The initial discussion of all these groups occurs in #8-11 within the lengthy introduction, #1-29. There Dio seeks to establish his own credentials as counselor and saviour of Alexandria through his use of comparison with philosophers, sophists, orators and poets. J. L. Moles defines 'counsellor' (σύμβουλος) as 'the typical figure of the external adviser interfering from a higher plane'.⁵ Dio may appear in the garb of a philosopher (traditionally 'clad in a mean cloak') but, as he tells his audience, he has been appointed to the task of addressing the Alexandrians 'by the will of some deity', #22,12. The 'deity' in question is Vespasian, to whom Alexandria had recently granted the traditional divine honours immediately on his accession to the Principate.⁶ It would seem that Dio came with the knowledge and blessing of Vespasian, as his ambassador.

Dio hoped to heal a rift between the emperor and the Alexandrians. The city's fortunes, robust under Nero, had been sharply reversed under Vespasian even though it was here that the legions first recognised his claim to the Principate in A.D. 69. Cassius Dio records the city's disappointment at receiving as a reward for its acceptance of his claim only a heavier tax burden.

Their dashed hopes turned to mocking and questioning of his ability to rule, and soon to open and 'foolhardy' demonstrations at which they abused 'the good nature of the emperor'.⁷ It was 'that impudent licence which is always working to their detriment' with which the Alexandrians abused the emperor, Cassius Dio notes;⁸ Suetonius added that they called him a 'fishmonger'.⁹

The conclusion of the oration holds out the possibility of an imperial visit, and even benefactions, if the Alexandrians could prove themselves by their restraint 'worthy of his favour and trust', #95. Dio aims then to convince the citizens that they must heed him, for 'in plain terms and without guile [he] speaks his mind with frankness', #11: he is their 'counsellor and saviour',¹⁰ concerned for the well-being of his audience. Two factors must be constantly before us as we evaluate Dio and his discussion of, and synkrisis with, philosophers, orators, poets and sophists. First, his speech must be weighed in the light of his overriding ambition to succeed in this difficult imperial mission. Second, any assessment of Dio's role, especially in relation to philosophers and sophists, must be made in the light of recent events in Rome and Dio's response to them.

In A.D. 71 Vespasian had expelled all philosophers from Rome with the exception of the noted Musonius Rufus.¹¹ The Cynics he singled out for special

mention, perhaps because he, like Seneca, found them to be 'rebellious and fractious persons, over-riding kings and officials and those responsible for the conduct of public affairs'.¹² They taught many doctrines 'inappropriate to the times' and publicly criticised the relationship of Vespasian's son, Titus, with Berenice.¹³ Dio's own lost work attacked philosophers in general and Stoics and Cynics in particular.¹⁴ He is said to have argued that philosophers should 'be expelled from every land and sea in the belief that they are Messengers of Death to state and civil organisations alike'.¹⁵ His comments on the threat of retaliatory measures may therefore be linked with Cynic activity in Alexandria,¹⁶ and his censure of the philosophers there must be coloured to some extent by recent events in the capital, all the more so if he comes as an imperial messenger. Moles calls Dio's stance in A.D. 71 'a pose of expediency in a moment of crisis'. However, there seems to be a consistency in attitude on the part of Dio from the time of the expulsion of philosophers from Rome to the delivery of this oration. The Rhodian discourse is dated by Jones prior to the Alexandrian discourse but after the expulsion of the philosophers. Dio's praise of the famous philosopher Musonius Rufus does not deny his consistency. This Stoic philosopher was the only one not expelled by Vespasian in the initial election in A.D. 71, Or. 31.122. According to Fronto, Dio was a pupil of Musonius Rufus.¹⁷ These two factors will be considered as we examine his discussion of philosophers, especially with respect to (1) their role in politeia, and (2) those who attempted to stand in their place in politeia, namely orators, sophists and poets.

In apportioning blame for the present instability in Alexandria, Dio tells his audience that they may not have been wholly culpable, #8. Earlier Dio sug-

gested the problem could have been avoided if the Alexandrians had made use of their heritage, namely 'education and rhetoric' (παιδεία καὶ λόγος). The blessings bestowed on those who have participated in them are that they make 'good men' (ἄνδρες ἀγαθοί) and 'saviours of the cities' (σωτῆρες τῶν πόλεων). The present emperor is devoted to them, and they are the remedy of the gods for κακία, #60, 61. Paideia is meant to produce the opposite of evil, i.e., virtue. The latter cannot flourish because the former does. Dio lists the vices as 'stupid contention', 'unbridled ambition', 'vain grief, 'senseless joy', 'raillery' and 'extravagance', #5 and the traditional virtues, #5,37,47,55,95,96. He tells them later that their conduct negates these blessings and could make them ἀπαίδευτος, #62. Responsibility rests with the one who 'wears the name philosopher'.¹⁸ Dio divides the philosophers into two groups.¹⁹ There are some 'who do not appear in public' at all because they despair of ever effecting an improvement in 'the masses'.²⁰ Thus they have 'quit the field and are silent' out of concern for their dignity, #19. They now serve no more purpose in politeia than shadow boxers, the scourge of the wrestling schools and gymnasia who view 'with suspicion the sun's heat and the blows', for they have abdicated their traditional role as admonishers of the citizens, #20. Dio reiterates this charge when he later states, 'In my opening remarks also I laid blame for this [disorder] upon the philosophers who will not appear before the people or even deign to converse with you', #20.

The second group²¹ wish to exercise their voices in 'what we call lecture-halls'.²² Since for Dio the theatre represents 'the organ of hearing of the people', his comment placing the philosophers in lecture-halls rather

than in the theatre is critical. He himself addressed the Alexandrian crowd in the theatre, and in so doing fulfilled the traditional role of the philosophers. Contemporary philosophers, however, have now secured an alliance with other audiences, and they and their lecture-hall audience mutually neglect any obligations in the assembly. The philosophers have not simply surrendered their traditional role, but have adopted many of the sophists' activities. Dio's invective at this point would have aimed to humiliate the Alexandrian philosophers who prided themselves that they were not like the sophists.

Further distinctions are drawn between two types of philosophers: a 'bad' philosopher lacks severity, for 'severity of speech is by nature salutary',²³ while a 'good' one uses 'persuasion and reason' (πειθὸς καὶ λόγος) 'to calm and soften the soul'. They should be the 'saviours and guardians' of all who can be saved, but a dearth exists, for men prefer wealth and power to importance in the polis. While 'magistrates, laws and jurymen' have the function of 'cautery and the knife' for the drastic treatment of vice, the philosopher's task resembles 'dieting and drugs'. This treatment is preferable, but in Alexandria they have neglected their practice of it. The bad philosopher then is one who fails to assist in politeia or serve as the 'saviour and guardian' through the exercise of his powers of persuasion and reason, #18-19. The good philosopher will do so in spite of abuse, rebuttal and derision from the crowd. Dio says he is empathetic to the philosophers' problem of the awesome and intimidating nature of the Alexandrian crowd. He tells them it is not easy to endure their uproar, #20. He uses a variety of methods to secure and retain the attention of the crowd. It reflects his skill that he uses praise, he evokes pathos for himself and attributes the ensuing silence to the supernatural, #2,29,30,33.

The Cynic philosophers of Alexandria are singled out for special condemnation. He tolerates their fundamental beliefs, for 'they comprise practically nothing spurious or ignoble', #9, but he condemns their eccentricity because of the studiously shameless begging which has brought ridicule upon philosophers in general.²⁴ In this regard he resembles Epictetus, who endorsed the ideal Cynic philosopher as a type of perfect wise man, but de-

nounced the contemporary Cynic philosophers for their begging with a citation from Homer: 'dogs of the table, guards at the gate'.²⁵

In Or. 32 comments are related to the majority of Alexandrian Cynics²⁶ and expose their shortcomings in two areas. Firstly, Dio will be recognised as a man who 'in plain terms and without guile speaks his mind with frankness'; thus he embodies the virtues of the prototypical wise man. His passing reference to, and his basic agreement with, this fundamental Cynic ideal, prepares the way for his own self-praise, #11,8.²⁷

Secondly, he explains that Cynic begging and constant railing against other philosophers have exacted a high price, because Alexandrians have come to despise all philosophers. The Cynics had betrayed a profession which served to knock insolence out of the people, rather than increase it as they themselves had done. The tragic consequence of this 'arrogance', #9, was the heavy-handed Roman intervention, #71.

The evaluation of the traditional role of the Alexandrian philosopher raises a number of points. Dio refers to the traditional and highly significant role of philosophers in politeia and adopts a stance towards their behavior which is very much in harmony with that of Rome; Vespasian had evicted them because of their opposition to his rule. That this policy would have met with Dio's approval seems clear given his view of the philosopher described in this oration.²⁸ Dio's charge hits at the Alexandrian philosophers' failure to lead the citizens of their great city, and not at their role as critics of the em-

peror's performance.²⁹ Just as Vespasian dealt harshly with the Cynics in Rome, so too Dio has censured their behaviour in Alexandria because of the denigration of the philosopher's role as saviour and guardian of the city. Dio's description of the role of the ideal philosopher in politeia is noted in other orations such as Or. 36.38, where they 'share in πολιτεία'. In the first Tarsian discourse Dio commended the work of Athenodorus, the Stoic philosopher and former tutor of Augustus, who was sent to reform that city and was subsequently appointed governor. Also, Philostratus tells us that Dio himself was noted as one who 'very often rebuked cities…like one who restrains an unruly horse with the bridle rather than the whip'.³⁰ As a direct result of this, their leadership role has fallen to others.

Dio's concern extends beyond the philosophers' activities and motivations to an interest in what happens when they themselves 'quit the field and are silent'. In Alexandria, to nobody's credit, the orators and poets filled the vacuum. There was a heavy demand for forensic orators because there had sprung up 'a multitude of quarrels and lawsuits, harsh cries, tongues that are mischievous and unrestrained, accusers, calumnies, writs, a horde of professional pleaders', #19.³¹

In addition to the forensic orators, two other groups described as 'those

who are educated' (πεπαιδευμένοι) emerged in the absence of the philosophers. One group, 'those who declaim speeches for display' (oἱ μὲν ἐπιδεικτικοὺς λόγους κτλ.) are identified in the same paragraph as orators. The others are the poets, #10.

Dio tells the Alexandrians there is nothing terribly shocking in what an orator does, even though in his declamations he shows he is 'unlearned'.³² However, he takes exception when orators disguise themselves as philosophers for 'deceitful' motives,³³ performing only for personal gain and 'reputation'.

Two important observations about these deliberative orators emerge from Dio's comments. Firstly, we have seen that the rhetorician filled a leadership role in politeia, normally associated with the Second Sophistic, and obviously already well established in Alexandria. This is corroborated by the role expected of Nicetes of Smyrna, a first-century sophist of Nero's reign who was skilled in both forensic, rhetoric and declamation. He should have addressed the citizens of Smyrna regularly, for they had bestowed upon him their highest honours. Thus when he failed to do so on a regular basis, they accused him of cowardice.³⁴

Secondly, Dio accuses the orators of being 'deceitful', for they feign an interest in the welfare of the citizens, but their real concern is for 'gain and glory'. The accusation that orators were primarily interested in their own pecuniary advantage goes back to the first sophist, Protagoras, who charged fees for lectures.³⁵ This is a charge that the critics of the sophists would find easy to verify, as the evidence of Neilus against Didymus clearly shows.³⁶ Dio, in linking money and reputation, may be suggesting that a substantial fee was

paid to an orator declaiming in the theatre. Alternatively, he could mean that an appearance in the theatre was a form of free advertising by which pupils were attracted to one's school. His words could in some cases mean both, for one established a reputation by appearing there before a large crowd. Philostratus remarks that the path to fame was to present a long oration about one's own renown, for 'this style of speech is likely to win favour for sophists in their public declamations'.³⁷ Reputation could attract great honours, and there were very famous sophists upon whom such were bestowed as Philostratus records.³⁸ Dio conceives of the rhetor's mission as addressing the public in place of the philosophers in order to improve the conduct of the body politic. Not only does he indict the philosophers for failing in this responsibility to the citizens, but he condemns the orators who do appear, because they are simply self-seeking.

The poets, as 'those who are educated' (πεπαιδευμένοι) also had a right to centre-stage in politeia. Dio had already alluded to their role in Athens where they had confronted not only the individual citizens for misdemeanours, but also the city-state. He counted this to their credit, and regrets that Alexandria had neither this tradition nor the poets 'to reprove you in all friendliness and reveal the weaknesses of your city', #6-7.³⁹ He laments that Alexandria, 'the second Athens', has not followed the Athenian precedent. They have no chorus, no poets, nor anyone else to admonish them, #7. He reminds them that originally poets were regarded as being possessed by the Muses when they spoke their messages from the gods, but the more recent poets speak of their own wisdom in the assembly. 'Uninitiated addressing uninitiated', he concludes. The poets who have stood before the Alexandrians have adjusted their presentation to suit the foibles of the audience as they 'sing' their poems, Or. 36.35-38.

Dio directs his hostility not at the poets' profession per se but at the fact that the Alexandrian poets, like the orators, practice deception. They come in the guise of philosophers for their own financial and personal advancement rather than for the improvement of the citizens. He illustrates both groups' lack of professional integrity by revisiting the medical analogy we saw above: a physician would not disregard the treatment and ultimate care of his patient by bringing useless gifts of flowers and perfumes or even harmful gifts

such as courtesans, #10. Yet orators and poets have done precisely this to the Alexandrians.

Generalisations are tempered with the ironical observation that a few have displayed frankness before the Alexandrian audience. Yet even those have been found wanting. They have merely uttered 'a phrase or two' and, after berating rather than enlightening the audience, they have fled from the theatre lest they should be expelled from the city, #11.

Having denounced those motivated by false motives and the few who panicked and fled, Dio then spells out the qualifications of the person whom Alexandria really needs.

But to find a man who in plain terms, and without guile speaks his mind with frankness, and neither for the sake of reputation nor for gain makes false pretension, but out of good will and concern for his fellow-men stands ready, if need be, to submit to ridicule, and the disorder and uproar of the mob — to find such a man is not easy, but rather the good fortune of a very lucky city, so great is the dearth of noble, independent souls. (#11)

The Alexandrians, however, are fortunate, for Dio, unlike 'the abundance of flatterers, impostors and sophists', offers himself as that fearless, noble and independent soul.⁴⁰

Dio's self-promotion as the ideal wise leader and adviser at this point is the culmination of his synkrisis with orators and poets, but it is by no means the end of it, for he has another criticism of them. He returns to the theme in #39 where he asserts that his aim is not 'to compare' himself (παραβάλλειν) with those 'who habitually sing such strains, whether orators or poets'.⁴¹ While denying that he wishes to engage in synkrisis with poets and orators, he very skilfully does exactly that by alluding to the superiority of the theme he treats. They praise the Alexandrians by praising their environs: Dio argues that only praise of men's virtue has value, and then spells out three of the traditional four cardinal virtues and a host of subsidiary ones, #39b-

40.⁴² The gods provide a remedy for the city's ills 'education and reason' (παιδεία καὶ λόγος), #16 (cf. #3). Since those who should have administered the medicine failed because they were preoccupied with money and reputation, Dio must serve in their place to ensure that by constant application of the cure of the gods, the Alexandrians can come at last to 'a healthy, happy end', #16. He thus establishes his credentials before the Alexandrians by clearly demonstrating the inadequacy of those who have claimed for themselves leadership roles in the city, namely sophists and poets. He has done so through the skilful use of synkrisis and finally through invoking his appointment by a god at whose bidding he speaks. Dio tells them it is the will of a certain god that he should speak to them. He also declares that this god must not only be thought to speak in dreams or through young boys, but 'if one hears words of wisdom, we must believe that they too were sent by god', #12-14⁴³

He also refers to those involved in philosophy and rhetoric in his denunciation of citharody,⁴⁴ asserting that 'the people of Alexandria are carried away by song as no other people are, and that if they hear the music of the lyre, however bad, they lose their senses', #65.⁴⁵ This mania had a considerable effect on philosophers, including Cynics, as well as orators and sophists, because they adjusted their style to this whim of the Alexandrians, #68.

Dio sees a correlation between, on the one hand, the singing mania of the citizens and their intellectual leaders, and on the other, the subsequent social disorder. He may have drawn this connection from Plato who, in his Republic, proposed to ban new music styles because he felt that they promoted social and political unrest.⁴⁶ 'Singing' is to Dio's mind a 'disease' which infects not only orators but also philosophers, #68. Some suggest that his claim to being a poor singer contains a sarcastic allusion to declaimers, #22, and that the 'singing' refers to a form of chanting, or even to the delivery of the peroration of a

speech in a sing-song fashion. Philostratus suggests that the sophists spoke in a sing-song voice suited to the metrical rhythms of the Asianists, especially in the peroration where the use of this term was meant to sway the audience or the jury.⁴⁷ This last suggestion may explain Dio's slur that if you passed a courtroom, you could not easily decide whether you heard a drinking party or a trial. Likewise if there was a sophist's lecture room in the neighbourhood, you would not know that a lecture was in progress. Quintilian also complains that this new trend Outrages the dignity of the courts with noises such as are dear to the Lycians and Carians', a reference to the Asianists' style.⁴⁸ Earlier Dio indicates that Alexandria was not alone in this, for he has heard philosophers 'singing' elsewhere, but singing Cynics are an Alexandrian first, #62.⁴⁹

These comments provide clear evidence of a capitulation to audience demands, and, more importantly, of philosophers necessarily responding to innovation by orators and sophists. The rebuke by Isaeus to his student Dionysius of Miletus, 'Young man from Ionia, I did not train you to sing', seems to have availed nothing. Dio had no greater success with his pupil Favorinus when he attempted to discourage this affectation.⁵⁰ Audience response and popular demand were the final arbiter in these matters and thus usurped the power to determine the shape of oratory. Dio, Quintilian and Isaeus witness and oppose, but fail to arrest, this trend. Dio's warning to the unruly Alexandrians and their singing philosophers, poets and orators, and even the threat of further political instability in Alexandria, could not stem the tide.⁵¹ The leaders do not censure, they all sing.

In a further explanation of the functions of orators and sophists in Alexandria, #68, Dio refers to two known facts about these professionals. Firstly, the orators' courtroom activity fulfils a well-established role, which is clearly attested elsewhere in Dio and in other literary, as well as non-literary sources.⁵² Secondly, the sophists in their lecture rooms teach students to declaim, as documented in P.Oxy. 2190 and in Philostratus.53 Dio refers to the possibility of having a sophist in one's neighbourhood, suggesting that they were visible in Alexandrian life, #68b. Again he engages in synkrisis between himself and such people in terms of his role, for he is noble, while they are 'flatterers and impostors', # 10-11,68.

This picture of Alexandrian orators and sophists in Or. 32 is not peculiar to that speech; it occurs also in Dio's Olympian discourse. He there describes them as 'able orators, most charming writers of both verse and prose, and finally, like gorgeous peacocks, sophists in great numbers, men who are lifted aloft as on wings by their fame and disciples', Or. 12.5. He expresses 'Socratic' surprise that his audience deigns to listen to him, 'a man who knows nothing and makes no claim of knowing'. In the city of his birth he denies possessing ability as an orator in the marketplace and in litigation, and hastens to add that he once appeared in court on behalf of a man whose chance of a fair trial was remote. He claims to seek no patronage or pay from anybody. This synkrisis is part of a skilful commendation of his own integrity, especially as he proceeds to hint that his pursuit of the interests of the state led him to neglect his own property, Or. 43.61.

One also sees views of the orators at work in Dio's speeches.⁵⁴ Some are only concerned with money, 'twisting and warping' unclear laws with eloquence and perverting justice.⁵⁵ Some 'advise the state' (συμβουλεύειν) and help legislate on its behalf.⁵⁶ In Tarsus 'the orators' alone were allowed to

make public speeches, possibly a reference to occasions when an official encomium was required, Or. 34.1. Dio envisages the orator 'in the noble and real sense of the word', but recognises that like their counterparts in court, there are good and bad orators. Some stoop to seek bribes, Or. 22.2-5.

In discussing sophists, Dio notes that some have schools. While some of these do their task well, others fail their students, 'leaving them to grow old in ignorance'. Their flawed approach to paideia robs men of the classical virtues.⁵⁷ They are mercenary, engaging in rivalry with other sophists; their pupils, out of loyalty, contribute to the factionalism.⁵⁸

The sophists also have a leadership role in the polis with accompanying social status, and are courted by communities and officials as well as pupils.⁵⁹ They advise kings though they do not know how to live themselves. Dio states that they are as ineffectual as eunuchs.⁶⁰ They love their reputation and so never say anything to offend their audience; thus they simply expound the views of their hearers. He parodies the sort of sophist whose liver swelled when praised and shrivelled when censured,⁶¹ and complains that they will not debate with him, even claiming that they hate him.⁶² His attacks on the ancient sophists are also applied to his contemporaries.⁶³

The above views correspond in the main with those expressed in Or. 32 as they portray the movement in various parts of the empire. Indeed, this brief review of Dio's opinion of orators and sophists in his corpus explicates the picture of the movement in Alexandria. One easily gains the impression of a 'blanket condemnation' of sophists, and this may be why the term 'sophist' itself is thought by some to be pejorative. However, Moles demonstrates that this is not the case in Dio, and provides a far more balanced presentation of the evidence than either C. P. Jones or P. Desideri.⁶⁴ He notes Dio's pains to reas-

sure his audience that he is not attacking all sophists:⁶⁵ 'However my remarks are not levelled at all sophists, for there are some who follow that calling honourably and for the good of others, men to whom we should pour libation and offer incense' (Or. 35.10). The term itself, therefore, does not have negative connotations. There are honourable virtuoso orators to contrast with those who are not worthy of the name. In Or. 4.35 Dio can speak of 'so-called sophists', implying that the term is inappropriate to some who claim it because they do not conform to the standards of their profession.⁶⁶ The phrase 'the most ignorant sophist' leaves open the possibility that some are not ignorant, as Dio observes elsewhere.⁶⁷ While contemporaries of Dio balked at designating the ancient Seven Sages as 'sophists', Dio did not.⁶⁸ Or. 71 provides an elaborate synkrisis of philosophers and sophists with Hippias. While that philosopher is certainly superior, Dio notes that this well-known ancient sophist had a high degree of skill in both manual and intellectual pursuits.⁶⁹ In discussing a case of bribery Dio tells his audience his criticisms are not against the art of rhetoric nor against good exponents but rather against bad ones. Moles maintains that Dio's most revealing comment is found in Or. 19.3ff, where he says, 'whenever I attend a sophist's lecture, on account of an uncontrolled craving which possesses me for the spoken word…and this is the way I have nearly always been affected when listening to sophists and orators'. Moles rightly adds that this is hardly Dio the aggressive philosopher, scourge of all sophists.⁷⁰ Dio's use of the term 'sophist' thus needs to be reviewed.

Jones suggests that the word is used pejoratively, usually of the philosophers, but tentatively cites only one example, Or. 32.11.⁷¹ It needs to be noted, however, that Dio does not use either σοφιστής or σοφιστικός when speaking of philosophers. When he critiques the behaviour of those whom he opposes he refers to 'those who are called philosophers'. Of the seventy occurrences of the term 'philosopher' in his orations, it never appears as a collocation with σοφιστής.⁷² Had Dio used 'sophist' of charlatan or impostor philosophers, then Or. 34.3 would have provided him with the ideal opportunity to do so. In that discourse the philosophers of Tarsus had been guilty of some misdemeanour. But Dio instead encourages the citizens not to curse all philosophers, for no person is a philosopher who is unjust, wicked, among the Brachmanes, or who harms their country or bands together against their fellow citizens. Just as J. Glucker complains that the later meaning of καθηγητής, namely that of 'professor', has been read back into the earlier period, so too in the case of Dio, our pejorative connotations of 'sophist' have been read into the first-century philosophers.⁷³

Secondly, even Jones hesitates to cite Or. 32.11 in support of his contention that the term is usually used pejoratively of philosophers. There Dio contrasts the dearth of noble, independent souls with the abundance of 'flatterers, impostors and sophists'. Later in the oration he uses these same terms after his encomium, #39, this time while instructing the crowd not to compare him with those who 'habitually sing such strains, whether orators or poets'. His reason is that they are 'clever persons, mighty sophists, wonderworkers' (δεινοὶ ἐκεῖνοι καὶ μεγάλοι σοφισταὶ καὶ γόητες), while in comparison he is 'quite ordinary and prosaic', #39. Why does Dio use these terms κόλαξ and γόης with σοφιστής? They were used of sophists by both Plato and Demosthenes, and in his own lifetime, by Philo, to reflect the bewitching effect they had on audiences.⁷⁴ Thus 'flatterer' and 'impostor' were used pejoratively of sophists, but the term 'sophist' was not used by Dio to pillory philos-

ophers. Or. 32.11 does not support Jones' thesis concerning the identification of sophists with philosophers but instead places them on opposite sides of the scales. The sophists in Dio were a specific group of public orators and poets in Alexandria; hence the term is to be understood in the technical sense of a virtuoso orator with a large public following.⁷⁵

From Dio's evidence we extract important information on the activities of orators and sophists in Alexandria in the first century. The former group were involved in forensic activity and declamations in Alexandria. The latter group ran schools, declaimed publicly and stood in the place of traditional leaders of the polis, namely the philosophers. In Dio's opinion, however, they proved to be ineffectual because their chief concerns were fame and wealth. He laments their occupying the place vacated by the philosophers, for they did not seek to improve the citizenry at a time when someone was desperately needed to admonish and persuade the people to a less belligerent frame of mind towards Vespasian and the Roman authorities in Alexandria.

The oration shows that there is a dearth of willing philosophers and sophists, that is, willing to come forward and advise the Alexandrians — but not a dearth per se. As will be demonstrated in the following chapter, there were 'multitudes of sophists' in this city in the first half of the first century. Dio's evidence is corroborated by Philo, who paints a picture of the same vigorous activity of the sophists.

It is important to note that the term 'sophist' was not used pejoratively by Dio. Invective such as 'flatterer' and 'impostor' was invoked when speaking in a derogatory way against them. Dio's derisive terminology was not peculiar to him, but had a history stretching back to Plato and used by many. This suggests that they were stock-in-trade terms of abuse against the sophists. But 'sophist' was never such a term, nor was it used of philosophers.