleasures can be deceptive. 

The foundation for Socrates’ argument is that, while pain and pleasure are opposite, there is a state which is neither pleasant nor painful; being between the two, it is a kind of calm (hêsuchia) within the soul (583c). Yet, Socrates remarks, those who are sick say that nothing is sweeter than to be healthy, although they were not aware that it was the highest pleasure before they were ill (hôs ouden ara estin hêdion tou hygianein, alla spas elelêthei, prin kamein, hêdiston on). In general, people in severe pain say that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of suffering (583c-d). What Socrates recounts are beliefs, i.e., what these people say. Furthermore, since they are actually in pain when they make these statements, they are talking about future states; they believe that when the pain is over, they will experience pleasure. Socrates also points out a reason to think that this belief is wrong; they were not aware that health was so pleasant before they were ill. After all, if health is so pleasant, why were they not aware of the pleasure before becoming ill? 

At this point Glaucon offers a reason why those in pain might believe its cessation is pleasurable. Perhaps, he says, at that point (scil., when the pain ceases) the state of calm becomes pleasant and welcome (touto gar, ephê, tote hêdu isôs kai agapêton gignetai, hêsuchia) (583d-c). Whereas Socrates was recounting beliefs about some future state, Glaucon is describing that state itself in suggesting that calm becomes pleasant. Socrates then responds to the suggestion. There are also those who say the opposite, i.e., that the cessation of pleasure is painful; Socrates seems to apply Glaucon’s suggestion in these cases to the effect that calm would also become painful after the cessation of pleasure. Socrates’ objection to the idea that calm becomes pleasurable or painful is that, then, what is between pleasure and pain would be both pleasure and pain; but what is neither cannot be both. The strength of this argument depends on the idea that the state of calm is really distinct from pleasure and pain. So, he also offers an argument to back up the distinction between the intermediate state of calm, on the one hand, and pleasures and pains on the other. Pleasures and pains are kinds of motion (kinêsis). But the state of calm is neither painful nor pleasant but is in between the two. So, it cannot be right to think that not being in pain (to mê algein) is pleasant nor not enjoying pleasure (to mê chairein) is painful (583e-584a). The argument begs the question in that it assumes what it aims to prove. However, a remedy is at hand. The use of infinitives in the conclusion picks up on the idea that pleasure and pain are motions. If so, the contrast between pleasure and pain, on the one hand, and calm, on the other, is that the former are motions but calm is not a motion. If the suppressed premise is that the state of calm is not a motion, then the conclusion follows. However, Socrates ends this section with an explanation for the mistake of taking the cessation of pain to be pleasure. He concludes that when the state of calm is next to the painful it appears (phainetai) to be pleasant and when it is next to pleasure it appears painful. But there is nothing sound in these appearances (phantasmatôn) with respect to the truth of pleasure; they are a kind of bewitchment (goêteia) (584a-b). 

Bewitchment implies not just falsehood but falsehood that has the appearance of truth. In this paper, we will focus on this bewitchment as the key to understanding the deception associated with pleasure throughout this passage. The term lends itself to two distinct interpretations, which can be seen by noting an ambiguity in the explanation of the bewitchment when Socrates says the state of calm is next to the painful. The meaning of ‘next to’ is temporal: one state succeeds the other. However, there are two senses of ‘next to.’ In the first sense of ‘next to’, the pain is over—is in the past—and the succeeding state of calm seems pleasurable. In the second sense, the pain is present and it appears that the future state of calm will be pleasurable. The important difference in these two cases is that the first is an illusion of pleasure—one feels pleasure but is mistaken because she is actually in the state of calm.¹ By contrast, in the second case, one has a false belief about a future pleasure. One believes that what will succeed the present pain will be pleasure; but the belief is mistaken because pain will be succeeded by calm. This kind of mistake fits the description of the mistake made by the sick at the beginning of the passage. When those still suffering illness say health is the greatest pleasure, they are expressing a belief about a future pleasure. 

Each of these kinds of mistake gives rise to an interpretation of bewitchment. In the first interpretation, the bewitchment is an illusion; one thinks she is experiencing pleasure when there is no pleasure. This notion of illusion of pleasure is problematic because it implies one can feel pleasure when there is no pleasure. However, if pleasure just is the feeling of pleasure, this implication makes no sense. By contrast, in the second reading of this passage, there is no such illusion. When pain precedes calm, the appearance of pleasure is the false anticipation that, when the pain ceases, one will experience pleasure. Following this reading, the second interpretation holds that the deception associated with pleasure is the false anticipation of pleasure. In what follows, we will see how this second interpretation works in this passage, although constraints of time will not allow an exhaustive treatment. Finally, we will see what difference this interpretation makes to the understanding of the role of pleasure in virtue. 

Next, Socrates undertakes to explain why pain’s being next to the state of calm leads to these people mistaking calm for pleasure. He starts in a somewhat surprising way, by suggesting that Glaucon might be tempted to believe that pleasure is by nature release from pain (584b). However, Socrates’ aim is strategic. He will argue that not all pleasure is cessation of pain but he will concede that there is a sense in which some pleasures are cessation from pain. In order to show that not all pleasure is the cessation of pain, he uses the example of the pleasure of smell, which—he claims—is not preceded by pain. Since this pleasure is not preceded by pain, one should not think pure pleasure is the cessation of pain (mê ara pheitheômetha katharan hêdonên einai tên lupês apallagên) (584c1-2).  

Although the belief that pleasure by nature is release from pain is shown to be false, just at this point Socrates makes a significant concession: but surely what are called pleasures that stretch through the body to the soul, the most and the greatest, are a kind of release from pain (lupôn tines apallagai) (584c6-7). In order to understand this claim, it is helpful to remark that ‘release from pain’ is ambiguous. In one sense, it could refer to the state of having been released from pain. The state of having been released from pain is also the state of calm. In this sense, bodily pleasure would be a kind of release from pain only in the sense that it would be the error of taking an occurring state of release from pain to be pleasurable; it would be what we have called an illusion of pleasure. However, in another sense, ‘release from pain’ can mean the process of being released from pain. This sense would fit with Socrates’ claim that pleasure is a motion; it would be the process of being released from pain. The idea that bodily pleasure is a process of being released from pain is found in the Gorgias. In that dialogue, claiming that all lack and desire is painful, Socrates also says filling the lack is pleasure. The conclusion is that one is in pain and enjoying pleasure at the same time when, being thirsty, he drinks (496e5-6). The idea that bodily pleasure is release from pain is echoed, later in this passage from the Republic, when Socrates says that bodily pleasure comes from filling the emptiness of desire (585a-e).²  

Before going on to explain the idea that bodily pleasures are a kind of release from pain, Socrates adds another idea whose full development is found in the Philebus. He introduces a wholly new idea: pains and pleasures of anticipation (proêsthêseis te kai prolupêseis). He says that they arise from the expectation of bodily pleasures and pains. The idea of anticipatory pleasures and pains seems to pick up on the theme of anticipation that runs through the passage. The sick anticipate pleasure; and one of the meanings of pain’s being next to calm implies anticipation of pleasure. If these anticipations were also pleasurable, then they could be anticipatory pleasures. However, Socrates also says these anticipatory pleasures and pains have a similar character to the pleasures which stretch through the body to the soul and are a kind of release from pain. Since anticipatory pleasures belong to the soul only, they are not pleasures that stretch through the body to the soul. So, they are similar in that they are a kind of release from pain. What Socrates says next reinforces this reading. Socrates asks Glaucon what they are like and to what they most resemble. The ‘they’ could refer to the pleasures which are a kind of release from pain or to anticipatory pleasures (and pains), or to both categories. So the following analogies represent the way bodily pleasure and anticipatory pleasure are a kind of release from pain.  

The spatial analogy depends on the idea of an up and a down “that are in nature,” with a middle region between the two. The idea of an up and a down that are in nature implies that ‘up’ and ‘down’ refer not just to directions relative to one another; rather there is an absolute or true upper region and an absolute or true lower region. In addition, the analogy includes the process of moving from one region to the other as well as the outcome of the process, i.e., being in one region or the other. Socrates says that someone who is borne from below to the middle region would think he is moving upward; then standing in the middle region and looking at the place from which he had come, he thinks he is up (presumably instead of thinking he is in the middle region) not knowing about what is truly above (584d6-9). So, in this analogy, there is the process of ascending and a belief about the process as it is occurring; there is also the outcome of the process and a belief about the outcome when it has happened. Then Socrates applies the analogy to pain and pleasure. Those without experience of truth would have unsound opinions about many other things, so that they are so disposed with respect to pleasures and pains and what is between these two, that when they are borne to what is painful, they truly think they are in pain, and are really so. But when they are borne away from pain to the middle region, they intensely believe they are reaching (have reached) fulfillment and pleasure. (hotan de apo lupês epi to metadzu, sphodra men oiontai pros plêrôsei te kai hêdonê(i) gignesthai) (585a2-3).  

Finally, at this crucial point in the account, there is an ambiguity in the text. The Greek sentence can be read as expressing the inexperienced persons’ belief that they have reached fulfillment and pleasure or as expressing their belief that they are reaching fulfillment and pleasure.³ The first is a belief about the result when it has occurred; the second is a belief about what the process will result in. Either, having moved from pain to the middle region, they think the middle region is pleasurable; or, in moving from pain to the middle region, they anticipate pleasure.  

We can now see that the ambiguities in this passage begin to fit a pattern. One set of ambiguities implies that bodily pleasure is an illusion that occurs when one is experiencing the present state of calm as pleasure. The second set implies that bodily pleasure is deceptive when it involves a false anticipation that the process of filling the emptiness of bodily desire will result in future pleasure. Thus, each set is the basis for a distinct interpretation of the bewitchment of bodily pleasure. While there are several reasons for preferring the second interpretation, I will cite only one. If the person moving from pain to the state of calm has a false anticipation of future pleasure we can understand why Socrates had mentioned anticipatory pleasure at the beginning of this section of the argument. It is the form that false anticipation takes in the error made by those who are moving from the lower region of pain to the mid-region of calm. In saying that they believe intensely that they will have pleasure in the future, Socrates is invoking the notion of anticipatory pleasure that he so mysteriously mentioned earlier. He is saying they are experiencing pleasure at the prospect of future pleasure. As such, the anticipatory pleasure is false because the mid-region is the state of calm, not pleasure; one is taking pleasure in something that will not happen. Nevertheless, in itself, anticipatory pleasure has a role in bodily pleasure’s being release from pain. The pleasurable anticipation of the cessation of pain as calm is not deceptive because it is the anticipation of what will happen. Moreover, it is itself part of the process of release from pain.  

Time does not permit us to pursue further this interpretation of the deception associated with bodily pleasure. By way of conclusion, I will sketch the major consequences of this interpretation. The first consequence is for non-philosophers, who do not understand how bodily pleasures are deceptive. If the bewitchment of bodily pleasure is a false pleasurable anticipation of pleasure, then the false anticipation will end in disappointment. The deceived person expects pleasure but in reality experiences only calm, the absence of pleasure. Nevertheless, the bewitchment is persistent; in spite of disappointment, the non-philosopher, because he does not understand how the deception works, continues to expect pleasure. In the rest of the passage, Socrates describes the obsessive pursuit of this phantom of pleasure that this bewitchment inspires (586a-c). The second consequence is for the philosopher, who is not deceived by bodily pleasures and does not falsely anticipate pleasure. Realizing that bodily pleasure is a process that ends in calm, he is not disappointed by expectations to the contrary. This realization, in turn, implies that the point of bodily pleasure is that it ends in calm. If so, in the life of the philosopher, bodily pleasure is not an end in itself but rather a stage on the way to the state of calm. Socrates signals that this state is preferable for the philosopher when, in the Philebus (33a-c), he characterizes the life of the gods as consistently calm. Insofar as divine detachment is appropriate for philosophers, it would be essential for them to understand that calm is the end of pleasure. The harm of the bewitchment by bodily pleasure is that it covers up the true value of the state of calm.

¹  The notion of an illusion of pleasure is problematic because it implies that one can feel pleasure when there is no pleasure. But the subjective state of feeling pleasure is what pleasure is. So feeling pleasure cannot be illusory; if one feels pleasure there is pleasure. One way to save Socrates from this objection is to allow that pleasure can refer both to the subjective state of feeling pleasure (pleasure₁) and an objective state (pleasure₂), e.g., a bodily process which, in most cases, causes pleasure₁. For instance, David Wolfsdorf makes a “…distinction between the appearance of the affective condition, which is a subjective component, and the objective component, which…is a kinetic or a-kinetic condition.” in “Pleasure and Truth in Republic 9,” Classical Quarterly, vol. 63 (2013) p. 116. Then the illusion of pleasure happens when one experiences pleasure₁ without the bodily process that usually causes it, i.e., without pleasure₂.

²  In contrast with the position defended here, Frede (“Disintegration and restoration: Please and pain in Plato’s Philebus” in Cambridge Companion to Plato, Cambridge University Press,1992) thinks it is unclear whether the filling is anything more than the appearance of pleasure, p. 436. By contrast, Erginel (“Plato on the Psychology of Pleasure and Pain,” Phenix, 65:3/4, 2011) argues that cessation from pain is a state and liberation from pain is a process (290-2).

³  The parallelism between the two motions (hotan men epi to lupêron pherôntai…hotan de apo lupês epi to metadzu (pherôntai) make it clear that Socrates is talking about going toward pain and going toward the middle. The result of this second motion is then described: sphodra oiontai pros plêrôsei te kai hêdonê(i) gignesthai. In moving toward the middle, they intensely believe they are coming near to fulfillment and pleasure. In fact, this is Shorey’s translation. The Republic, Paul Shorey, trans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970) p. 387.