In Quod detenus potiori insidiari soleat, Philo deals more fully than anywhere else in his corpus with the subject of debating (συζήτησις) with the sophists.²³ He distinguishes 'shadow' debates from genuine ones. Choosing Cain and Abel, because of their conflict, to epitomise the sophist and the layman²⁴ he warns his fellow Jews, 'the friends of Moses',²⁵ who were 'laymen' in rhetoric, not to accept a challenge from the sophists to a debate. He then discusses who should in fact engage the sophists, which affords him yet another opportunity to reinforce the importance of virtue for those who love God, be they laymen or orators.

Debating and not declaiming

Philo asserts from the beginning of this work that Cain's invitation to Abel to come 'to the plain' was an invitation to a disputation, not simply to a declamation given by the sophists, Det. 1. Philo later differentiates between these distinct events by comparing a disputation with the activity of a boxer engaged in actual combat, and a 'declamation' (ἐπίδειξις) with another who is engaged in shadow boxing.²⁶ The images are apposite because σκιαμάχειν means 'to fight in the shade' and is applied figuratively to activity 'in the

school', #41.²⁷ Declamations were not only carried out in public, but, as we have already seen, were also important school exercises.²⁸

The real abilities of the contestants, however, are needed not for declaiming, but for debating. Thus Philo considered debate no showpiece but a 'contest and desperate battle', #1,²⁹ the danger of which he stresses by treating 'the plain' as the location of this debate in the opening section of Det. 1-31.

Qualifications for debating

If debating is such a serious activity, who should accept the challenge to a disputation? In Philo's judgement, Abel should certainly never have done so, for he had 'never learnt the art of rhetoric' (τεχναί λόγων), #37. Philo reaffirms this in Migr. 75 where Abel is said to be untrained (περὶ λόγους) and thus is defeated by Cain. In spite of his many natural endowments, fault is found with Abel because he actually accepted the challenge instead of remaining silent. He ought to have ignored his quarrelsome brother, for Philo adds that 'the village sages usually get the worst of it when they encounter those who acquire the cleverness of the town'.³⁰ Elsewhere he discusses those who should not engage 'in the war waged by the sophist', designating them ἰδιῶται, Agr. 159-65. They include not only those who have never been instructed in rhetoric, but even 'those who are beginning to learn, those making progress and "those who have reached perfection". Experience had shown they were defeated for different reasons: the beginner [was overthrown] because of his lack of experience, the man who was progressing because he was incomplete, the man who had reached completeness because he was unpractised in virtue', Agr. 160.³¹ Philo later in Agr. 143 distinguishes these three groups from sophists, and both from men in gen-

eral.³² The 'unlearned' thus include not only students of rhetoric, but also those who have graduated from such schools. The graduates often fail, however, because they lack training in virtue.

Philo suggests that no shame derives from declining to debate with the sophists; indeed, friends will consider 'shrinking back' from the challenge of 'the enemy' prudent, not cowardly, Det. 37. Moses did precisely this because he was not 'eloquent', which Philo argues is the equivalent to saying he had no gift, literally, 'he did not have the defences against the rhetoric of eloquence and plausible arguments based on specious guess-work', #38. He thus imputes to Moses the notion that to engage in conflicts with the sophists before undergoing a thorough training in all ἰδέαι would have been wrong, #39.³³ It is important for the unprepared not to join the fray with the sophists, but to keep quiet and so win the prize which involves no risks. Such is the task of the man who has been equipped with all virtues, #42.

Philo praises those who pursue virtue, calling them 'experts' not in rhetoric,³⁴ but in praiseworthy deeds. They alone make the soul the treasure house of the good without even a thought for the 'juggling tricks of rhetoric', #35a.³⁵

Another group, however, also seeks virtue; thus they too may enter into disputations with the sophists. Their strength is twofold: they fortify themselves by 'wisdom in counsel' and good works, and their speech with the art of rhetoric, #35b. All who possess good works and words are thus equipped to successfully counter the wranglings of the sophists, #36. They can then expose the sophists as mere 'shadow boxers' and not real combatants. While shadow boxers may win the admiration of fellow boxers, they 'are thought very little of when they engage in a real match', #42.

The sophists' debating

Philo then cites in toto an argument the sophists present to defend their lifestyle.³⁶ They contend that because 'the body is the soul's house', the physical

senses that surround the soul are indeed its 'allies and friends'. The senses thus have value equal to that of the soul. Since nature intended that 'pleasures and enjoyment and the delights that meet us all the way through life' should appeal to our senses, they must be legitimate. It follows then that 'the πλοῦτος, δόξα, τιμή, ἀρχή and "everything else of that sort" exist not only for our security, but also for our happiness', #33. Thus in the sophists' hands ἀρετή had effectively degenerated into 'a kind of amoral "art of success"'.³⁷

The sophists' argument is extremely interesting, for it shows how the imagery associated with Plato's trilocation of the soul was developed and interpreted in the first century A.D. not only by the sophists but by others as well.³⁸ It allowed them to insist that their status, privileges and pleasures were the quite legitimate result of treating the senses as 'friends and allies'. They further added that nature did not create enjoyable sense experiences for the dead and the unborn, but for the living. Hence the enjoyment of their lifestyle was not wrong; indeed, their 'success' proved that they were right while their opponents  — the so-called seekers after virtue — were wrong.

'The mode of life of these two is a witness of the truth of what I say (μάρτυς ὁ βίος τούτων)', #33.³⁹

Sophists' μάρτυς		Opponents' μάρτυς
ἔνδοξοι		ἄδοξοι
πλούσιοι		εὐκαταφρόνητοι
ἡγεμόνες		ταπεινοί
ἐπαινούμενοι		τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐνδεεῖς
τιμώμενοι		ὑπηκόων καὶ δούλων ἀτιμότεροι
ὑγιεινοί		ῥυπῶντες
πιόνες		ὠχροί
ἐρρωμένοι		κατεσκελευμένοι
ἁβροδίαιτοι		λιμόν ὑπ' ἀσιτίας ἐμβλέποντες
θρυπτόμενοι		νοσωρώτατοι
πόνον οὐκ εἰδότες
ἡδοναῖς συζῶντες		μελετῶντες ἀποθνῄσκειν	(#34)

The sophists expounded thus on the witness of their wealth, glory, honour and authority, proclaiming themselves to be 'men of mark and wealth, holding leading positions, praised on all hands, recipients of honours, portly, healthy and robust, revelling in luxurious and riotous living, knowing nothing of labour, conversant with pleasures which carry the sweets of life to the all-welcoming soul by every channel of sense' (#34b).⁴⁰ With a series of antonyms they argued that their opponents were 'almost without exception obscure people, looked down upon, of mean estate, destitute of the necessities of life, not enjoying the privileges of subject peoples or even of slaves, filthy, sallow, reduced to skeletons, with a hungry look from want of food, the prey of disease, in training for dying' (#34a).⁴¹

It is unclear whether the detractors are referring to the Jews in general or specifically to the Therapeutai community.⁴² If the former, then the 'almost without exception' acknowledges only a few notables, and may refer to Philo's family, who enjoyed wealth and influence in Alexandria.⁴³ Certainly, when taken as a whole, the derogatory comments of the sophists describe a group without status.

If, alternatively, these words refer to the Therapeutai, then the transfer of property to their children upon joining the community and the general renunciation of material possessions could explain the language. Philo does speak of 'their longing for the deathless and blessed life', Contempl. 13. The fact that he discusses the activities of this community by means of a synkrisis with orators and sophists need not imply that his readers only knew of the activities of those he opposed. In fact, Philo may be engaged in a counter synkrisis in De vita contemplativa in response to the sophists' pillorying of the Therapeutai as the seekers of virtue as described in Det. 32-34. Self-control was the foundation of life for those whom Philo endorsed, and upon it they

'built other virtues', pressing on 'to reach the summit of virtue' which 'procured for them God's friendship', Contempl. 34, 72, 90.

Defeating the sophists

Philo maintained that those with a thorough training in 'the styles of rhetoric' (περὶ τὰς τῶν λόγων ἰδέας) will conquer the sophists, Det. 41. He as much as repeats this when he insists that one wins 'sophistic debates' (ἀγὼν σοφιστικός) by carefully attending to λόγοι, not only for the purpose of eluding an opponent's grip, but for taking the offensive and proving one's own superiority in artistry and power, Migr. 82.

While Moses initially excused himself from 'the well-worded and specious arguments' of the sophists, he did become acquainted with them 'with a view to getting the better of the sophists of Egypt', Migr. 76. He could never have defeated them if he had not been armed with λόγος; and it is by Aaron his mouthpiece, and by Aaron's rod, that 'all the arguments of the sophists are devoured and done away with by the "finger of God"'. This narrative functions as a divine rescript which declares that 'sophistry is ever defeated by wisdom'. So the sorcerers can no longer withstand Moses, 'but fall as in a wrestling-bout vanquished by the sturdy strength of the opponent', Migr. 85. Like Moses, Philo affirms, 'we shall no more sink to the ground through inexperience of the tricks of rhetoric, but we shall spring up and carry on the struggle and disentangle ourselves with ease from the grips which their art has taught them' (Det. 41). So the better can overcome the worse and not, as the title quod detenus potiori insidiari soleat implies, the reverse.

The 'ancient band' of Moses' disciples pursued 'a hard-fought contest', eschewing the paths of 'the present day sophists who have practised arts of speech against the truth', for a royal road, 'true and genuine philosophy' paved with ῥῆμα καὶ λόγος θεοῦ. They despised 'the soft enchantments of pleasure' and 'engaged with a fine severity in the study of what is good and fair', Post 101-2. Philo knew that the sophists of Egypt could only be overcome by those who had adequately prepared for such combat; hence in his own day, only those versed in rhetoric should ever do battle with the sophists.

His advice, then, as outlined in this chapter surely reflects his own methods of engaging the sophists. The manner in which he joined the fray, be it against the Alexandrian Greek delegation in Rome or in his philosophical works and his debates with his nephew, demonstrates both his careful approach to debating and his opinion on who is qualified for such an undertaking.

In concluding this survey of Philo and the sophists it may prove helpful to consider the work of another Hellenised Jew, Caecilius of Calacte.⁴⁴ A contemporary of Philo, he was a rhetorician during the reign of Augustus. His writings include How the Attic Style Differs from the Asian; A Comparison of Demosthenes and Cicero; Essay on Lysias; On the Character of the Ten Orators; and a history of the Servile Wars in Sicily. This list of known works provides clues to his interests. The first essay attempts to overthrow the Asianic style in favour of the pure Attic to which he ardently adhered. The second work drew sharp criticism from Plutarch, who likened him to 'a dolphin on dry land [who] … never knew when to stop' in his criticism of the Latin style. His essay on Lysias sought to demonstrate that orator's superiority over Plato. His magnum opus described the ten Attic orators, and while we cannot be certain, he may well have been responsible for establishing the members of that canon.⁴⁵

According to W. Rhys Roberts, Caecilius was one of 'the two leading critics in the literary world of Greece and Rome'.⁴⁶ Many rhetoricians from the Greek tradition flocked to Rome at the invitation of Augustus and attached themselves to the great Roman houses, as Caecilius did.⁴⁷ He, however, left a greater mark than most on the literary circles of Rome, being cited by Quintilian and Plutarch. Longinus' work on literary criticism, On the Sublime, clearly owes a debt to Caecilius.

The Suda records that 'in faith he was a Jew' (τὴν δόξαν Ἰουδαῖος), not an apostate like Philo's nephew. He stands then on the same ground as Philo, both in his training in rhetoric and in his faith. Yet there is no hint that he ever sought to integrate his training as a rhetorician and literary critic with his Judaism.

Philo, by contrast, went to Rome only briefly, and not to establish any reputation for himself. In terms of his literary output we have his extended

exegetical work on the Pentateuch, his important philosophical treatises and his apologetic works. These were born of a desire to gather together such philosophical insights as he judged to be closest to the thought world of Moses so that he could, having 'discovered' the philosophy embedded in the Pentateuch, offer a sophisticated reading to a new generation.⁴⁸ The contrast with Caecilius could not be sharper.

Moses was for Philo 'the wise man' (πάνσοφος), exceeding in age and wisdom even the Seven Wise Men of the Greeks who flourished as the pillars of civilisation in the seventh and sixth centuries B.C.⁴⁹ While Caecilius thought in terms of a canon of orators, Philo placed Moses at the head of a canon of wise men. As R. Mortley notes, 'the idea of antiquity implies superiority, once a culture has been demonstrated to be the most ancient, it has also been demonstrated to be the source of all others'.⁵⁰ Clement of Alexandria,echoing Numenius the Pythagorean philosopher, asks: "What else is Plato, but Moses speaking Attic Greek (Μωυσῆς ἀττικίζων)?'⁵¹ The same notion vivifies Philo's overall enterprise.

Philo's war against contemporary sophistic activity was an outworking of this perspective. He believed that conflicts in which noted OT characters engaged provided the paradigm for his evaluation of the sophists, with Plato's critique of them and their 'magic' presenting the key which enabled him to identify the magicians of Egypt with the sophists of Alexandria. Philo thus did not unthinkingly 'borrow' the ideas simply because he found them helpful.

Our chapters on Philo derive from his writings a description of the sophistic tradition which shows little variation in their activities from Philodemus' era to Philo's day and that reflected in Philostratus' Lives. Philostratus does not distinguish between the activities of first-century sophists during the Principate of Nero onward and those of great second-century

representatives such as Herodes Atticus. The evidence from Philo's corpus surely challenges the view of Philostratus that the Second Sophistic began in earnest in Nero's Principate. The same characteristics and trends which characterised the Second Sophistic are in fact to be found a century before Philo, if the evidence of Philodemus is accepted, and we have no reason to doubt its veracity when he discusses the sophists of his own day.

Philo has proved to be an important but largely neglected commentator on the social world of the first half of the first century,⁵² and a significant witness to, and critic of, the sophistic tradition in the East. In the second half of this book we will turn to Paul's interaction with, and assessment of, the sophistic tradition as he experienced it, before comparing and contrasting the ways in which both men confronted this exceedingly powerful movement in their day.