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PHILO AND PAUL AMONG THE SOPHISTS

Alexandrian and Corinthian Responses
to a Julio-Claudian Movement




 

 

CHAPTER 3



Who Are Philo's Sophists?



Identifying Philo's sophists

The Hellenised Jew Philo of Alexandria discusses in detail the sophists and the shape of the Alexandrian sophistic movement of the first fifty years A.D. The evidence he provides, however, has not been carefully examined.1 Since



1While Philo's comments on the sophistic movement have been neglected, his use of rhetoric has been discussed. See M. A. Michel, 'Quelques aspects de la rhétorique chez Philon', in R. Arnaldez, C. Mondésert and J. Pouilloux (eds.), Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1967), pp. 81-103; J. Leopold, 'Philo's Knowledge of Rhetorical Theory', 'Rhetoric and Allegory', and T. Conley, 'Philo's Use of topoi', in D. Winston and J. Dillon (eds.), Two Treatises of Philo of Alexandria: A Commentary of De Gigantibus and Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis, Brown Judaic Studies 25 (Chico: Scholars Press, 1983), pp. 129-36 and 155-78; B. L. Mack, 'Decoding the Scripture: Philo and the Rules of Rhetoric', in an unpublished paper given at a Philo Seminar, Canterbury, August, 1983,1-44; T. Conley, Philo's Rhetoric: Studies in Style, Composition and Exegesis, Center for Hermeneutical Studies Monograph Series no. 1 (Berkeley: Center for Hermeneutical Studies, 1987); and M. Alexandre, 'The Art of Periodic Composition in Philo of Alexandria', in D. T. Runia, D. M. Hay and D. Winston (eds.), Heirs of the Septuagint: Philo, Hellenistic Judaism and Early Christianity, Festschrift for Earle Hilgert, The Studia Philonica Annual 3 (1991), 135-50.


For recent discussion of Philo see H. L. Goodheart and E. R. Goodenough, A General Bibliography of Philo (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1938); P. Borgen, 'Philo of Alexandria: A Critical and Synthetical Survey of Research since World War II', ANRW II.21.1 (1984), 98-154; and D. T. Runia, 'Recent Developments in Philonic Studies', in his Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), ch. 2, and more recently R. Radice and D. T. Runia, Philo of Alexandria: An Annotated Bibliography1937-1986 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988).



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he has been shown to be an invaluable source of information on other issues, 2 quarrying his corpus for details of the sophistic movement in Alexandria may also prove worthwhile, especially when we recognise his own training in rhetoric.3

Disagreement surrounds the attempt to identify Philo's sophists, and no survey of the evidence has been undertaken to resolve this dilemma. An assessment of the various opinions concerning his use of the term 'sophist' must therefore precede our investigation of his critique of the sophistic tradition. Lacking this, the insufficiently scrutinised opinions of secondary sources will continue to support the highly questionable premise that for Philo the term 'sophist' has pejorative connotations, and will greatly diminish the value of Philo's evidence for subsequent chapters.

Who then are the sophists Philo describes as his contemporaries in Contempl. 31, oἱ ῥήτορες ἢ oἱ νῦν σοφισταί?4 Η. Α. Fischel believes that these words function as 'a symbol of notoriously argumentative Epicureanism and occasionally of all "impious" and sophistic (argumentative) philosophies' but do not refer to 'a sophist in the technical sense of the word'. He further asserts that the term contains an 'implied anachronism, since he [Philo] speaks of the perennial types, and his audience, attuned to him, knew that he castigated simultaneously contemporary situations'.5 I. Heinemann, alternatively, argues that the term 'sophist' should be taken quite literally.6

It is E. Bréhier's opinion that the term 'sophists' includes teachers who give all manner of regular teaching but excludes philosophers.7 F. H. Colson,



2See E. R. Goodenough, Jurisprudence of the Jewish Courts in Egypt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1929), for Philo on Greek, Roman and Egyptian law. See R. Barraclough, 'Philo's Politics: Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism', ANRW II.21A (1983), 417-533 for first-century politics; and H. A. Harris, Trivium, Greek Athletics and the Jews (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1976), pp. 13, 51-91, for Philo as a source for athletic terms. Harris expresses surprise at the vividness of Philo's description of athletic activities and describes him not only as 'a keen and well-informed spectator of the Games at Alexandria', but also as a former pupil in the gymnasium.

3On the inadequate use of Philo in first-century rhetoric in the Roman Empire by G. A. Kennedy and R. W. Smith and on Alexandria see my comments on pp. 2-3, n. 7, and for evidence on his training see pp. 81-82.

4For the distinction between orators and sophists, G. W. Bowersock, Greek Sophists in the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p. 14.

5H. A. Fischel, Rabbinic Literature and Greco-Roman Philosophy: A Study of Epicurea and Rhetoric in Early Midrashic Writings, Studia Post-Biblica 31 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973), p. 131.

6I. Heinemann, Philons griechische und jüdische Bildung (Breslau: Marcus, 1932), p. 436, and Michel, 'Quelques aspects de la rhétorique chez Philon', 84.

7E. Bréhier, Les Idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie (Paris: Boivin et Cie, 1925) pp. 287-89.



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however, maintains that teachers of philosophy do fit the group in question.8 V. Nikiprowetzky concludes that the term applies in Philo to those whose philosophies differ from Plato's but who stand within the Greek philosophical tradition, especially the Sceptics and Academics.9 S. Sandmel also associates sophists with philosophers but identifies them as the Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans, Eleatics, Sceptics and non-Sceptics.10

H. A. Wolfson proposes that the term should include Jewish 'experts' in literal interpretation, and that Philo used it, not in a derogatory sense, but to denote 'sages' and 'experts'. 'Taken in this sense it may reflect the Hebrew term hakamin ("sages"), which is one of the names by which the Pharisaic interpreters of the law are known.' Wolfson leans heavily on a definition offered by Josephus, namely 'men learned in the law'.11 He discusses the term with an eye to the literalists/traditionalists of Alexandrian Judaism and includes also the ancient Greek poets. J. Pépin endorses Wolfson's understanding of the term when he writes 'il est done fondé à flatrir de nom injurieux de sophists ses adversaires litteralistes'.12 J. Drummond maintains that the sophists were public speakers who, unlike the philosophers, were 'powerful in saying, but powerless in doing, what was best'.13

A. Mendelson, who greatly enhanced our understanding of encyclical education in Philo, states that the term 'cannot be relied upon to designate, consistently, practitioners of sophistry'. The sophist, 'ill-educated in rhetoric', exploits the legitimate arts of speech or methods of persuasion not to defend the truth but to oppose it. Mendelson's caution is evident when he describes 'Alexandrian sophists of whom, if we are to believe Philo, there were many'. He also accepts Wolfson's non-pejorative meaning, 'sages' or 'experts'.14

Three important features about the opinions expressed in the past one



8F. H. Colson, 'Philo on Education, JTS 18 (1917), 161: 'the great mass of "sophists", among whom seem to be included the teachers of philosophy'.

9V. Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de l’écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 97-98, 110.

10S. Sandmel, Philo's Place in Judaism: A Study of Conceptions of Abraham in Jewish Literature (New York: Ktav Publishing House, 1971), p. 168, n. 310.

11H. A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity and Islam (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), vol. I, pp. 57-60.

12J. Pépin, 'Remarques sur la théorie de l'exégèse allégorique chez Philon', in Arnaldez, Mondésert and Pouilloux (eds.), Philon d'Alexandrie, pp. 148-49, n. 6.

13J. Drummond, Philo Judaeus, or the Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy in Its Development and Completion (London and Edinburgh: Williams & Norgate, 1888), vol. I, p. 353 citing Congr. 13 and Migr. 13.

14A. Mendelson, Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982), p. 90, n. 48; pp. 7-10.



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hundred years call for attention. Firstly, we lack a thoroughgoing survey of Philo's discussion of the sophists. In fact, some have expressed their opinions in footnotes with few or no actual references to Philo's works. This lacuna is partly responsible for the diverse, even conflicting, opinions relating to the identity of the sophists. Secondly, discussion of Philo's sophists and orators often overlooks recent studies of the sophists of the late first and second centuries A.D. Thirdly, Philo's sophists have not generally been discussed within the context of paideia, with the exception of Colson's and Mendelson's work, nor have they been measured against the comments by other first-century writers on the sophists in Alexandria. Perhaps modern negative connotations of the term 'sophist' have been read back unconsciously into Philo's use of this term by recent scholarship. The following survey will show that Philo never uses the term pejoratively, although he may castigate the group to which it applies albeit with traditional invective. He furthermore consistentlyuses it of virtuoso orators, following other first-century writers such as Dio Chrysostom and Plutarch.



Present-day orators and sophists in Contempl. 31

He [the Therapeutai Elder] does not make an exhibition of clever rhetoric like the orators or sophists of to-day …οἱ ῥήτορες ἢ οἱ νῦν σοφισταί. (Contempl. 31)

Philo declares as he begins his discussion of De vita contemplative that he has not added to the information 'to improve upon the facts as is constantly done by poets and historians', #1.15< He purports instead to provide a reliable account. A similar criticism of orators and sophists who strive for 'improvement' is found in Philo's 'unadorned' history of the Therapeutai (#31).16 G. W. Bowersock's definition of the term 'sophist', drawn from first- and second- century sources, also notes that these prominent groups attempted to



15For discussions of the historicity of Philo's account of the Therapeutai and the integrity of De Vita Contemplativa see E. Schiirer, The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ, 2nd edn. (Edinburgh: Τ & Τ Clark, 1979), vol. II, pp. 595-96; and Β. Μ. Bokser, Philo's Description of Jewish Practices (Berkeley: The Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture, 1977), pp. 1-12, and pp. 30-40 contra the discussion by others at the Bokser seminar which fails to do justice to what has been written before on the question of historicity.

16For a recent survey of the literature on this community see Schürer, History of the Jewish People, vol. II, p. 591, n. 17.



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enhance the facts, although he does not cite Philo as a source.17 Philo describes them in contrast both to the ancient sophists, #4, and the Therapeutai elder in #31. The latter individual and his activities he describes in detail while, significantly, he offers no detailed explanation of the activities of the orators and sophists; surely because their methods were well known. Such knowledge, shared by Philo's audience, thus offers him a point of comparison to explain the unknown activities of the Therapeutai elder.

Philo used the sophists as a benchmark to empower five comparisonsand contrasts which informed his discussion of the little-known, or perhaps misunderstood, Jewish community of the Therapeutai. Firstly, orators and sophists and the Therapeutai elder all sought to educate. H. I. Marrou observes that 'For the very great majority of students, higher education meant taking lessons from the orator, learning the art of eloquence from him.'18 Philo similarly describes the Sabbath meeting of the Therapeutai as taking the form of a lecture with the elder resembling the proven teacher who 'has the fullest knowledge of the doctrines which they profess', #31.

Secondly, similar teacher/student relationships characterised both sides. The pupils or members of the community 'sit in order according to their age in the proper attitude…and listen, showing their approval merely by their looks or nods…with ears pricked up and eyes fixed on him always in exactlythe same posture…[they praise the speaker] by cheerful change of expression which steals over the face', #30,32,77. Orators and sophists were known to have enjoyed the loyalty of their pupils, and often developed an intimate relationship with them.19

Thirdly, and by way of contrast, Philo claims that the elder 'gives a well-reasoned and wise discourse', #31b, while the orators and sophists are said to 'make an exhibition'.20 He establishes the superiority of the elder's discourse by means of a negative comparison with sophistic declamation, emphasizing in the process that the elder 'does not make an exhibition of clever rhetoric like the orators and sophists of today, but follows careful examination by careful expression of the exact meaning of the thoughts', #31b. Philo's word



17Bowersock, Greek Sophists, p. 13 for a summary of views. C. P. Jones, 'The Reliability of Philostratus', in G. W. Bowersock (ed.), Approaches to the Second Sophistic (University Park, Penn.: American Philological Association, 1974), p. 12, endorses Bowersock's definition with regard to Philostratus ( A.D. 170-244), although he suggests a pejorative use by earlier authors.

18H. I. Marrou, A History of Education in Antiquity, English translation (London: Sheed and Ward, 1956), pp. 194-95.

19Ibid., p. 197.

20παρεπιδείκνυμι, 'declaim'. For this technical term see pp. 31-32 and also Spec. I.56, Legat. 94.



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choice stresses the notion that the elder's concern for precision runs parallel to the affection for 'clever' words shown by orators and sophists in their public declamations.

Fourthly, Philo contrasts the effectiveness of communication between the lecturer and his audience. He says of the elder's message: 'this does not lodge just outside the ears of the audience but passes through the hearing of the soul and then stays securely', #31b. The strong adversative in this sentence indicates that he is still defining the elder by contrasting him with orators and sophists.

Fifthly, Philo notes the motives of the two groups later in the treatise. There he again discusses the elder's methods of addressing his audience on a biblical issue or a matter that has been discussed by another member of the community.21 These methods betray no thought of giving a 'display lecture' (ἐπίδειξις) for, Philo explains, 'he has no ambition to get a reputation for clever oratory', #75.22 This contrasts with the ambitious speakers who declaim solely for reputation's sake.23 The elder speaks for honourable purposes: to 'gain a closer insight into some particular matter and, having gained it, not to withhold it selfishly from those who, if not clear-sighted as he is, have a similar desire to learn', #75. Philo may be here alluding to teachers who, for financial gain, refuse to share their knowledge freely but dole out pieces one at a time, thus compelling their pupils to return again and again, Ios. 125.

Again Philo contrasts effective communication by the elder with the technique of the orators and sophists. To ensure that the truth is grasped permanently repetition is used, for without this, Philo argues, the hearer will not apprehend the lesson. The elder differs in this from the speaker who 'goes on descanting with breathless rapidity'.24 The audience of the Therapeutai even



21The president (ὁ πρόεδρος), 'the one who takes the chair', is presumably the elder of Contempl. 31.

22δεινότης when used of an orator can refer to 'cleverness' or 'shrewdness'. Philo uses it in Chr. 105 of the nature of rhetoric 'which seeks out and weighs the materials for shrewd treatment'. This passage describes the encyclical education. Cf. also Fug. 84; Somn. II.283 (LCL, vol. V, pp. 570-71, n. a); Hyp. 6.4; Praem. 97. For other examples of δεινότης outside Philo see Isocrates, Orator, 1.4, where it is used to contrast learning that leads to sound character with learning that seeks merely to provide skill in rhetoric; and Demosthenes, De Corona, 242, 277; Thucydides also warns against being carried away by this technique, Histories III.37; Plutarch, Lives, Pompey, 77, 80.

23On Bowersock's understanding, both the orators and the sophists desire recognition of their oratorical ability. See Greek Sophists, p. 13.

24εὔτροχος characterises the glib tongue with speech that is so rapid that the speaker does not pause for breath, e.g., Demosthenes, De Corona, 308 where the rhetorician strings words together without pausing. Philo levels this charge elsewhere, cf. Congr. 64.



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employ gestures to signal their comprehension: they motion with 'nods and glances if they comprehend and if in difficulty they move their head gently and point with a finger-tip of the right hand', #77. Their lecturer aims to communicate with his audience and so takes time to explain those points not readily understood: the sophists do not share his concern.

The use of orators and sophists and their activities in the Therapeutai discussion was apposite, for they were instructors of rhetoric, which remained at the heart of all Hellenistic and Roman education and culture. They were regarded as specialists in eloquence who both completed a student's higher education and declaimed before an audience.25 By developing the contrast with these highly specialised professionals — themselves involved in an educative process — Philo successfully demonstrates the superiority of the Therapeutai elder.26

In addition to these five comparisons we find that Contempl. 31, 75 depends on a number of rhetorical terms. These terms and their import would have been lost on Philo's readers if they were not well versed in rhetoric, for he never explains them.27 The fact that Philo does explain the activities of the unknown Therapeutai elder in contrast with techniques of known groups of orators and sophists in Alexandria (often referred to with technical language) adds to our impression of a widespread understanding of rhetoric. This familiarity, furthermore, suggests that the sophists under discussion were present and operative in Philo's world.

Contempl. 31 is not, moreover, Philo's only specific reference to contemporary orators and sophists which uses νῦν. In Post. 101 he refers to "the sophist group of present day people', denying that their teaching contains true philosophy, namely the utterance and word of God, #102. He supplies three reasons for this. Firstly, they 'practised arts of speech to use against the truth', that is, 'rhetorical art'.28 Secondly, 'they have given the name of wisdom to rascality'. Thirdly, they have conferred 'on a sorry work a divine name'. Philo



25Marrou, History of Education, pp. 194, 196-97.

26R. Mayer, 'Geschichtserfahrung und Schriftauslegung: Zur Hermeneutik des frühen Judentums', in O. Loretz and W. Strolz (eds.), Die hermeneutische Frage in der Theologie (Freiburg: Editiones Herder, 1968), p. 320, argues that Philo's allegorical exegesis 'is formally, even in details the same as the pesher methodology of the Essenes and Therapeutai'.

27Regrettably, rhetorical terms in Philo are not always noted in the LCL translations; thus the full import of Philo's lexical choice is not always conveyed by the translation.

28LCL adopts a variety of translations for τέχνη λόγων: Verbal artifices', LA III.232, Post. 119, Aet. 121; Oratorical artifices', Virt. 206; 'arts of speech', Det. 37, Migr. 77, Post. 101; 'arts that deal with speech', Det. 43; 'practice in speech', Det. 43; 'practice in rhetoric', Det. 43 and 'arts of eloquence', Det. 35. In Det. 35-43 four alternative renderings are given to the same phrase. The phrase is best translated 'art of rhetoric' or simply 'rhetoric' in Philo, as it is elsewhere.



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notes, with the use of another strong adversative, how present-day sophists differ both from the 'ancient band of aspirants', who pursued with rigour the study of philosophy, #101b, and the followers of Moses.29 Again we see that Philo speaks not anachronistically but of his own contemporaries.

We can now conclude, in view of (1) the known role of orators and sophists as teachers in first-century Alexandria, (2) the rhetorical terminology Philo used to explain both their work and that of the Therapeutai elder in Contempl. 31, 75, and (3) the reference to the sophists as a contemporary, professional group misusing the art of rhetoric in Post 101, that Fischel's assertion of a Philonic use of some 'implied anachronism' or symbol is unsustainable.30 The evidence suggests that Philo denotes contemporary, professional orators and sophists in Alexandria.31 Other first-century writers such as Plutarch, Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom likewise refer to both groups as a sort of contemporary, identifiable and professional guild.32



The throng of sophists in Agr. 136

Who then should we include in the throng33 of sophists which Philo daily observed everywhere? Is Bréhier justified in including all teachers? 'Les sophists désignent en général chez Philon, non pas toute une espèce d'enseignement régulier. Ce sont non seulement des chercheurs, mais des grammairiens, des musiciens, des geómètres, ce sont les specialistes dans chaque science.'34



29#101 refers to Moses' followers, and not ancient sophists, for they follow the 'central road' which Philo clearly defines, 'This royal road…is called in the Law the utterance and word of God', #102a.

30Fischel, Rabbinic Literature, p. 130. He takes no account of Contempl. 31, nor does he relate the sophist to the wider category of orators. His evidence will not support the necessary nexus which is germane to his thesis on Epicureanism and rhetoric.

31It is assumed that the orators in Contempl. 31 are not legal advocates because of the educative context in which the Therapeutai discussion is conducted. Only in Mut. 198 and Agr. 13 is there a reference to the legal advocate. Papyrological references to legal advocates abound, e.g., P.Teb. 287.2; 343.75; P.Amh. 29.10; P.Oxy. 37.4; 151.2; 237.21; 653.9; 707.13; 899.21; P.Lond. 188.79; 354.19; 1716.15. There is only one papyrus in the early centuries A.D. referring to sophists: P.Oxy. 2190.

32G. R. Stanton, 'Sophists and Philosophers: Problems of Classification', AJP 94.4 (1973), 351-57, for references.

33LCL translates this as 'swarm', which may be unnecessarily pejorative.

34The starting point for Bréhier, Les Idées de Philon, p. 288, is Agr. 136-42. Colson, 'Philo on Education', 161, using the same passage, suggests that teachers of philosophers may be included as well as those included in paideia. Because Philo likens them to the pig, Colson suggests 'Much of this diatribe is rather unjust.'



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He rests his case on the statements made in Agr. 136-42, especially #136.35

Day after day the swarm of sophists to be found everywhere wears out the ears of any audience they happen to have with disquisitions on minutiae, unravelling phrases that are ambiguous and can bear two meanings and distinguishing among circumstances such as it is well to bear in mind…Or do not some [of them] divide the letters of written speech into consonants and vowels? And do not some [of them] break up language into its three ultimate parts noun, verb and conjunction? Do not geometricians put all lines under two main heads? Do not musicians divide their own science into rhythm, metre, tune? Do not other experts place everything in principal categories?

Bréhier's conclusion, however, falters when one properly assesses the genre used by Philo. The whole treatise, a discussion of Genesis 9.20 ('And Noah began to be a husbandman'), is followed by a lengthy discourse on the virtues of 'distinguishing', #126-68.36 It indicates how Noah began well, but failed to reach the final stage, #181. In #136-41 Philo provides examples of 'distinguishing', diairesis, undertaken by various groups, namely sophists, grammarians, musicians, geometricians, any other 'technician' (τεχνίτης), philosophers or dialecticians. Bréhier assumes that this list of professions can be subsumed under the title of 'sophists' who are discussed in #136a, basing this at least partly on the fact that the second group are grammarians but are not referred to by name.

But do grammarians (and the other professions) really form a subset of the class 'sophists'? The difficulties with this view are worth setting out. #136b provides examples of diairesis of the grammarians. The use of οἱ μέν and ἔνιοι δέ in #136b indicates the division of grammarians at the levels of primary and secondary education. The first comments refer to primary work: 'Do not some of them divide the letters of written speech [letters of the alphabet] into consonants and vowels?' Children began with reading, first learning the names of the twenty-four letters of the alphabet and then pro-



35A. Mendelson in 'Encyclical Education in Philo of Alexandria', Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago (1971), 180, n. 2, rejects Bréhier's identification of the term with the specialist-professor in encyclical education but without explanation, although in his Secular Education in Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press, 1982), p. 9, n. 54 he appears to endorse Bréhier's position. Pépin, 'Remarques sur la théorie de l'exégèse allégorique chez Philon', pp. 148-49, n. 46, likewise feels uneasy about Bréhier's conclusion but does not refute it with evidence.

36Philo's use of diairesis as a literary genre in #1-124 is succeeded by a discussion of the term; διαίρεσις occurs first in Agr. 127.



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gressing to simple syllables in alphabetical order: βα, βε, βη, βι, βυ, βω.37 Dionysius Thrax' Τέχνη γραμματική observes this division.38 The second example from #136b refers to a first-century-B.C. innovation, namely instruction in the 'technique' of grammar combined with the study of poets and historians at the secondary level. It comprised the systematic study of the elements of language.39 'And do not some of them break up language into three ultimate parts, noun, verb, conjunction?' This division of grammatical technique under three headings originates with Aristotle, who added to Plato's twofold division of the noun and the verb, the concept of conjunction to cover all other parts of speech. Philo here follows this division rather than the eightfold division of Dionysius Thrax which was finally accepted.40 Bréhier implies that Philo has connected #136b to #136a, subsuming the grammarians under the sophists, but in fact this misses the flow of thought. Philo simply provides two examples of diairesis by grammarians, one from each level of grammatical study. Their work was so well known that he need not name them but only describe their activity in much the same way that mention of 'learning the ABC would signal a reference to primary education today. Thus Philo's distinction succeeds because of the clear and well-known differences between primary and secondary grammatical studies, as well as clear differences within the levels.

In #136a Philo has provided examples of diairesis from sophists who engage in 'unravelling phrases that are ambiguous and can bear two meanings and distinguishing among circumstances such as it is well to bear in mind'.41 Then comes his illustration based on the two levels of work undertaken by the grammarians, which is then followed by more illustrations of diairesis from other professions: musicians, #137; geometricians and other experts, #138; philosophers, #139-40a; and dialecticians, #140-41. Philo then resumes



37Marrou, History of Education, pp. 150-51.

38For the text see I. Bekker, Anecdota Graeca (Berlin, 1819), section III. This was the foundational work for subsequent treatment of formal grammar as we know it. See H. Steinthal, Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern (Berlin, 1891), vol. II, pp. 189-209 for a discussion of ἡ γραμματική in Dionysius; and R. H. Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory in Europe (London: G. Bell & Sons, 1951), p. 39.

39Marrou, History of Education, pp. 170-72.

40ἔνιοι δέ, 'and some' in contrast with the previous group of primary grammarians, τὰ ἀνωτάτω τρία, 'the three ultimate or main parts'. Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval Grammatical Theory, p. 40.

41Philo in Agr. 16 attributes a similar function to the key role of logic in philosophy when he affirms that 'it disentangles ambiguous expressions capable of two meanings', M. Alexandre, 'La Culture profane chez Philon', in Arnaldez, Mondésert and Pouilloux (eds.), Philon d'Alexandrie, p. 111.



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his discussion of those events which stimulate the intellect in #141, that is, beneficial teaching sessions during which the participants are not merely 'chewing the cud', #142. This bovine imagery he then applies to the sophists and adds a further reference to 'their hair-splitting and their clever inventiveness', though not without acknowledging 'their precision in speech and their rhetorical skill in collating material', #143. Thus, in reality Philo speaks of the sophists, turns aside momentarily to provide (non-sophist) examples of diairesis (#137-41), and then returns to the sophists. In #136 he does not classify the other professions under the one heading but uses them — through an analogy — to explain diairesis.

The Loeb translation contributes to the confusion by translating oἱ μέν and ἔνιοι δέ in #136b as 'some of them' when the description of the activities is of two levels of grammarians. 'Or do not some on the one hand divide…And do not others on the other hand…?' Furthermore, it does not translate at all ἢ, 'or', which begins the sentence discussing the two levels of the work of grammarians.

Bréhier's mistake is explicable. An initial reading of #136-42 which misconstrues (1) diairesis as a literary genre, (2) Philo's use of examples of diairesis among professional groups, (3) the background of the differing roles of primary and secondary grammarians and (4) the particle introducing the sentence and the division of the labour of the grammarians indicated by οἱ μέν and ἔνιοι δέ, prompts his conclusion that the other professional groups are subsumed under the term 'sophist'. We conclude that the 'throng of the sophists' constitutes a specific group in #136, distinguishable from others who specialize in grammar, music, geometry, other sciences, philosophy and dialectics.



Sophists and Sceptics and
Academic philosophers in QG III.33

Philo, in commenting on Genesis 16.12, 'He will be a wild man; his hand will be against all, and the hands of all against him', states in QG III.33:

Now this picture clearly represents the sophist whose mother is wise learning and wisdom. But the sophist is wild in thought, while the wise man is civil and is suited to the state and to civilisation; but the man of wild thought is from that very fact a lover of contention. Therefore (Scripture) adds, 'his hands against all, and the hands of all against him', for, being trained in wide learning and much knowledge, he contradicts all men. (He is) like those who are now called Academics and Sceptics…



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For they are all kin, in a certain sense, uterine brothers, offspring of the same mother, philosophy. Therefore (Scripture) says, 'over against all his brothers he will dwell'. For in truth the Academics and the Non-committals take opposite stands in their doctrines, and oppose the various opinions which others hold.

Nikiprowetzky suggests that Philo uses 'sophist' in this portion to denigrate the Sceptics and Academics, and that he does not confine it to the followers of the ancient sophist Protagoras.42 If this is correct, we must adjust our understanding of Philo's use of the term to include, at least in this instance, negative connotations.43 But can we agree that Philo considers Academics and Sceptics actually to be 'sophists', or are we again witness to a metaphor which effectively describes their methods?

Unfortunately, we have only an Armenian translation of the whole of Quaestiones et solutiones in Genesim and Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum. Greek fragments of both works exist, but none of QG III.33, so that Philo's actual terms remain uncertain.44 For example, the word 'Sceptics' in #33a means literally 'investigators' in Armenian, and LCL notes that it evidently reflects the Greek. Of Philo's phrase 'Academics and "Non-committals'" in #33b, we are uncertain that the latter refers only to 'Sceptics'. LCL comments, literally 'non-sayers', and notes that 'probably the Sceptics are meant as above'. Now, 'non-committals' could refer explicitly to Sceptics, but why then use a different word in #33b from the one introduced in #33a to refer to the same group?45 Clearly Philo chose a word which encompassed the characteristics of both Sceptics and sophists: both were certainly contentious, as Philo notes in #33a. In fact, any doubt that he recognises the differing positions of the two most closely linked members of his analogy, the Academics and the Sceptics, dissolves upon his remark that they 'take opposite stands in their doc-



42Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de l’écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie, pp. 98 and 97-116, where he has surveyed Philo's comments on philosophy and has classified the term under three headings: Greek philosophy, foreign 'exotic' schools, and the practice or study of the Mosaic Law.

43They are therefore no 'virtuoso rhetor' class, Bowersock, Greek Sophists, p. 13.

44F. Petit, Quaestiones in Genesim et in Exodum: Fmgmenta graeca (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1978).

45QG, LCL, p. 221, n. 1. It is unlikely that the Armenian translator would substitute another word if σκεπτικοί was used by Philo in both instances. R. Marcus, 'An Armenian-Greek Index to Philo's Questiones and De Vita Contemplativa’, Journal of the American Oriental Society 53 (1933), 251, cites with approval the assessment of F. C. Conybeare, Philo about the Contemplative Life (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895), p. 155, that the translator is 'marvellously faithful, reproducing the Greek original word for word and as a rule without any change of order'.



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trines'.46 He has already mentioned one common denominator between the Academics and the Sceptics, namely their opposition to other schools of philosophy, a point which he repeats again in describing the Academics and the 'Non-Committals'. Thus, Philo speaks pejoratively of the Sceptics when he uses the term 'Non-Committals' and creates a useful analogy. 'Philo seems to jettison his general dogmatic principles and enrol himself in the school of the Sceptics.' Although he reproduces the arguments of eight of the ten tropes of the Sceptic philosopher, Aenesidemus, Philo does not in fact endorse these views. With respect to Ebr. 164-68 it needs to be noted that in the preceding treatise, De plantation, of which De ebrietate is the sequel, Philo has been reproducing the arguments of other philosophers on drunkenness which he has 'stated to the best of his ability', Ebr. 1, and Plant. 142-77 follows the model of a θέσις in structure and in the convention of presenting others' arguments in the first person.47

Does Philo, however, identify the Sceptics as sophists? Nikiprowetzky suggests that he does, citing Mos. II.212 as supporting evidence:48 'wisdom must not be that of the systems hatched by word-catchers and sophists who sell their tenets and arguments like any bit of merchandise in the market, men who for ever pit philosophy against philosophy'. He notes that Philo also uses λογοθῆραι in Congr. 53 to describe certain philosophers 'who are merely word-mongers and word-hunters'.49 That context, however, describes the 'third race', that is, the Sceptics. While Nikiprowetzky correctly identifies the λογοθῆραι of Mos, II.212 with the Sceptics of Congr. 52-53, it does not follow that the discussion of the false wisdom in the former passage equates the Sceptics and the sophists, oἱ λογοθῆραι καὶ σοφισταί refer to two separate groups, and the καί is not epexegetical in the former citation.

Congr. 52 is also conscripted as evidence for identifying Sceptics and Academics with sophists.50 Here Philo speaks of the Sceptics who 'spend themselves on petty quibbles and trifling disputes'. But the use of the term σόφισμα



46Cf. Sextus Empiricus I.33, and his whole chapter on 'How Scepticism Differs from the Academic Philosophy'.

47It has been suggested that Philo adopted as his own the ideas of the Sceptics. LCL, vol. III, p. 14, commenting on Ebr. 164. For a treatment of this convention see D. T. Runia, 'Philo's De Aeternitate Mundi: The Problem of Interpretation', Vigiliae Christianae 35 (1981), 105-51, esp. 113, and on the structure of Plant. 142-77 and for the literary convention and literature cited in support of this, 130. For Philo's refutation of Sceptic ideas elsewhere see LA III.206; Ios. 125-470; Op. 170; Somn. II.283.

48Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie, 187.

49The derisive nature of Philo's comment is reflected in the use of 'merely'.

50Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie, p. 108, n. 5.



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in this passage does not imply that Sceptics are sophists, for it has a wider meaning.51

Thus, against Nikiprowetzky's notion that Philo identifies the sophists as Academics and Sceptics, we have suggested that 'the wild man', the sophist, is merely described as possessing certain characteristics shared also by Academics and Sceptics. Only such a conclusion can adequately account for the words: '(he is) like…', #33. We do not argue that no sophist ever held Sceptic or Academic views on particular issues, but that Philo does not say Sceptic and Academic philosophers as a class are sophists. In QG III.33 Philo notes that the sophists possess 'wide learning and wisdom'. As men of 'wild thought' they love contention. Thus, like the Academics and Sceptics, they contradict all men as a result of having been trained in 'wide learning and much knowledge'. The analogy is apposite, although it constitutes no argument for identifying them with these particular philosophers.



Sophists and Peripatetics, Stoics,
Epicureans, etc. in Congr. 67

Sandmel argues that in Congr. 67 Philo identifies as sophists the philosophers of the following schools of thought: 'the Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans, Eleatics, Sceptics and non-Sceptics'. He cites in support of his conclusion the editors of LCL. While the editors do indeed extract a list of disagreements among the philosophical schools concerning the nature of the cosmos from Philo's comment in Her. 247, they do not share Sandmel's conclusion that the philosophers are sophists.52

Two difficulties weaken Sandmel's thesis that all who hold the philosophical positions outlined in Her. 247 are sophists, and thus the concomitant that this passage can help explain Congr. 67. Firstly, this would demand that Philo and Plato are also sophists, for both hold that the cosmos is created and not to be destroyed. As Runia notes: 'The reason that Philo quotes this Platonic text [The Timaeus, 41a-b, cited in Aet. 13] is to prove that according to Plato the cosmos is created (γενητός) but not to be destroyed (ἄφθαρτος). It is more-



51σόφισμα carries a variety of meanings: 'captious argument', 'quibble', 'sophism' or 'sly trick' or 'artifice'.

52Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria: An Introduction (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 168, n. 310, citing LCL, vol. IV, p. 574. For a careful discussion of Her. 247 see J. Mansfeld, 'Philosophy in the Service of Scripture: Philo's Exegetical Strategies', in J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), The Question of Eclecticism': Studies in Late Greek Philosophy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), ch. 3, esp. pp. 89-98.



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over clear that there is no difference of view between Plato and Moses [and of course Philo] on this issue, for also Moses affirms this' (Gen. 1.1, 8.22, Aet. 19),53 what Philo has explicated in Aet. 13ff. he merely notes in Her. 246: 'Thus those who declare the universe to be uncreated are at strife with those who maintain its creation; those who say that it will be destroyed with those who declare that though by nature destructible it will never be destroyed, being held together by a band of superior strength, namely the will of its maker.'

On this second proposition, καὶ πάλιν, the editors of LCL observe that Philo quotes from The Timaeus; but Sandmel ignores this note. He then simply identifies the third proposition as Eleatic, that is, those who subscribe to the notion that 'nothing is, but all things become', in antithesis to Plato's Theaetetus. Again Sandmel overlooks the holders of the antithesis even as he cites the holders of the thesis.54

Secondly, in Her. 246a Philo cites the sophists simply to base an analogy on their conduct, not to identify them, as the context shows. In discussing what 'the man of worth' is like he compares him with a chairman or a president of a council who can arbitrate, Her. 243. He comments that some who might be regarded as allies, holding the same position as Philo and Plato, ultimately cause offence when they engage in the conduct of the sophists, namely 'strife' (ἔρις). Philo thus simply notes the similarity between the sophists' conduct and that of allies. He next remarks that some of the proponents of certain views are allies and friends: 'In so far as their minds are fixed on one end to discover the facts of nature they are friends, but when they do not agree, they engage in civil strife.' He thus sees the need of a 'man midwife' who possesses discernment, a chairman who can 'observe', 'throw away', 'save' and 'approve'.55 In addition, Philo observes that the history of philosophy is 'full of discordance, because truth flees from the credulous mind which deals in conjecture', Her. 248.

Hence this portion simply describes the conduct of philosophers of differingviewpoints and insists that allies can hinder one another if their argumentative behaviour begins to resemble the sophists' combativeness.

In addition, Sandmel has linked Her. 246-47 with Congr. 67 as examples of a negative attitude on the part of Philo compared to a more favourable outlook elsewhere. The latter text, he maintains, supports Philo's identification of the philosophers as sophists.



53Runia, Philo and the Timaeus, p. 234 and see pp. 233-38 for the importance of this very substantial debate in the first century.

54This is the one passage where Philo quotes verbatim from The Timaeus, 41a-b, as Runia notes, Philo and the Timaeus, p. 233.

55Socrates so designates himself, Theaetetus, 151c. Cf. #246 where Philo cites Theaetetus, 152.

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Again, however, Sandmel neglects certain germane facts. In exegeting Genesis 16.2 in Congr. 63-67, where Abraham 'hearkened to the voice of Sarah', Philo comments that hardly a day goes by but lecture-halls and theatres fill with οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες. Various classes of people listen with different but inadequate responses. But to whom does Philo refer? While οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες can be translated as 'philosophers', it often means sophists in the Philo corpus. In Post. 34 Philo mentions that many who have 'professed' philosophy arrive at conclusions belonging to the ancient sophist, Protagoras. Det. 74 refers to sophists who have proven to be 'lecturers of the highest order as far as understanding beautiful things and philosophical discourses are concerned', yet they invariably are caught 'indulging in practices that are base'. This clearly refers to those already designated 'sophists' in Det. 72. This charge against them, that is, that they teach virtue and yet practise evil, appears elsewhere in Philo. In Deus 170 those who commend κακία are said to φιλοσοφεῖν, and their activities to bar 'the heavenly and royal road of virtue'. They are epitomised by the earthly Edomites, referred to elsewhere as 'present day sophists', Post. 101. In this same passage Philo alludes to 'the philosophy which is pursued by the present day sophists'. So sophists did debate philosophical subjects,56 an instance being the thesis, 'The unevenness of the earth would no longer exist if the world were from everlasting', Aet. 132.

Congr. 67 seems to authorise translating oἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες not simply as 'philosophers' but as those who discourse on philosophical subjects. Further evidence only reinforces this conclusion: Philo equates their efforts with typical sophistic activity, for they are said to be ἀπνευστὶ συνείροντες τοὺς περὶ ἀρετὴς λόγους;57 and the subject of their discourse in Congr. 67 is one upon which the sophists elsewhere declaimed, for example, Mut. 196-97.58

Finally, this audience in the lecture-hall responds to the sophist in one of three ways, Congr. 65. The minds of some wander to their daily preoccupations. Others hear but do not profit, for they listen 'to please their sense of hearing rather than to gain profit', Congr. 66. The third group appear to be students of sophists who learn to reproduce what was said but never bring their lives into conformity with their words.59 While capable of speaking on



56G. A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern Times (London: Croom Helm, 1980), ch. 4.

57Philo uses ἀπνευστὶ συνείροντες in the description of declamations of sophists, Contempl.. 46, and in referring to orators and sophists in Mut. 197-98.

58Demosthenes, De Corona, 64 uses the same clause to describe a rhetorician as Philo does in Congr. 67 and Contempl 76.

59For an example of students of paideia listening to public declamations see P. Oxy. 2190 and the discussion on pp. 30-34.



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the best, that is, about virtue, they fail to live up to what they say, #67. The significance of these reactions for our purpose is that these same charges are leveled elsewhere against sophists, Det. 72.

Based on both the description of the activities of οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες and the observation that they affect their audience in ways elsewhere ascribed to the sophists, we conclude that Philo refers to sophists, not philosophers per se, in Congr. 67.



Sophists and the ancient poets Homer and Hesiod in Op. 157

H. A. Wolfson and P. G. Geoltrain state that Philo uses the term 'sophist' to include the ancient poets, especially Homer and Hesiod.60 Wolfson finds support for his statement in Diogenes Laertius: 'Sophist was another name for the wise men, and not only philosophers but for the poets also. And so Cratinus when praising Homer and Hesiod in his Archilochi gives them the title of sophist', I.12.61

Philo does not follow Cratinus in the use of the term 'sophist' but regards the poets, including Homer and Hesiod, as important lifelong educators:62 'if we are justified in listening to the poets — and why should we not, since they are our educators through all our days, and as parents in private life teach wisdom to their children, so do they in public life to their cities' (Prov. 1.143). He elsewhere elevates the poets when he speaks of their importance in the acquisition of 'civic virtue'. 'No doubt, it is profitable, if not for the civic virtue, to feed the mind on ancient and time-honoured thoughts, to trace the venerable tradition of noble deeds, which historians and all the family of poets have handed down to the memory of their own and future generations' (Sacr. 78).

In the same section Philo cautions against rejecting ancient learning and argues that 'we should make it our aim to read the writings of the sages', Sacr. 79. He acknowledges his own debt to the poets, for he had been exposed to what he called the 'handmaid of philosophy', namely grammar, when at the secondary level he 'consorted' with 'the study of the writings of the poets', Congr. 74.



60Wolfson, Philo, vol. I, p. 28; P. G. Geoltrain, 'Le Traité de la Vie Contemplative de Philon d'Alexandrie', Semitica 10 (1960), 51, citing Wolfson.

61Cratinus' Archilochi was written ca. 450 B.C., but only a fragment exists.

62In Op. 157, which Wolfson does not cite, Philo speaks of τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ σοφιστικόν, but here γένος is used of two distinct groups, as in Ios. 56, where it refers to Greeks and Barbarians. Elsewhere the term is used of poets, Sacr. 78, Agr. 41, Spec. II.164; prophets, Migr. 84, Her. 249, 265, Fug. 247; and the Therapeutai, Contempl. 11.



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Philo attaches importance to the poets — 'For grammar teaches us to study literature in the poets and historians, and will produce intelligence and wealth of knowledge', Congr. 15. The task of this level of grammar is 'the elucidation of the writings of the poets and the historians', Congr. 148. Elsewhere he commends 'research into poetry…and the study of the doings of old times', Chr. 105, or 'the diligent search into what wise poets have written', Agr. 18. Lovers of wisdom, among whom Philo numbers himself, must have an 'acquaintance with the poets and learning of ancient history', Somn. I.205. The index in LCL indicates his considerable knowledge and use of literary references.63 He speaks positively of poets in a way he never does of sophists.64

For Philo, Homer65 is the poet par excellence: 'Homer [is] the greatest and most reputed of poets', Conf. 4, and 'the poet most highly esteemed among the Greeks' is Homer, Mut. 179; 'we give the title "the poet"66 to Homer in virtue of his pre-eminence', Abr. 10. Philo provides twenty direct quotations from Homer.67 In one instance he cites 'chapter and verse' from memory:'The same idea is suggested, I think, by Homer in the Iliad at the beginning of the thirteenth book', Contempl. 17. LCL, responding to the notion that Philo's attempt to locate the quotation is strikingly rare, suggests that it must have been an obscure passage the relevance of which would not have readily occurred to the reader. Philo may, however, remember simply because of a deep familiarity with the context: it is the only Homeric quotation that appears at the beginning of a book in either the Iliad or the Odyssey.68 In at least one instance Philo knows the context of two lines of Homer, for he notes of Iliad



63Vol. X, pp. 434-86.

64On thirteen occasions Philo makes the statement 'as the poets say', or 'to use the poet's term', or 'to use the poet's phrase', when referring to specific words or phrases: Deus 60,169; Agr. 24; Plant. 151; Ebr. 103; Somn. II.52, 275; Spec. I.74; Prob. 42; Contempl. 40; Act. 63, 127; Legat. 13.

65Homer was intensely studied in encyclical education; S. J. Myres, Homer and His Critics (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p. 29. For the depth of study, see F. W. Householder Jr., Literary Quotation and Allusion in Lucian (New York: King's Crown Press, 1941), p. 57.

66Plutarch also calls Homer 'the poet', Moralia 667f. For the debate as to precisely who is 'the poet' see A. M. Harmon, 'The Poet κατ' ἐξοχήν, CP 18 (1923), 35-47; A. P. Dorjahn, 'Philodemus on Homer', CJ 26 (1931), 457-58, and Apollonius Dyscolus on Homer', CP 25 (1930), 282-24. Certainly Philo makes it quite clear to whom he refers when he speaks of 'the poet'. Dio, Or. 55.6, likewise regards Homer as 'a poet without a peer'.

67. For the use of Homeric quotations by contemporaries of Philo see M. van der Valk, 'The Homeric Quotations or the Indirect Tradition of the Homeric Text', in Researches on the Text and Scholia of the Iliad (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1963), Part 2, ch. 12, esp. p. 285. He makes no reference to Philo.

68For the learning of all of Homer by rote see Xenophon, Symposium, 3. 5. See also Dio, Or. 36.9.



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II. 13.204-5 that the words apply more appropriately to God and the world than to 'cities and men', Conf. 170: 'It is not well that many lords should rule… Multiplicity produces many evils.' Significantly, in this instance he cites Homer over against Genesis 1.26, 3.22 to substantiate the monotheism for which he contends, for the text of Genesis says 'Let us make man'. In Legat. 149 he uses this same quotation to apply to Augustus, which better fits the Homeric context.

Philo's reapplication of Homeric texts to new situations resembles his approach to other literary sources.69 For example, Iliad II. 13.5-6 reads: 'The Mysians fighting hand to hand, and noble mare's milk drinkers — Nought else but milk sustains their life, these men of perfect justice.' Philo's rendering, offered in a discussion of the superiority of the Therapeutai over the Greek philosophers Anaxagoras and Democrates, explains: 'the idea conveyed is that injustice is bred by anxious thought for the means of life and moneymaking, justice by holding and following the opposite creed', Contempl. 17. A survey of Philo's use of Homeric quotations indicates that he, while always accurate with the text, sometimes attends less carefully to the context, a legacy of his literary education and proof of his esteem for this poet.70

Philo's debt to Homer is also reflected in his Quaestiones et solutions. R. Marcus suggests that in its form it resembles the Hellenistic commentaries on the Homeric poems.71 P. Borgen and R. Skarsten's preliminary exploration of the whole Philo corpus would suggest that the influence of such commentaries was even more widespread.72 Indeed, the influence of Homer on Jewish literature may reach well beyond Philo if F. E. Halleway is correct that aggadic works 'resemble Greek and Hellenistic commentaries to the poems of Homer'.73 H. Dorrie argues that Philo followed the Stoic allegorical exegesis of Homer which regarded the non-literal meaning as superior to the literal.74



69van der Valk, 'Homeric Quotations', Part 2, p. 266.

70Householder, Literary Quotation, p. 57 describes how the Iliad was studied. Homer was the basic source of illustrations of tropes, figures, barbarisms, solecism, styles, and many other points of grammar and rhetoric. See also Μ. Η. Ibrahim, 'The Study of Homer in Graeco-Roman Education', Ἀθηνα 76 (1976-77), 187-95 for a description of the ongoing use of Homer at all levels of paideia.

71R. Marcus, Philo Supplement, LCL, vol. I, p. xi.

72P. Borgen and R. Skarsten, <i.'quaestiones>: Some Observations on the Formof Philo's Exegesis', SP 4 (1976-7), 1-15.

73F. E. Halleway, 'Biblical Midrash and Homeric Exegesis', Tarbiz 31 (1959), 157.

74H. Dorrie, 'Zur Methodik antiker Exegese', ZNW 65 (1974), 133-34; and also ). C. H. Lebram, 'Eine stoische Auslegung von Ex. 3.2 bei Philo', in Das Institutum Judaicum der Universität Tübingen in der Jahren 1971-72 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1972), p. 31 for the view that Philo's method was based on Stoic Homeric exegesis.



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LCL also suggests a Homeric allegorising influence on Philo's treatment of the OT.75 Whatever the outcome of current attempts to measure his indebtedness to Homeric exegesis, Philo's attitude to Homer was consistently positive and his debt considerable. He never calls him a 'sophist'.

Wolfson cites Contempl. 4 as his only evidence that other ancient poets were called sophists. There Philo refers to the ancient sophists who gave divine names to the elements: 'air [is called] Hera, because it is lifted up and exalted on high'. But Wolfson neglects the fact that those who gave divine names to the elements were sophists, namely Theagenes, Empedokles and Prodikos.76 While others may have referred to ancient poets as sophists, Philo never so designates them.

Moreover, Wolfson's view that the term designates Jewish 'sages' cannot be substantiated by a single occurrence from the Philo corpus. His only evidence comes from Josephus where, appropriately, a virtuoso forensic rhetorician described as 'learned in the law' was called a sophist. Wolfson's case thus rests on comments from Diogenes Laertius and Josephus, and an unexplored assumption about Contempl. 4.



Conclusion

This examination of opinions on Philo's sophists has shown that orators and sophists comprised an identifiable grouping in Alexandrian society similar to those mentioned in P.Oxy. 2190 and Dio's Alexandrian Oration. Within the educational system of the first century, the term 'sophist' was not a fluid one: it excluded philosophers, dialecticians, grammarians, musicians, geometricians and any other specialised group. Philo's 'sophists' comprised a specific group within paideia, Agr. 136-42.

Philo does not use the term 'sophist' to stigmatise philosophers such as



75LCL, vol. I, p. xvi.

76LCL, vol. VII, p. 610 believes that this was first suggested by Plato and adopted by the Stoics, citing Cratylus 404c. That suggestion is incorrect on two counts. First, it misunderstands the nature of Cratylus in believing that the comment by Plato is a serious one, aiming to make fun of the established use of anagrams. See R. K. Sprague, Plato's Use of Fallacy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), ch. 3. Second, others were first chronologically. Empedokles, the sophist whom Philo cites elsewhere (Prov. I.23, Aet. 5, Chr. 25, Somn. I.21) may well be the one to whom he refers, and the others could be Prodikos and Theagenes. For evidence of their use of this or similar anagrams see H. Diels and W. Kranz, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: Weidmann, 1974), vol. I, Empedokles, line 35, p. 286; Prodikos, lines 35-36, p. 285, line 44, p. 286; Theagenes, lines 9-10, p. 52.



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the Academics and the Sceptics (QG III.33), non-Sceptics, Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans or Eleatics, Her. 246. Nor does he join others in applying it to poets, 77 although he does associate it with those who gave divine names to the elements, Contempl. 4.

The term in Philo's corpus is neither a 'symbol' nor a pejorative label applied to Greek or Jewish teachers or Greek philosophers.78 Heinemann correctly concludes that the word should be read literally.79 Philo may well speak of the sophists in a pejorative way, but like Dio, he does not use it pejoratively of non-sophists.80 A distinct vocabulary of invective, drawn from Plato and well suited to its purpose, was used of the actual sophists in the first century.81

While this chapter has endeavoured to identify the Alexandrian sophists mentioned by Philo as the virtuoso orators who have public followings, the survey has yielded important information on the sophistic movement which also ought to be noted. Philo records the impact of the sophists on city after city, and describes the great admiration that their technical prowess won for them. They drew the whole world after them, yet were prematurely aged by indulging their lower natures, Agr. 142-43. Another complaint is that the sophists bestow no lasting benefit upon their hearers: they only declaim to enhance their own reputations, Contempl. 75. In this passage one also finds the allegation that some sophists withhold information for a later lecture merely to inflate profits. Philo notes that there is a threefold response of the audience to the sophist. Some allow their minds to wander as they hear the declamation. Others derive sensory pleasure from the performance without benefit to the soul: the moment the sophist ceases, so does that pleasure. The students listen to their teacher's display just to learn rhetorical techniques, never to reproduce that over which the sophists proclaimed themselves master, namely ἀρετή, Congr. 66-67. The next two chapters will add greater detail to this sketch as they build upon this chapter's conclusions concerning Philo's use of the term 'sophist'.



77Unlike Dio, Philo does not call poets 'sophists' because the former group is important for the educated man as this chapter has shown, while the latter is seen as an enemy to the seekers after virtue, as we shall see.

78D. I. Sly, Philo's Alexandria (London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 95, states that Philo looked down on philosophers and called them 'sophists', but she provides no evidence from his corpus to support her conclusion.

79See above, n. 6 of this chapter.

80On Dio see pp. 55-58.

81See p. 57.



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