While the background of Paul's opponents in 2 Corinthians has been the subject of considerable discussion,³ our concern is with their assessment of his performance in 2 Corinthians 10.10 and 11.6. They claimed that he was 'unpresentable' in appearance as a public speaker (ἡ παρουσία τοῦ σώματος ἀσθενής), and that by contemporary canons of speaking he was 'inarticulate'(ὁ λόγος ἐξουθενημένος, 10.10). He was only a layman in oratory (ἰδιώτης τῷ λόγῳ, 11.6) who used underhanded methods to obtain financial support for his ministry (12.14-18).

Paul as an orator: 2 Corinthians 10.10

The disparity between Paul's letters, described as βαρεῖαι καὶ ἰσχυραί, and his actual 'bodily presence' and 'contemptible speech' provided the impetus for his opponents' criticism in 2 Corinthians 10.10.⁴ This disparity elicited comment, 'They are saying' (ὅτι…φησίν), from his opponents and solidified his image as an unpresentable and inarticulate public speaker in a city highly conscious of rhetorical prowess.⁵

³For a summary see J. J. Gunther, St Paul's Opponents and Their Background: A Study of Apocalyptic and Jewish Sectarian Teaching, Supp. NovT XXXV (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 1; E. Earle Ellis, 'Paul and His Opponents', in Prophecy and Hermeneutic in Early Christianity (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1978), ch. 6, and more recently R. P. Martin, 2 Corinthians (Waco: Word, 1986), pp. 336-42.

Writing versus extempore orators

2 Corinthians 10.10 presupposes a dichotomy, observed by his opponents, between Paul's letters on the one hand and his personal presence and public speech on the other. This verse reflects a continuing debate among the sophists over written versus extempore oratory,⁶ an argument begun in the fourth century B.C.⁷ An excellent example of this debate is found in the exchanges between Alcidamas and Isocrates.⁸

Alcidamas, in his work On the Writers of Written Discourse or On the Sophists, conceded that sophists who engaged in literary rhetoric or written speeches might be able to write well. There was, however, no guarantee that the clever writer could speak acceptably extempore. If he tried, he would suffer 'mental embarrassment, wanderings and confusion' (#9,16). He may be able to write 'with extreme care, rhythmically connecting phrases, perfecting style', but when compelled to speak extempore 'in every respect he makes an unfavourable impression, and differs not a whit from the voiceless' (ἰσχνός), #16a.⁹ Indeed, 'through lack of a ready presence of mind he is quite unable to handle his material fluently or winningly' (#16b). Alcidamas believed that written discourses should not be called real speeches (λόγοι δίκαιοι) because they are 'wraiths, semblances and imitations' (#27-28). He further insisted that extempore speakers held a greater influence over their audience because of their spontaneity than those who delivered written speeches (#22). The writings of Alcidamas and Aristotle testify to the fact that in courts of law and in assembly both written and extempore speeches were allowed.¹⁰ Alcidamas,

however, opposed forensic orators engaged in 'speech writing' (λογογραφία) and deliberative orators dependent on a manuscript.¹¹ Therefore he formulated an especially sharp distinction between written discourse and extempore oratory. The exponents of the former were bound to fail in the latter, although, according to Alcidamas, the extempore orator could readily engage in the former.¹² A much later observer noted in the Scholia of Aristides, the public orator persuades more than written speeches.¹³.

Alcidamas' work responded to attacks found in Isocrates' discourse Against the Sophists (391 B.C.). The latter was written as he commenced a career as a teacher of rhetoric, having spent 403-392 B.C. as a speech writer (λογογράφος) for Athenian law courts. Among those he attacked were the teachers of rhetoric who advertised that they could fashion all who followed their instruction into eloquent orators. Isocrates opposed extempore speech and, although the antithetical position he adopted was related in some ways to his background and his inability to speak in public, he also believed that 'oratory is only good if it has the qualities of fitness for the occasion, propriety of style, and originality of treatment'.¹⁴ He disapproved of those who taught deliberative oratory because they promised to make orators of students regardless of natural ability and experience (#9-10).

This dichotomy in rhetoric was firmly established in Isocrates' time as his polemical work, The Antidosis, written many years later, was to show. The predominant emphasis on declamation in education among orators in the first century A.D. demonstrates further the primacy of extempore speech over written speeches,¹⁵ an emphasis reflected in 2 Corinthians 10.10. Dio Chrysostom reiterated the common opinion when he said, 'he who utters his thoughts aloud is more nearly in the mood of a man addressing an audience than one who writes … it contributes more to your habit of readiness'.¹⁶

Paul's letters: 2 Corinthians 10.10a

Rosenmeyer subjected three collections of letters from the imperial period, namely those of Alciphron, Aelian and Philostratus, to a detailed examina-

tion. All were from the Second Sophistic, and of them she writes, 'These letters were masterpieces of rhetorical display, paeans to classicism'.¹⁷ In her discussion of the letters of Alciphon she suggests that two terms, 'rhetor' and 'Atticist', best described him as a letter writer. They were concerned not only with ancient themes but also with language styles because they looked back tothe fifth and fourth century B.C. in both respects. They demonstrated rhetorical skills and knowledge of ancient classical sources from a culture of letter writing.¹⁸

It is also interesting to read Cicero's letters to his friends, recently published in three volumes in the Loeb series, for the picture they present of him. It is best summed up by the recent editor of his letters, when he wrote, 'He [Cicero] failed to realise that self-praise can defeat its end. Alongside the image of the wise dauntless patriot which he tried to project into posterity has arisen the counter image of a windbag, a spiteful, vainglorious egotist…The flabbiness, pomposity and essential fatuity of Ciceronian rhetoric at its too frequent worst does him more damage than any epistolary "secrets'". He noted the view of those letters in antiquity: 'Asinius Pollio's son wrote a book comparing Cicero with his own father to the disadvantage of the former. This may have criticised him mainly as an orator and stylist, like another production entitled "Cicero whipped".'¹⁹ So letters were self-disclosing documents of their authors and could evoke reaction and assessments unintended by those who framed them.

What was said of Paul's letters? He actually related a comment made about them 'that (ὅτι) "on the one hand", he is saying [or 'as the saying goes'], "the letters are weighty and strong'", and by way of contrast it was said, "on the other hand his bodily presence is weak and his speech is contemptible'" (10.10). The immediate context concerns his use of authority or power over the congregation for what others saw as destructive purposes (10.8). T. Morgan has drawn attention to how those trained in rhetoric harnessed it fortheir own purposes. She demonstrates that 'the virtuous and cultured man controls his socio-cultural inferiors…The first is the way in which the ability to speak is constructed among elite writers as a correlate of power; the second is the relationship…between the spoken and written forms of right language'.²⁰ Those who were trained in rhetoric realised that they had a tool at

their disposal which made them superior to those without such an education. 'Nowhere is this clearer than in passing references to those who have learnt no rhetoric'. They are seen as being unable to act either rationally or effectively. 'If, occasionally and despite all ideology to the contrary, they are found speaking, their speech is inadequate and ineffective.' Is this paralleled in Paul's situation with the Corinthian Christians?

Paul himself notes that others accused him of intimidating the Corinthian congregation 'through the letters' (διὰ τῶν ἐπιστολῶν), clearly the ones he had written (10.8-10a). At the same time his detractor or detractors observed a discrepancy between his written letters and his speech, presumably in some public setting, charging that he cut a sorry figure because his presence and his presentation were grossly inadequate (10.10). The following sections address the two issues of his letters and his public persona.

Although no clear indication is given as to who actually made these comments, 2 Corinthians 10-13 certainly provides some clues. Paul simply refers to 'such a one' (ὁ τοιοῦτος) (10.11). He later makes reference to others in 10.12-15; 11.13-15. What that person was saying or citing (10.10) is signalled by the marker 'that' (ὅτι) and the verb φησίν, which is in the third person singular. It has generally been translated as 'they say', but it can also be rendered either as 'he is saying', 'it is said' or 'as the saying goes'.²¹ The absence of any pronouns in 10.10 may indicate that it is some sort of stock saying or summary of a widely accepted view. What is clear from the context is that Paul's letters have been subjected to scrutiny by his Corinthian detractors, and on three occasions in three consecutive sentences the term 'letters' is referred to (10.9-11).

What was being said about them? They were reported to have been 'weighty' or 'impressive' (βαρύς) and 'strong' (ἰσχυρός). C. Forbes has argued that the word βαρύς means 'indignation', citing in support the second-century-A.D. work of Hermogenes, where that word itself refers to a technique used by orators who felt themselves to have been badly treated or maligned. While Paul could have used this rhetorical technique to refute his opponents, can it be said that his letters are full of 'righteousness indignation'? More importantly, it does not seem to be the case that it is Paul's defensiveness in the light of criticism that is being discussed but rather the criticism by

others of his letters that he is recording. In Lucian's Dialogues of the Dead, an injunction is given to the rhetorician to throw away 'interminable arguments,²² your antithesis, balanced clauses, periods, foreign phrases, and everything else that makes your speech so "impressive" (βαρύς).'²³ The word βαρύς is used there in connection with the rhetorical techniques cited in the first part of the sentence, not of a particular one bearing that name; in other words, it is descriptive of them, as the context indicates.²⁴ When Lucian used the term 'impressive' preceded by 'interminable argument' (ἀπεραντολογίαν),²⁵ the context and the particular sentence can be taken to be pejorative in tone in its criticism of the rhetorician. It has been noted of the other term, 'strong' (ἰσχυρός), used in 10.10 that it is found elsewhere as a description of stylistic qualities: 'forcefulness, strength and vigour'.²⁶ Liddell and Scott propose 'vigorous', based on Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Literary Composition 22, who discusses the special character of what is called the 'austere style' whose characteristic is such that 'it requires that the words shall stand on their own feet and occupy strong [or 'vigorous'] positions (στάσεις ἰσχυράς)'. He proceeds to discuss the way in which parts of sentences can be separated from each other by considerable distances. It does not mind admitting harsh and dissonant collocations. If the translations are correct, then something is possibly being said here about the style and the impact of Paul's letters.

What have ancient historians whose specialty is ancient rhetoric made of Paul's letters? J. Fairweather, whose expertise is rhetorical forms in Greek and Latin sources, and in rhetoric Seneca the Elder in particular, undertook a lengthy investigation into the style of Paul's letter to the Galatians. She concluded that the style was not an Atticising one. She cites from a letter the

opinion of D. A. Russell, who is a specialist in classical literature. He concluded that Paul's epistolary style was not really 'suited to writing' (λέξις γραφική), but 'suited to debate' (ἀγωνιστική).²⁷ This is a significant observation from two scholars in ancient history who read the NT from the perspective of their own field of rhetoric.

In discussing the debating style, Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, III. 12.1 noted that 'a different style is suitable to each kind of rhetoric. That of written composition is not the same as that of debate; nor, in the case of the latter, is that of public speaking the same as that of the law courts… For the one requires a knowledge of good Greek, while the other prevents the necessity of keeping silent when we wish to communicate something to others. The style of written composition is most precise, that of debate is most suitable for delivery'. He then observes: "When compared, the speeches of writers appear meagre in public debates, while those of the rhetoricians, however well delivered, are amateurish when read…hence speeches suited for delivery, when delivery is absent, do not fulfil their proper function and appear silly' If it is the case that Paul's style is now judged not to be suited to writing, and the same judgements were made in his own day, what then are we to make of the comments made about his letters in 2 Corinthians 10.10? The term 'vigorous' would certainly have been apposite for a debating mode. What would be made of the description of 'weighty'? They certainly conjure up agnostic activity, that is, athletics and boxing, both of which Paul uses by way of an analogy with respect to his own activities (1 Cor. 9.25-26), and both of which are cited by Aristotle, Art of Rhetoric, 1.5.14. So the question arises as to whether the comment about his letters is not a pejorative one made by his opponents in which his style was deemed to be inappropriate to the sophisticated culture of letter-writing in his day.

What Paul himself says about his own letters (10.11) in response to the description may provide some possible clues as to the significance of the comments made about them by his detractors (10.10). By placing the neuter demonstrative pronoun 'this' (τοῦτο) at the commencement of the sentence, not omitting 'that' (ὅτι), which was often done in such constructions in Koine Greek, and adding (οἷοι), Paul was vigorously dealing with the implications of what he sees as aspersions cast against him (10.10). In 10.11 he refers to 'what we ourselves are by means of λόγος through letters' (oἷoί ἐσμεν τῷ λόγῳ δι' ἐπιστολῶν), we do when present'. While the term λόγος is mentioned in a pejorative comment (10.10b) in connection with his rhetorical delivery (see pp. 222-23), Paul immediately takes it up in a positive sense in relation to his

own letters, 'what we are τῷ λόγῳ δι' ἐπιστολῶν' (10.11). He immediately rejects any distinction being made between what he is by λόγος 'through his letters' in absentia and his 'labour' or 'deed' when present, contending that any alleged inconsistency between them on his part is to be emphatically rejected (10.11).

It may be thought impossible to attach any precise meaning to λόγος in this context. Liddell and Scott record one meaning of λόγος as 'verbal expression or utterance', and comment further under that heading that it is 'coupled or contrasted with words expressed or understood signifying act, fact or truth, etc., mostly in a depreciatory sense'. There are cases where λόγος is coupled with ἔργον which illustrate this dichotomy, and the odious contrast was often implied, according to Merritt on the basis of his survey of ancient literature: 'by fact, not by hearsay I judge' (ἔργῳ κου’ λόγῳ),²⁸ 'the false and the seeming-good are those who do all in word, not in fact' (οἱ λόγῳ ἅπαντα ἔργῳ δὲ οὐδέν), or, conversely, 'one should emulate the deeds and actions of virtue, not the words (ἔργα καὶ πράξια … οὐ λόγους), 'speech is the shadow of action' (λόγος γὰρ ἔργου σκιά). In 10.11 the issue relates not to his speech but to his letters, and therefore a more apposite rendering could be 'argument' or 'teaching'. Under the latter heading Liddell and Scott cite (among other sources) John 5.24. His rejoinder to their comments was that what he was by means of teaching or instruction through his letters while absent, he would be also in deed when present. There was no discrepancy between word and deed on his part.²⁹

After rejecting any charge of inconsistency, he proceeded to justify his response at this stage in his argument for refusing to engage in any comparison, synkrisis, with his detractors (10.12). There the cognate of the term 'compare' was a technical device used by philosophers against sophists and by the latter against each other.³⁰ He explains that he simply does not do this: 'for (γάρ) we are not so bold as to number or compare ourselves with certain of those who commend themselves; but they themselves are without understanding who measure themselves by themselves, and compare themselves with themselves' (10.12). He regards that as a foolish activity in the extreme, however much it may have been done in sophisticated ways by his critics. While those

who made claims to be wise engage in comparison with him and among themselves, he will not do so.

What impression did his detractors mean to convey when they said that his letters (10.10) were 'impressive' or 'weighty' (βαρύς) and 'strong' or 'vigorous' (ἰσχυρός)? There are three possibilities, all with important implications. If the meaning to be given to βαρύς is 'impressive' and to ἰσχυρός is 'vigorous', then they were saying that they were rhetorically impressive — following the example of Lucian (see p. 209). Thus his detractors could have charged, 'He might well argue that in his coming to, and conduct in, Corinth he was anti-sophist renouncing the use of rhetoric in preaching (1 Cor. 1.17; 2.1-5) but look at the letters he has written.' Clearly some in the church concluded that Paul himself operated in a secular way — 'some reckon that we walk according to the flesh. For though we walk in the flesh, we do not war according to the flesh' (10.2-3) — and they now level against him the very charge he had made against them in 1 Corinthians 3.3, namely, 'walking in a secular fashion' (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατούμενοι). Could Paul defend himself if, having so forcefully denounced the use of rhetorical devices for preaching, his own letters betray their use? This could be the reason that Paul was defending himself against the charge of inconsistency (10.11).

If the meaning to be given to these two terms is 'weighty' and 'strong', then it is being said that his letters lay on the conscience of the Christian community in Corinth apostolic paradosis. 1 Corinthians abounds with ethical injunctions that were definitive and binding on the Christians to whom it was written. There is no need to read into the comment any assessment of Paul's rhetorical prowess in his letters. This is the position that Anderson takes: 'The adjective ἰσχυρός ["strong"], and for that matter βαρύς, may say something about Paul's style, but the context must determine this. Yet, even if this were the case, there is no necessary allusion to rhetoric.'³¹ The context, however, does have a rhetorical setting, as the subsequent discussion of 'rhetorical delivery' will show.

The third possibility is that his adversaries were damning Paul by commenting that his letters were written in an inappropriate style. His method of argument was more fitted for the debating situation, but of course he lacked the prerequisite for such an activity, as they noted only too readily (10.10b).

For whom were the comments in 10.10 meant? They were not primarily meant for Paul, but at least for those who had claimed to have 'belonged to Paul' in Corinth (1 Cor. 1.12). There may well have been a wider group, presumably the church as a whole who had originally written seeking Paul's

apostolic ruling on a number of critical issues facing the church (1 Cor. 7.1, 25; 8.1; 12.1; 16.1, 12) and expected a letter in return. It is more possible that the detractors are simply acknowledging the strength of the arguments of Paul and the weight of his apostolic paradosis in response. The issue for his adversaries was a deficiency that disqualified him from any future speaking role in Corinth. He lacked rhetorical delivery, which was critical for any teacher.

Paul took up comments made about his letters in 10.10a and explicated from his perspective the consistency of his modus operandi in relationship to the Corinthians through his letters and what he will prove to be by his actions when present. He did not respond here to the criticism concerning his bodily presence and his public presentation of his message. His detractors focused on Paul's 'rhetorical delivery' (10.10b) — 'on the one hand … and [but] on the other' (αἱ μέν … ἡ δέ). How serious was that deficiency for the first century Corinthians both inside and outside the church? It is to this issue that we now turn in our search to understand Paul's writing and speaking abilities in a culture of sophisticated letter-writing and polished public speaking.

'Rhetorical Delivery' (ὑπόκρισις)

Morgan observes: 'There is no suggestion that the orator's language or argument would be any different in written form; indeed, the contrast depends on its being the same; what vary are the extra-linguistic means of winning the audience'.³² If it was acknowledged that Paul persuaded at least some in Corinth through argumentation in his letters (πείθειν διὰ γραμμάτων), to borrow a phrase from The Scholia of Aristides, how did he measure up when it came to his public presentations? His opponents are reported to have said that his 'bodily presence was weak and his speech was of no account' (10.10b). This was their assessment of what was known as 'rhetorical delivery' (ὑπόκρισις), and D. A. Russell has demonstrated from the second century A.D. that this 'delivery' along the 'histrionic technique' were of supreme importance in public declamations.³³

Philodemus' work On Rhetoric is a neglected, but important, treatise for New Testament scholars interested in the topic of delivery. It contains information for our understanding of the first-century preoccupation with 'rhe-

torical delivery' by the sophists and their audiences.³⁴ That which epitomised the first-century sophistic had also thrived in his time (ca. 110 — ca. 40-35 B.C.). In the second section of book IV of On Rhetoric he conducts a relatively short, but highly informative, discussion of the history of rhetorical delivery and his assessment of it. His analysis will help illuminate the force of the indictment of Paul for his deficiencies in this area.

However, Philodemus was not the first to give attention to the importance of 'delivery' in oratory. Aristotle commented on the subject in the context of style, and opined that delivery 'is of the greatest importance but has not yet been treated by any one'. The reason he gives is that it had only recently appeared in tragedy and rhapsody because, up to this point, poets had acted their own tragedies and did not use professional actors. 'It is clear, therefore, that this is something of the sort in rhetoric as well as in poetry.' Aristotle restricts delivery to the voice and mentions three aspects, namely its volume, harmony and rhythm. 'Those who make proper use of these carry off the prizes in dramatic contests or as actors dominate performances.' To this he adds, 'It is the same in political contests (i.e., the law courts and the public assembly) owing to the corruptness of our forms of government'.³⁵

Aristotle reiterates that there is no treatise on the subject and makes the telling comments that 'rightly considered it is thought vulgar. But since the whole business of rhetoric is to influence opinion, we must pay attention to it, not as being right but necessary… Nevertheless as we have just said, it is of great importance owing to the corruption of the hearer.' He rightly predicted, 'Now, when delivery comes into fashion, it will have the same effect as acting.'³⁶

Although Thrasymachus in Pathos 'attempted to say a few words' on the

subject, according to Aristotle,³⁷ it was the latter's associate and successor, Theophrastus, who was first thought to have discussed the theory of oratorical delivery. In it he not only discussed the use of the voice and its modulation but also added comments on facial expressions and gestures.³⁸

Philodemus himself records a short history of the attitude taken on this subject by ancient orators, and reveals the great importance attached it. He first lists Isocrates, who actually refrained from public appearances because he recognised that he was deficient in rhetorical delivery.³⁹ He reports that Hieronymus said of orations that they are 'easy to read, but hard to deliver in public; there is no fire in them; everything is monotonously smooth. He sounds like a boy speaking through a heroic mask'.⁴⁰ Isocrates' long sentences militated against ease of delivery.⁴¹ Isocrates himself complained that his discourses were read aloud by others 'in the worst possible manner'. Yet he admits how much more persuasive is the spoken discourse, for when read it is 'robbed of the prestige of the speaker, the tones of his voice, the variations which are made in the delivery'.⁴² On his own admission delivery was a crucial ingredient in an oral presentation of his work.

Isocrates was caught up in a vigorous debate with Alcidamas about written versus extempore oratory in which Isocrates was a noted representative of the former position.⁴³ In a later work, The Apodosis, Isocrates shows how firmly entrenched the view of the superiority of extempore oratory had become. Regardless of his objections that, on their premise, his opponents could make the least gifted into a public orator, his own deficiencies in rhetorical delivery forced him to side with those who argued in favour of the overall importance of written orations.

Demosthenes placed great store on delivery, according to Philodemus. 'Yea by Zeus, but (ἀλλά) Demosthenes used to say delivery was the first thing in oratory, and the second and the third', XV.3-6. In this he agreed with Athenaeus, who said that of the parts of rhetoric 'the most important

is delivery', XI. 12-16. Philodemus is highly critical of Demosthenes even though he was seen in the first rank of the orators⁴⁴ — 'Notwithstanding (this reputation) he foolishly said that this element [delivery], which is of assistance to every work and presentation of treatises, is of more importance in rhetoric than in other prose writings', XV.13-19.⁴⁵ Philodemus states that even Demosthenes had surprisingly succumbed to the folly of those who believe that delivery was everything in oratory. Even through he was regarded as a first-rank orator, Demosthenes was criticised by his bitter opponent, Aeschines, because of the timbre of his voice, which he said was shrill as well as loud. Demetrius of Phalerum also criticised him for being too 'artful and oversubtle in his delivery, not straightforward and did not use a good mode' XVI.9-13.⁴⁶

Philodemus concluded, 'Moreover most of the sophists, judged by their writings, delivered wretchedly (ἀθλίω ὑποκεκρίσθαι).' The reason given for this was that 'their long sentences were bad for delivery, just as it was proposed by Demetrios concerning those of Isocrates', XVI.9-13.⁴⁷ To have lumped together the extempore orators with a writing orator was not what one would have expected of the ancient sophists, given their preoccupation with delivery.

How are we to interpret the comment of Philodemus: 'Sophists of the present day have somewhat improved in delivery' when his subsequent comment is 'The formal instruction in delivery is a product of recent foolishness', XVIII. 18? This suggests that only in his time had delivery become a recognised subject in the curriculum for the teaching of rhetoric and that he regarded the formal teaching of its techniques as a mistaken move. Philodemus is certainly seeking to diminish ancient and present-day orators by drawing attention to their deficiency in the very thing which had come to epitomise much of their activity and in which they clearly took so much pride, namely on their rhetorical delivery. At the same time Philodemus criticises recent de-

velopments in it which they considered an improvement but which he brands as a foolish endeavour — 'formal instruction in delivery is a product of recent foolishness', XVII, 18.

What does Philodemus, himself a philosopher, believe about delivery appropriate to his own profession? He commences his discussion by agreeing that delivery is important, for by it a person 'exhibits a statesmanlike presence', 'catches the audience's attention', and, more than that, 'makes the audiencetake notice of and collect' what has been said, 'even sways the [the audience] emotionally' and 'likewise achieves these things', XL 16-25.⁴⁸ 'But if it is fitting for rhetoric to teach this [delivery] rather than dialectic or grammar, one would desire to learn it', XI.25-XII.4. Philodemus later states emphatically that there is no place for the teaching of delivery, XVII. 18 — dialectic and grammar are sufficient. His reason for saying this arises out of his conviction that it is the role of dialectic to teach a person how to argue and grammar how to read, XII.5-8, and this, he says, is what one needs. In a telling comment full of irony he states emphatically, 'Yes, by Zeus, if they claim that delivery in drama come under the aegis of rhetoric, then we congratulate them for [their] intelligence', XII.8-14.⁴⁹

Reference was made at the beginning of this discussion to a form of delivery that Philodemus believed was appropriate to the sphere of philosophy. It was spelt out in terms of the apposite effects 'philosophical delivery' would have upon an audience, XXI. 16-25. Later he adds, 'There is a need of natural good proportions similar to the melody and loftiness and tone and spirit of the voice, and the dignity and proportion and boldness of the face and the hands and the rest of the body', XIV. 19-25.⁵⁰ Here we deduce that 'philosophical' delivery is not restricted to the way in which the voice is used. It concerns the bearing or presence of the whole person standing before the audience and not just the effect his delivery technique has upon them. Furthermore, one is struck by the fact that in certain aspects Philodemus' response on delivery coalesces with that of Isocrates.⁵¹

If the assistance of rhetoricians has not been sought by actors for whom

delivery is crucial to their profession, then, as a philosopher, Philodemus believes that his discipline should be allowed to lay down a 'delivery appropriate to our own sphere'. He is highly critical of rhetoricians for daring to suggest that they alone have formulated an art of delivery, for 'poets and prose writers have a theory of delivery even though they have never committed it to writing', XIII-XIV.7. As a result of the sophists' teaching on delivery, Philodemus accuses them of changing detrimentally the use of the voice and the body, XVI.8-12. He then points to the natural use of delivery by laymen as well as barbarians, XVI.13-14.

Philodemus reveals that 'what the writers on the art of rhetoric (oἱ τεχνογράφοι) have done is to make plain what had been kept secret by the politicians by the subordination of the truth (τὸ κατ' ἀλήθειαν μὲν ὑπάρχον), which presented them as statesmen and public benefactors (σεμνοὶ καὶ καλοὶ κἀγαθοί),⁵² and worst to mislead the audience', XIX.3-10. The latter comment is at the heart of his concerns, namely the deleterious effects of their delivery on the audience, whether it was the jury in the law court or the members of the public assembly. Contrast this with the criterion by which he judges an 'appropriate' delivery, that is, the beneficial effects it has upon the audience who have themselves absorbed what they were meant to learn. This is the view he states at the commencement of his discussion.

This is clearly one, if not his major objection to naming 'political' rhetoric, which included speeches delivered in the courtroom and in the assembly,⁵³ as an 'art' (τέχνη). This conclusion has puzzled scholars. The question has been raised regarding Philodemus' definition of 'art' as 'a faculty or disposition arising from observation of certain common and fundamental things which extend through most particular instances, a faculty which grasps and produces an effect such as only a few who have not learned the art can accomplish, and doing this firmly and surely, rather than conjecturally', XXXVIII.⁵⁴ D. Blank commented, 'On the basis of this definition, Philodemus comes to the remarkable conclusion that sophistic rhetoric ('speech or writing concerned purely with description or praise, and … encomiastic or epideictic rhetoric'), of all things, is a techne, while rhetoric proper (i.e., forensic) and political rhetoric

are not.'⁵⁵ Blank has proceeded with an examination of 'exact' arts such as grammar, music, painting, and sculpture. He comes to the conclusion that '[T]he orator's ability to achieve the goal of persuasion with some regularity by applying rules is what makes sophistic rhetoric an art for Philodemus', and 'it is a transmissible method of using this language to write clear treatises'.⁵⁶ Philodemus' comments on delivery seem to have been overlooked in Blank's discussion, and it is suggested here that they help throw light on 'the remarkable conclusion' less so, if still not entirely explicable. The widespread use of rhetorical delivery and its unhelpful effect upon the audience in the crucial arena of governing the city may have provided one, if not the major reason, for the exclusion of 'political' rhetoric from Philodemus' definition of an 'art'.

The reason for this suggestion is that once again the age-old conflict between the philosophers and the sophists has emerged with a little variation. Whether it was over the issue of charging fees or the use of sophisticated forms of rhetorical showmanship such as were taught under the heading of delivery, the former were forced to mount a long defence, while the latter continued to win the day in the field of education (παιδεία) and public life (πολιτεία). As Dio Chrysostom was to remind an audience in Alexandria in the A.D. 70s, philosophers had quit the field in their advice to 'the People', and their role had been usurped by the orators and sophists. Parents and 'the People' had voted with their feet and were only too anxious to enrol their sons in the sophists' schools. Alas, for the philosophers of his day, they no longer held centre stage in the public's estimation.

It is important to note that Philodemus was not dismissive of rhetoric per se. One has only to read the extant portion of section I of book IV which deals with rhetorical 'expression' to be aware of the importance he attached to the various categories discussed under this heading, namely 'correctness', 'clarity', 'forcefulness', 'brevity', 'appropriateness' and 'elaboration', to be aware that the presentation of a speech must not flout the rules of rhetorical composition.⁵⁷

For Philodemus, the crux of the issue was that rhetorical delivery was now being developed by the teachers of oratory into an 'art' form, as if it were appropriate for the orator's podium or courtroom rather than for the actor's stage. It had become a master and not a servant of rhetoric. Because it was not taught in any other sphere, Philodemus states categorically in his conclusion, 'This system is not needed by any other artist, certainly not by philosophers. The fact is, each profession has its own peculiar delivery', XIX. 11-16.

In the second century A.D. the Epicurean writer Diogenes of Oenoanda wrote to Hermarchus, who as a young man had studied rhetoric:

At present you reject our philosophy; but later perhaps you will wish, when your hostility has been banished, to open the congenial entrance to our community, and you will veer away from the speeches of the rhetoricians in order to listen to some of our doctrines. And from then on it is our firm hope that you will come as quickly as you can to knock at the doors of philosophy.⁵⁸

Diogenes and Philodemus knew only too well that rhetorical delivery was inappropriate for the purpose of the transformation of the followers of Epicureanism, hence their criticism of it.

A more positive attitude towards delivery comes from Quintilian, a near-contemporary of Paul. He, too, notes the emphasis given it by Demosthenes, and Cicero's discussion, which included both voice and physical appearance under this rubric. Body gestures and adornment are discussed at great length.⁵⁹ In Quintilian's estimation,'…a good delivery is undoubtedly impossible for one who cannot remember what he has written, or lacks the quick faculty of speech required by sudden emergencies, or is hampered by incurable impediments of speech. Again, physical uncouthness may be such that no act can remedy it, while a weak voice is incompatible with first-rate excellence in delivery'.⁶⁰ It is clear is that the most devastating criticism one could make of any orator who ventured into the public arena was that he was deficient in the important area of delivery.

What did other writers in the early empire say in their reflections on rhetorical delivery and the ancients? According to Plutarch, Demosthenes, in the face of such criteria, hired an actor to help him with his delivery.⁶¹ Dionysius

of Halicarnassus explains why Isocrates refrained from public speaking: he lacked 'the first and most important quality of a public speaker', the exhibition of 'self-confidence and a strong voice'.⁶² Isocrates thus falls into that group of non-performing orators whom Alcidamas calls 'voiceless'.⁶³ Demosthenes even turned the standard expectations into a weapon when he disparagingly claimed that Aeschines went to law to display his oratory and his vocal prowess, but when diction (λόγος) and quality of voice (ὁ τόνος τῆς φωνῆς) failed him, he turned to pandering to public sympathies. Delivery played no part in his success.⁶⁴ But victory without 'delivery' was rare.⁶⁵ Much later an observer noted in the Scholia of Aristides, 'The orator who appears in public persuades more than through written speeches' (ὁ ῥήτωρ μᾶλλον ὁρώμενος πείθει, ἤπερ διὰ γραμμάτων), and this was because of the power of 'rhetorical delivery' (ὑπόκρισις).⁶⁶

Paul's Rhetorical Delivery (ὑπόκρισις): 2 Corinthians 10.10

H. D. Betz opines that the discussion in 10.10 can he epitomised under the term σχῆμα, which in the Cynic tradition related to outward appearance. In support of this he cites Lucian's 'Lover of Lies', 34, as a parallel to Paul's being ἀσθενής. Lucian describes Pancrates as 'wonderfully learned', familiar with all σοφία καὶ παιδεία. His friend, Arignotus, is surprised because he identifies him as speaking 'imperfect Greek', as 'flat-nosed with protruding lips and thinnish legs'.⁶⁷ By the canons of delivery both his speech and appearance

would be judged inadequate for public oratory. Arignotus clearly associates ὑπόκρισις with its rhetorical connotations and not the Cynic concept of σχῆμα as Betz suggests.⁶⁸ It has already been noted that in his search for examples in Epictetus, Betz overlooked the significance of the discourse entitled 'On personal adornment' (Περὶ καλλωπισμοῦ).⁶⁹ The student of rhetoric from Corinth who comes to Epictetus reflects in his dress and appearance his understanding of what was expected of an orator, and at the end of the discourse Epictetus delivers his most telling blow by calling the student 'ugly' because of his lack of traditional virtues.⁷⁰

The judgement of Paul's opponents that 'his bodily presence was weak' was rendered according to the canons of rhetoric. It meant that his presence constituted such a liability as to all but guarantee his failure as an effective public orator.⁷¹ He elicited no murmur of approval when audiences first saw him — as did the sophist Polemo, whom Philostratus so admired.⁷² The traditional description of Paul would justify the dissatisfaction felt by his detractors.⁷³ Paul's speech fared no better, for they describe his λόγος as ἐξουθενημένος (v. 10b).⁷⁴

This deficiency precluded him entering the public arena or even taking steps to overcome the problem.⁷⁵ The use of the perfect participle may suggest that the problem could not be remedied. The attention of the Corinthian congregation had been drawn to the fact that Paul's speech in effect amounted to 'nothing' by opponents who appear to have attacked him on this point to show up his inconsistency. In the light of the apologia concerning his coming (1 Cor. 2.3) his enemies could argue that his activity was governed not by theological considerations but by his own deficiencies as a public speaker. To be sure, such weaknesses had blocked great orators of the past from entering the public arena. It has already been argued that Paul's opponents appear to have used the language of 1 Corinthians 3.4 against him in 2 Corinthians 10.2-3, which is further evidence that they rejected Paul's theological defence of his modus operandi in 1 Corinthians 2.1-5. They attributed his 'failure' instead to a lack of ὑπόκρισις.

The above discussion implies that the sophists' preference for extempore oratory over the written form, and their preoccupation with declamation, control the judgement against Paul in 10.10b.⁷⁶ The pejorative terms used by his opponents are strong evidence that he has been assessed as a public speaker by the canon of ύπόκρισις, and has been found wanting.

Paul as a debater: 2 Corinthians 11.6

Paul writes, εἰ δὲ καὶ ἰδιώτης τῴ λόγῳ, ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ γνώσει, ἀλλ' ἐν παντὶ φανερώσαντες ἐν πᾶσιν εἰς ὑμᾶς (11.6).⁷⁷ This verse appears alongside his contention that he is in no way inferior to the 'super-apostles' mentioned in the previous verse. Verse 6a reiterates an evaluation of Paul,⁷⁸ but requires that we address three questions. (1) What does the term ἰδιώτης signify when linked with τῴ λόγῳ? (2) What is to be made of the strong adversative statement which follows? (3) How does the final adversative comment relate to the previous statements?

'The non-professional orator' (ἰδιώτης τῴ λόγῳ)

What does ἰδιώτης τῴ λόγῳ mean in a rhetorical context? Philodemus indicates that two features distinguish the layman, philosopher and dialectician from the rhetorician or sophist. First, the former group does not 'display their speeches rhetorically' and second, they do not follow 'the received form' of sophistic speakers. He cites as an example the ignoble tricks of the forensic rhetorician whose δύναμις dominated his presentation. Without it the orator would appear 'modest' in court and thereby 'forfeit that peace of life and solidarity of character which contributes most to his success' — a reference to the rhetor's extravagant lifestyle.⁷⁹ Philodemus then encourages the ἰδιώτης and other non-orators not to be ashamed if they cannot produce the second distinguishing mark, namely forms of speech used in forensic and deliberative oratory. A jury finds 'even stammering' by a layman more persuasive than the forms used by the orator, which, in his opinion, aim only to mislead. The classical virtues (ἀνδρεία, δικαιοσύνη, and σωφροσύνη) influence the jury more than forms of rhetorical speech. The 'non-orators' may indeed possess some knowledge of rhetoric, but they have abandoned ἀπάτη in their practice of it.⁸⁰ Philodemus thus condemns sophistic rhetoric — by which he means the efforts of those who deliver panegyric orations and declamations, and compose written works — for such sophists perform in schools and lecture rooms, leaving it to others to function in the forum and the ecclesia. Those who do engage in real conflict, unlike the pretenders, do so without depending on ἀπάτη.⁸¹

As already noted, Philo of Alexandria labels as ἰδιώτης not only those who have never been instructed in rhetoric, but also 'those who are beginning to learn, those making progress and those who have reached perfection'. He has already distinguished between σοφιστής, ἰδιώτης, and men in general in Agr. 143.⁸² We saw that he applies the term not only to students of rhetoric, but even to graduates of the sophists' schools. The opposite of ἰδιώτης for Philo was τεχνίτης or ἀσκητής, not σοφιστής, for the ἀσκητής practised virtue, unlike the sophist.⁸³

Isocrates applies the term ἰδιώτης to those who have been trained in a

school of rhetoric but have become neither orators nor teachers of rhetoric. He writes, 'from all our schools only two or three students turn out to be real champions [in the contests of oratory], the rest retiring from their studies into private life, ἰδιώτας'.⁸⁴ As the editor noted, 'private' is 'distinguished from the professional life of public orators and teachers of oratory'.⁸⁵ Isocrates notes that those trained in oratory but preferring to live in private have by reason of their training become 'keener judges and more prudent counsellors' — it would be wrong to assume that they did not play a role in the affairs of the city.'⁸⁶

Epictetus includes in the term tax gatherers, orators and procurators by way of contrast with philosophers.⁸⁷ Alcidamas and Aristides use the term in their discussion of orators and sophists to refer to laymen untrained in rhetoric.⁸⁸ Because of this range of usage, context must be the primary determinant of meaning.

Paul as 'the non-professional orator' (ἰδιώτης τῴ λόγῳ)

Did ἰδιώτης τῴ λόγῳ in 2 Corinthians 11.6 signify the same for Paul's opponents as for Philodemus, Philo of Alexandria and Isocrates or for Epictetus, Alcidamas and Aristides? G. A. Kennedy says that 'it basically denotes a private person, not a professional', but cites no evidence to support this interpretation of verse 6a.⁸⁹ The answer can be determined by an analysis of the whole of verse 6, and in the light of that a comparison can also be made with the findings on 10:10.

11.6b presents the strong adversative statement: 'but certainly not in knowledge'.⁹⁰ γνῶσις is widely held to mean either spiritual knowledge or the gospel.⁹¹ J. P. Meyer, however, suggests that Paul means his own expertise in forensic rhetoric. He concludes after a short survey of Acts 24 that Luke's pre-

sentation of Paul's performance before Felix suggests he possessed skill in this type of rhetoric — although he rejected as unsuitable for the gospel the rhetorical stance of his opponents in 2 Corinthians 2.14 and 2 Corinthians 4.2.⁹² Could Paul, although usually not wishing to make a rhetorical display, rely on forensic rhetoric if the need arose? Certainly an examination of Paul's facility in his confrontation with Tertullus as reported by Luke in Acts 24 suggests that this was so.⁹³

Does the remainder of verse 6 uphold this reading? With another strong adversative Paul affirms, ἀλλ' ἐν παντὶ φανερώσαντες ἐν πᾶσιν εἰς ὐμᾶς (v. 6c). The textual variants betray the difficulty of this phrase — leading R. Bultmann to describe the clause as 'scarcely intelligible'.⁹⁴ He does note, however, along with other commentators, that the object of the verb must be αὐτήν, referring to γνώσει in verse 6b.⁹⁵ Does this mean that Paul on occasion used his knowledge of forensic rhetoric for the benefit of the Corinthians? Favouring this proposition is the rhetorical flourish Paul makes with ἐν παντί…ἐν πᾶσιν. This resembles Acts 24.3, where Tertullus says in his exordium, πάντῃ τε καὶ πανταχοῦ, which is generally accepted as a rhetorical comment.⁹⁶ If Paul can point to the manifestation of his forensic knowledge, could it be that there were occasions on which he used it to defend himself in court, hence the reference in verse 6c? According to Luke, Paul was prepared to defend himself before Gallio, although circumstances rendered that unnecessary (Acts 18.14). More significant still is his telling use of rhetorical devices such as the covert allusion in 1 Corinthians 4.6ff. Of his rhetorical skill J. P. Meyer concludes: 'The Corinthians knew this not from hearsay but from personal experience.'⁹⁷

Paul could also follow rhetorical forms in his letters.⁹⁸ H. D. Betz has argued for Galatians' rhetorical structure, as have others for the Thessalonian letters.⁹⁹ Both Paul and Philo use rhetorical forms for the purpose at hand.¹⁰⁰ Paul would not present his gospel rhetorically for reasons carefully spelt out already in 1 Corinthians 2.1-5, but felt free to employ accepted rhetorical forms in his writings. It thus appears that, to borrow a notion from Philodemus, Paul may not have felt compelled to renounce rhetoric per se but the 'deceit' (ἀπάτη) which all too often accompanied its spoken manifestation, especially of the sophists.¹⁰¹

2 Corinthians 10.10 runs parallel to 11.6. While in the former a contrast is drawn between Paul's writing and his public face as a speaker, in the latter a dichotomy occurs between Paul's capacity as an orator and his knowledge of rhetoric. A corresponding division exists in 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 where Paul displays a knowledge of the three traditional proofs on the one hand, and, on the other, explicitly states that his preaching stance forms part of a strategy which benefits those who responded positively to his message (1 Cor. 2.4-5).

The critique of Paul's opponents in 10.10 and 11.6 is consistent with autobiographical details found in 1 Corinthians 2.3, namely that his visit to Corinth was marked by fear, trembling and much weakness. He suffered from a presentation style which fell short of the quality expected of a public orator or sophist who aimed to persuade a first-century Corinthian audience. This attracted his opponents' attention because it was an irreparable deficiency. How could Paul expect to exercise a continuing speaking role in the church when preaching standards had risen dramatically subsequent to

his departure, most especially through exposure to Apollos? In the eyes of the Corinthians Paul may well represent Alcidamas' man whose abilities allowed for a well-crafted written discourse, yet rendered him 'inarticulate' in extempore rhetorical speech. The meaning of the term as defined by Philodemus, Philo of Alexandria and Isocrates may reflect Paul's educational status — trained in rhetoric but not living the professional life of a public orator and teacher, even though he engaged in public proclamation and private instruction.

Paul's finances: 2 Corinthians 12.16

Someone had suggested to the church that though Paul himself had not openly sought financial gain, he had actually tricked the Corinthians into supporting him. In 2 Corinthians 12.16 he notes that on his third visit he would not be a financial burden. He then raises what is obviously a charge brought against him: 'but being crafty (πανοῦργος), I caught you with 'guile' (δόλος)'.¹⁰² In the following verse he cross-examines them about the allegation that he had taken financial advantage of them. Had Titus and the unnamed disciple who accompanied him taken advantage of them? No, they had not; in fact all three employed the same policy.

That first-century sophists hungered for money was a perennial allegation.¹⁰³ Paul has previously defended his financial policy (1 Cor. 9) precisely because some in Corinth have actually challenged him on the matter (9.3).

2 Corinthians 12.14-18 suggests that while Paul's detractors could not refute his defence based on the evidence, they now allege that he has surreptitiously provided the means by which others can collect money for him. To have financial intermediaries was not without precedent. Isocrates drew attention to the practice in his own day, noting that fees for instruction in a sophist's school were deposited with a third party. He maintained that such a procedure rendered hypocritical the sophists' claim to inculcate ἀρετή in their pupils.¹⁰⁴

The conduct of his financial affairs in 1 Corinthians 9 may have sounded admirable given Paul's lofty theory of a self-supporting apostolic ministry, but there were some who insisted that it did not bear close scrutiny (2 Cor. 12.14-18). Perhaps, they seem to have suggested, some of the money was not

really destined for the poor in Jerusalem. This was despite the care Paul took to avoid giving the wrong impression.¹⁰⁵

The opponents' use of 1 Corinthians against Paul

It has also become clear that Paul's opponents selected concepts and terms from his critique of the sophistic movement in 1 Corinthians 1-4 and 9 and used them to discredit him before the church. Bultmann has rightly paralleled Paul's ἀσθενής in 2 Corinthians 10.10 with τὰ ἐξουθενημένα…τὰ μὴ ὄντα of I Corinthians 1.28.¹⁰⁶

The ἰσχυρός-ἀσθενής language of 1 Corinthians 4.10 has been carefully exploited in 2 Corinthians 10.10. The dichotomy to which Paul referred in 1 Corinthians 1.26 between the Corinthians' secular status and their Christian status, and which he used in 1 Corinthians 4.10 in relation to himself and the church, was now used against Paul in order to contrast his deficiencies as a public orator with his obvious writing ability as a rhetorician.

His λόγος καὶ κήρυγμα, which 1 Corinthians 2.4 had affirmed was not in ἐν πειθοῖς σοφίας λόγοις, is now exploited by opponents who remind the Corinthians that Paul's λόγος is that of an ἰδιώτης (2 Cor. 11.6). While Paul could say in 1 Corinthians 1.5-7 that the Corinthians did not lag behind in eloquence and knowledge, had he not proven himself deficient in λόγοι and κατὰ πρόσωπον μὲν ταπεινὸς ἐν ὑμῖν (2 Cor. 10.1, 11.6)?¹⁰⁷

Paul may have denigrated the συζητητὴς τοῦ αἰῶνος τούτου in 1 Corinthians 1.20, but how did he himself perform? Was he not a persistent failure when it came to ὑπόκρισις (2 Cor. 10.10)? Was not his apologia in 1 Corinthians 2.1-5 a masterful theological rationalisation of his self-evident weak, trembling and inadequate performance as a public speaker in Corinth?

Paul had accused the Corinthian congregation of behaving in a secular fashion by evaluating Christian teachers according to sophistic standards (κατὰ ἄνθρωπον περιπατούμενοι). He furthermore added pejorative terms to

highlight their immature conduct (1 Cor. 3.1-4). Now his detractors accused him of precisely the same conduct in 2 Corinthians 10.2. He was κατὰ πρόσωπον μὲν ταπεινός ἐν ὑμῖν and bold when away but was in effect κατὰ σάρκα περιπατούμενος (2 Cor. 10.1-2).¹⁰⁸ They chose to highlight his deficiencies by drawing attention to the discrepancies between his poor performance as a public speaker when in Corinth and the very 'weighty and strong letters' he wrote when absent (2 Cor. 10.1ff.).¹⁰⁹

J. Harrison has made the very unlikely suggestion that 1 Corinthians 1-4 and 2 Corinthians 10-13 may form one letter because of nine parallel thoughts he finds within the two passages.¹¹⁰ The reconstruction offered above does not follow Harrison in arguing for parallel thought, but rather recognises the use by Paul's enemies of his criticisms in order to undermine his influence on the Corinthian church.

The evidence reveals that Paul's modus operandi is being judged by sophistic categories (2 Cor. 10.10, 11.6 and 12.14-18). Furthermore, the assault was framed in the light of his own critique of the sophistic tradition in 1 Corinthians 1-4. Whatever remains unknown about these opponents of Paul in 2 Corinthians, this much is certain: they were trained in the Greek rhetorical tradition. Others have followed separate paths to the conclusion that Paul's accusers were sophists.¹¹¹ The objection that since these Christians were Jews they could not be sophists poses no problem, for Philo, his nephew and others were Jews trained in Greek paideia.¹¹² The sophists could have argued

convincingly that if the secular ἐκκλησία of Corinth demanded of speakers a facility in oratory, then the ἐκκλησία τοῦ Θεοῦ in the same city should flourish with teachers of no less ability. Paul clearly lacked the necessary prowess.

Paul calls his opponents in 2 Corinthians 10-13 'ignorant' and 'fools' because they engaged in σύγκρισις and boasted about their achievements. To the Corinthians he discloses that he intends to do all in his power to undermine the false claim that they work on the same terms as he does (11.12). 2 Corinthians 10-13 contains his attempt to do so. God promised to destroy the wisdom of the wise and bring to nothing the reasoning of the clever so that men could know him (1 Cor. 1.19,21); it appears that Paul saw himself engaged in a similar demolition work against strongholds of entrenched arguments, λογισμοί, and proud obstacles to the knowledge of God in the congregation.¹¹³ This included his opponents (2 Cor. 10.4-5).

Substantial discussion of καύχημα and its cognates in 2 Corinthians 10-13 underpins Paul's argument.¹¹⁴ This is not unexpected, for sophistic boasting was the thread which had bound together subsidiary issues as Paul's critique of the sophistic tradition in 1 Corinthians 1-4 unfolded.¹¹⁵ Now Paul would employ the same standard to appraise the proponents of the sophistic tradition. As the previous section of this chapter has shown, the Corinthian

church had already passed judgement on him (2 Cor. 10-13).¹¹⁶ Secondary literature on 2 Corinthians 10-13 has overlooked the sophistic context in which the antithetical use of καύχημα takes on particular significance.¹¹⁷ We have already encountered the problem of καύχημα in 1 Corinthians 1.26-28 and 4.8-13, and the similarities between the Alexandrian and Corinthian sophistic traditions concerning boasting in status and achievement have been shown to be striking.¹¹⁸ We now turn to the dual questions: How did Paul's opponents boast? and In what did they boast?

Sophistic boasting

In voicing their criticism of Paul's lack of ὑπόκρισις (2 Cor. 10.10) his opponents would have called attention to their own strengths in this regard, for they surely would not have offered such a biting attack if they themselves had been κατὰ πρόσωπον ταπεινός (10.1).¹¹⁹ 'Not only had the opponents unfairly contrasted his past ministry with the one he currently conducted via his letters, thereby drawing attention to his unsuitability for further ministry in Corinth (10.1-10), but they had also offered an internal σύγκρισις of their achievements based on ὑπόκρισις:¹²⁰ 'Not that we have the effrontery¹²¹ to measure or compare ourselves with some of those who commend themselves but (ἀλλά) when they themselves measure themselves by one another (ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἑαυτούς μετροῦντες) and compare themselves with themselves (καὶ συγκρίνουντες ἑαυτούς ἑαυτοῖς), they are without understanding' (10.12).¹²²

They were judging (ἐγκρῖναι) or comparing (συγκρῖναι) their achievements among themselves, so that self-promotion came at the expense of one's colleagues in the congregation (10.12) It is clear that ἔρις and ζῆλος are still present (2 Cor. 12.20), and it cannot be over Paul and Apollos at this stage.¹²³ They thus indulged, like Philo's sophists, in a rhetorical σύγκρισις, only it was among themselves rather than against a common opponent.

Despite their skill in ὑπόκρισις Paul considers his opponents ignorant because they indulge in this rhetorical activity of 'measuring and comparing'. Regardless of its acceptance as a standard rhetorical convention and its place in the handbooks, to measure one's activities against a colleague's was a highly subjective and foolish endeavour.¹²⁴ It lacked objectivity and ultimately amounted to nothing more than self-praise in pursuit of praise from others. Like the sophists in Epictetus, they solicited the praise of their audience.¹²⁵ But for Paul, only the Lord's approval could render a person δόκιμος (10.18). Once more he invokes Jeremiah 9.24 against boasting. Just as he depended upon these words to convey divine displeasure with the boasting and status pretensions of the sophistic tradition in 1 Corinthians 1.31 (within his unfolding critique of 1 Cor. 1-4), so too in 2 Corinthians 10.17 he relies on the Jeremiah prohibition to combat 'measuring and comparing': 'Let him who boasts, boast in the Lord.' It is not the one who commends himself who is accepted, but the one whom the Lord commends (2 Cor. 10.17-18). Can the Lord commend those in Corinth who, in their 'boastful mission', have gone beyond 'the limit' (1 Cor. 1.29, 2 Cor. 11.12)?

Secondly, in what did Paul's opponents boast? As has already been noted, the sophists' grounds for boasting were their πλοῦτος, δόξα, τιμή and ἀρχή which they expressed in terms of their achievements and the accompanying lifestyle.¹²⁶ According to Paul, his opponents were actually claiming credit for 'other men's labours' performed 'in another's field', that is, the founding apostle's (2 Cor. 10.15-16). With this assertion that he will not engage in this sort of conduct, designating it boasting εἰς τὰ ἄμετρα, Paul makes it plain that his ministry has divinely fixed boundaries.¹²⁷ Surely (note the use of the

strong adversative ἀλλά) if there can be any legitimate boasting, it must be within the parameters fixed by God (κατὰ τὸ μέτρον τοῦ κανόνος). They would include Paul's Corinthian ministry (v. 13). He repeats that he will 'not boast beyond limit' (εἰς τὰ ἄμετρα καυχώμενοι) in the labours of other men (v. 15), but he hopes to preach in the regions beyond Corinth 'without boasting of work already done in another's field' (v. 16). The opponents are stealing Paul's δόξα for themselves while denigrating him and his achievements — though by divine standards they have done nothing worthy of boasting.

Paul's 'sophistic' boasting

Paul discusses the work which he has undertaken 'in his own field' by taking upon himself his opponents' mantle of boasting in ch. 11,¹²⁸ requesting that they 'bear with me in a little foolishness'. The passage which follows has rightly been described as 'an ironic parody of self-praise and comparison of his opponents', 'a σύγκρισις style counter-attack' (11.1-12.10).¹²⁹ The irony is that Paul does not wear the wise man's cloak but the fool's, an indirect but no less obvious comment on his opponents. In so structuring his argument he makes it patently clear to the Corinthians that he speaks not κατὰ κύριον but in foolishness (11.17). Nevertheless, he feels that he must speak out, for his opponents boast κατὰ σάρκα, and therefore he too will boast (11.18). The Corinthians must have recognised that Paul was linking the 'measuring and comparing' of his boastful, ignorant opponents in 10.12 with the many who boast 'according to the flesh' in 11.18. This becomes sharper still, for, having said that he would not dare to do what others have done (10.12), he himself now does it 'as a fool': 'In whatever any one dares to boast — I am speaking as a fool' (τολμὼ κἀγώ, 11.21b). Then he clarifies this (ἐν ᾧ) by discussing his own credentials and achievements in his κανών. It is clear from 11.22ff. that

Paul is catching his opponents at their own game in order to secure their indictment before the congregation.

In tabulating his credentials and achievements, Paul initially must have sounded like any sophist who proves his life is a witness (μάρτυς ὁ βίος).¹³⁰ By Jewish standards he was among the εὐγενεῖς (v. 23). As regards his work 'in his field' he succinctly affirms his superior performance over that of his opponents, but then adds, because he is engaging in a σύγκρισις, 'I am talking irrationally'.¹³¹ This comment was intended as a direct assault on the sophistic convention of comparison. The long list of Paul's achievements turns out, ironically, to be a catalogue of his afflictions and deprivations (11.23-27). The long list of churches established by Paul (a sure sign of his apostolic success) is missing, dismissed with the statement, 'And, apart from other things, there is the daily pressure of my anxiety for all the churches' (11.28).¹³² Paul's boasting throughout this passage (11.23-29) relates not to his successes, but to his vulnerability and lack of status as he travelled from city to city. When held up to the canons of weakness Paul says, 'Who is weak?' 'Am I not also weak?' (v. 30).

Paul declares that if it was necessary to boast (καυχᾶσθαι δεῖ), then he would do so, but it would be of his own weaknesses — a statement affirmed by an oath rarely heard in Paul (11.30-31). His reason for swearing 'that the God and Father of the Lord Jesus knows that I do not lie' was to eliminate the possibility, which would have almost certainly occurred to the Corinthians, that Paul was engaging in a recognised form of inverted boasting, that is, 'selfdeprecation'.¹³³

An interesting addendum to Paul's list of tribulations is the only event with a specific geographical location (11.32-33). The Damascus incident demonstrates yet again Paul's weakness and lack of heroism. Had he been recognised as a person of status and come to the city as a sophist, he would have received deferential treatment. As it was, his account shows that he faced nothing but humiliation, for being lowered over the wall would have been the ultimate sign of failure for a sophist.¹³⁴ Noteworthy sophists were met outside

the city walls and escorted by the city fathers and young men of good birth. Paul, in fleeing over the wall under cover of night, resembles more an undesirable alien than a sought-after foreign sophist destined for citizenship and the honours of the council.¹³⁵

As Marshall observes, Paul boasts only of 'events forced on him by necessity, apparent failures, imprisonments by legal authorities, humiliations', of things which 'marked him off as a man of shame'. If he was the superior servant of Christ, then a list of his finest deeds would have been expected.¹³⁶ But no such list is forthcoming. Even as the 1 Corinthians 4.10-13 'tribulation' list had a polemical thrust aimed at the pretensions of the Corinthian Christians, so too the tribulation list of 2 Corinthians opposes the arrogance of his opponents.¹³⁷

In 12.1-10 Paul boasts about another area of ministry which, surprisingly, reveals his weakness: visions. Paul, in the beginning of his discussion of his revelations, reminds the Corinthians that he boasts not because it is profitable, but only because it has become necessary (12.1). To prove conclusively that nothing is gained by boasting he argues that it was precisely that which for others might have become the greatest claim to spiritual power, namely visionary experiences, which stopped him from exalting himself after the fashion of the super-apostles (10.1).¹³⁸

As C. Forbes succinctly concludes, 'they … boast of qualities which they do not have. Paul will not even boast of those he does possess.'¹³⁹ Paul's reason emerged from his humiliating experience, the thorn in the flesh, which brought him a word from God. God's grace would be sufficient for him amidst the trials of his ministry because God's 'power is perfected in weakness'. This revelation persuaded Paul to rejoice in his tribulations, for his strength, he now saw, lay at the point of his weakness (vv. 7-10). The same truth also held for the Messiah, who was crucified in weakness and yet lives through the power of God. His ministers are 'weak in him' but likewise live through the power of God with respect to the Christian community (εἰς ὑμᾶς, 13.4).

Paul argues ironically that he has been forced by the Corinthians to boast because they failed to do it for him. What should they boast about? 'For I was not at all inferior to these superlative apostles, even though I am nothing' (εἰ καὶ οὐδέν εἰμι, 12.11).

What was Paul hoping to achieve in 11.16ff.? It was his stated aim in 11.12 to undermine the claim of those who sought recognition as missionaries or apostles of comparable status. How did he do this? Forbes observes that 'Paul is admitting comparability here only "as a fool", due to the fact that certain "fools" in Corinth had been indulging in comparisons. He wishes to satirise their pretensions by use of the same form: in his view there is no such comparability.'¹⁴⁰ He has sought to demonstrate that the teachers were in reality fools, their claims to wisdom notwithstanding. While disclaiming any intention of engaging in a synkrisis with his opponent, 10.12a, Paul 'ironically conceded the exaggerations and misrepresentations of his opponents, only to refute them' in 10.12bff.¹⁴¹

In the end, Paul's evaluation of his sophistic opponents with their σαρκικὴ σοφία (noted already in 2 Cor. 1.12) is clearly in keeping with his critique of the sophistic tradition in 1 Corinthians 1-4 and 9. The earlier critique was enunciated well before the appearance of sophistic teachers in the Corinthian church in 2 Corinthians. Here now were not just congregational members who were wise by the standards of this age but rhetorically trained teachers who refused to join in becoming fools in order to become wise as Christians.

This chapter has argued that the dispute in Corinth did not pit an untrained debater against sophistic Christian leaders in Corinth. Paul demonstrated substantial argumentative skills in his struggle against opponents in 2 Corinthians 10-13. His strategy was, however, controlled by an all-encompassing theological interpretation of weakness which was erected upon the paradigm of the Messiah crucified in weakness but now reigning by the power of God (13.4). This was replicated in Paul's own weakness, for his ministry was empowered by the same divine power — to the benefit of the Corinthian congregation (2 Cor. 12.7-9, 13.4).

Likewise Paul took over boasting from the sophistic teachers with their

technique of σύγκρισις by which they commended themselves in order to generate adulation. Boasting, like weakness, was interpreted in the light of Paul's soteriological understanding of the crucified Messiah. There was henceforth to be no boasting in σαρκικὴ σοφία. The attempt to import this improper activity into the Corinthian church met with Paul's firm resolve to undermine its proponents with all the powers of persuasion at his disposal. One could now only boast in the Lord, as Jeremiah 9.23-24 had affirmed.

Kennedy finds in Paul's argument two kinds of rhetoric, 'the radical (basically sacred) rhetoric of authority and the rhetoric of rational argumentation which was perceived as more worldly', and two kinds of boldness, 'the humble' variety of 10.1 (related to the Lord's authority) and the 'worldly' boldness of ch. 11.¹⁴² An important treatment of Paul's boasting from the standpoint of rhetorical forms comes from Forbes, who combines the discovery of rhetorical devices with an evaluation of their use in 2 Corinthians 10— 13.¹⁴³ While substantial work has been done on the structure of the 'fool's speech' in 2 Corinthians 11.22-12.11,¹⁴⁴ the final word on the form of 2 Corinthians 10-13 has perhaps not yet been written.¹⁴⁵

This chapter has maintained a narrow focus on (1) the sophistic reaction to Paul's critique of their tradition in 1 Corinthians 1-4 and 9, and (2) his reply in 2 Corinthians 10-13. What has emerged in this remarkable exchange is a spirited defence by Paul following the personal attack launched by his sophistic opponents. Having had his own critique used against him, he shows that he is not bereft of rhetorical skill as he turns their techniques against them. If they used σύγκρισις against him, he too could use it to great effect —

though he did not in any way share their delusion that human commendation was ultimately important.

Like the Israelites who asked, when confronted with Saul's prophetic activity, 'Is Saul among the prophets?' (1 Sam. 10.11), so the Corinthians asked of his first-century namesake, 'Is Paul among the sophists?' That he failed as a 'public' orator when judged by the canons of the first-century sophistic tradition with its emphasis on extempore declamation meant that he was excluded from the circle of virtuoso orators in Corinth who attracted a large public following. This discussion has shown, however, that Paul overcame any oratorical limitations with epistolary argumentation which, with his distinct λογισμοί, could conquer the rhetorical devices of his adversaries. Aristides was to claim in the following century that, 'Alone of all the Greeks whom we know, we did not engage in oratory for wealth, reputation, honour, marriage, power of acquisition.' Paul could make a similar rejection, although unlike Aristides, who wrote 'But for me oratory means everything', Paul renounced its use as the appropriate medium for the message.¹⁴⁶

A great deal of heartache and anguish had occurred since Paul, in the face of ἔρις and ζῆλος, first exhorted the Corinthians to unity and tranquillity (1 Cor. 1.11ff.). For all that, 2 Corinthians 12.20 shows little progress, with 'strife, jealousy, anger, retaliation, slander, gossip, conceit and disorder' (ἔρις, ζῆλος, θυμοί, ἐριθεῖαι, καταλαλιαί, ψιθυρισμοί, φυσιώσεις and ἀκαταστασίαι) still present and aggravated by the sophistic Christian teachers. Paul says that he may yet come to Corinth and find to his dismay that the dislocation persists. However skilled Paul may be among the sophists, his ultimate concern as a spokesman for the Messiah and a steward of the mysteries of God is to build up the Christian ἐκκλησία. Demolition of his opponents has unfortunately become a prerequisite to that aim (1 Cor. 4.1; 2 Cor. 10.4-5, 8).

E. A. Judge, whose groundbreaking 1969 essay alerted NT scholars to the manner in which this conflict was carried out, concluded his discussion with the observation that 'Paul's struggle [in 2 Corinthians 10-13 was] with rhetorically trained opponents for the support of his rhetorically fastidious converts',¹⁴⁷ a fastidiousness well attested in secular Corinth. Part II of this book substantiates his judgement.