The
Hellenised Jew Philo of Alexandria discusses in detail the
sophists and the shape of the Alexandrian sophistic movement of
the first fifty years A.D. The evidence he provides, however,
has not been carefully examined.1
Since
For
recent discussion of Philo see H. L. Goodheart and E. R.
Goodenough, A General Bibliography of Philo (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1938); P. Borgen, 'Philo of Alexandria: A
Critical and Synthetical Survey of Research since World War II',
ANRW II.21.1 (1984), 98-154; and D. T. Runia, 'Recent
Developments in Philonic Studies', in his Philo of Alexandria
and the Timaeus of Plato (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1986), ch. 2,
and more recently R. Radice and D. T. Runia, Philo of
Alexandria: An Annotated Bibliography1937-1986 (Leiden: E.
J. Brill, 1988).
he
has been shown to be an invaluable source of information on
other issues, 2 quarrying his corpus
for details of the sophistic movement in Alexandria may also
prove worthwhile, especially when we recognise his own training
in rhetoric.3
Disagreement surrounds the attempt to identify
Philo's sophists, and no survey of the evidence has been
undertaken to resolve this dilemma. An assessment of the various
opinions concerning his use of the term 'sophist' must therefore
precede our investigation of his critique of the sophistic
tradition. Lacking this, the insufficiently scrutinised opinions
of secondary sources will continue to support the highly
questionable premise that for Philo the term 'sophist' has
pejorative connotations, and will greatly diminish the value of
Philo's evidence for subsequent chapters.
Who then are the sophists Philo describes as his
contemporaries in Contempl. 31, oἱ ῥήτορες ἢ oἱ νῦν
σοφισταί?4 Η. Α. Fischel believes that
these words function as 'a symbol of notoriously argumentative
Epicureanism and occasionally of all "impious" and sophistic
(argumentative) philosophies' but do not refer to 'a sophist in
the technical sense of the word'. He further asserts that the
term contains an 'implied anachronism, since he [Philo] speaks
of the perennial types, and his audience, attuned to him, knew
that he castigated simultaneously contemporary
situations'.5 I. Heinemann,
alternatively, argues that the term 'sophist' should be taken
quite literally.6
It is E. Bréhier's opinion that the term
'sophists' includes teachers who give all manner of regular
teaching but excludes philosophers.7
F. H. Colson,
however, maintains that teachers of philosophy do
fit the group in question.8 V.
Nikiprowetzky concludes that the term applies in Philo to those
whose philosophies differ from Plato's but who stand within the
Greek philosophical tradition, especially the Sceptics and
Academics.9 S. Sandmel also associates
sophists with philosophers but identifies them as the
Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans, Eleatics, Sceptics and
non-Sceptics.10
H. A. Wolfson proposes that the term should
include Jewish 'experts' in literal interpretation, and that
Philo used it, not in a derogatory sense, but to denote 'sages'
and 'experts'. 'Taken in this sense it may reflect the Hebrew
term hakamin ("sages"), which is one of the names by
which the Pharisaic interpreters of the law are known.' Wolfson
leans heavily on a definition offered by Josephus, namely 'men
learned in the law'.11 He discusses
the term with an eye to the literalists/traditionalists of
Alexandrian Judaism and includes also the ancient Greek poets.
J. Pépin endorses Wolfson's understanding of the term when he
writes 'il est done fondé à flatrir de nom injurieux de sophists
ses adversaires litteralistes'.12 J.
Drummond maintains that the sophists were public speakers who,
unlike the philosophers, were 'powerful in saying, but powerless
in doing, what was best'.13
A. Mendelson, who greatly enhanced our
understanding of encyclical education in Philo, states that the
term 'cannot be relied upon to designate, consistently,
practitioners of sophistry'. The sophist, 'ill-educated in
rhetoric', exploits the legitimate arts of speech or methods of
persuasion not to defend the truth but to oppose it. Mendelson's
caution is evident when he describes 'Alexandrian sophists of
whom, if we are to believe Philo, there were many'. He also
accepts Wolfson's non-pejorative meaning, 'sages' or
'experts'.14
Three important features about the opinions
expressed in the past one
hundred years call for attention. Firstly, we lack
a thoroughgoing survey of Philo's discussion of the sophists. In
fact, some have expressed their opinions in footnotes with few
or no actual references to Philo's works. This lacuna is partly
responsible for the diverse, even conflicting, opinions relating
to the identity of the sophists. Secondly, discussion of Philo's
sophists and orators often overlooks recent studies of the
sophists of the late first and second centuries A.D. Thirdly,
Philo's sophists have not generally been discussed within the
context of paideia, with the exception of Colson's and
Mendelson's work, nor have they been measured against the
comments by other first-century writers on the sophists in
Alexandria. Perhaps modern negative connotations of the term
'sophist' have been read back unconsciously into Philo's use of
this term by recent scholarship. The following survey will show
that Philo never uses the term pejoratively, although he may
castigate the group to which it applies albeit with traditional
invective. He furthermore consistentlyuses it of virtuoso
orators, following other first-century writers such as Dio
Chrysostom and Plutarch.
Present-day orators and sophists in Contempl.
31
He [the Therapeutai Elder] does not make an
exhibition of clever rhetoric like the orators or sophists of
to-day …οἱ ῥήτορες ἢ οἱ νῦν σοφισταί. (Contempl.
31)
Philo declares as he begins his discussion of
De vita contemplative that he has not added to the
information 'to improve upon the facts as is constantly done by
poets and historians', #1.15< He
purports instead to provide a reliable account. A similar
criticism of orators and sophists who strive for 'improvement'
is found in Philo's 'unadorned' history of the Therapeutai
(#31).16 G. W. Bowersock's definition
of the term 'sophist', drawn from first- and second- century
sources, also notes that these prominent groups attempted
to
15For discussions of the historicity of
Philo's account of the Therapeutai and the integrity of De
Vita Contemplativa see E. Schiirer, The History of the
Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ, 2nd edn.
(Edinburgh: Τ & Τ Clark, 1979), vol. II, pp. 595-96; and Β.
Μ. Bokser, Philo's Description of Jewish Practices
(Berkeley: The Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic
and Modern Culture, 1977), pp. 1-12, and pp. 30-40 contra
the discussion by others at the Bokser seminar which fails to do
justice to what has been written before on the question of
historicity.
16For a recent survey of the literature
on this community see Schürer, History of the Jewish
People, vol. II, p. 591, n. 17.
62
enhance the facts, although he does not cite Philo
as a source.17 Philo describes them in
contrast both to the ancient sophists, #4, and the Therapeutai
elder in #31. The latter individual and his activities he
describes in detail while, significantly, he offers no detailed
explanation of the activities of the orators and sophists;
surely because their methods were well known. Such knowledge,
shared by Philo's audience, thus offers him a point of
comparison to explain the unknown activities of the Therapeutai
elder.
Philo used the sophists as a benchmark to empower
five comparisonsand contrasts which informed his discussion of
the little-known, or perhaps misunderstood, Jewish community of
the Therapeutai. Firstly, orators and sophists and the
Therapeutai elder all sought to educate. H. I. Marrou observes
that 'For the very great majority of students, higher education
meant taking lessons from the orator, learning the art of
eloquence from him.'18 Philo similarly
describes the Sabbath meeting of the Therapeutai as taking the
form of a lecture with the elder resembling the proven teacher
who 'has the fullest knowledge of the doctrines which they
profess', #31.
Secondly, similar teacher/student relationships
characterised both sides. The pupils or members of the community
'sit in order according to their age in the proper attitude…and
listen, showing their approval merely by their looks or
nods…with ears pricked up and eyes fixed on him always in
exactlythe same posture…[they praise the speaker] by cheerful
change of expression which steals over the face', #30,32,77.
Orators and sophists were known to have enjoyed the loyalty of
their pupils, and often developed an intimate relationship with
them.19
Thirdly, and by way of contrast, Philo claims that
the elder 'gives a well-reasoned and wise discourse', #31b,
while the orators and sophists are said to 'make an
exhibition'.20 He establishes the
superiority of the elder's discourse by means of a negative
comparison with sophistic declamation, emphasizing in the
process that the elder 'does not make an exhibition of clever
rhetoric like the orators and sophists of today, but follows
careful examination by careful expression of the exact meaning
of the thoughts', #31b. Philo's word
17Bowersock, Greek Sophists, p.
13 for a summary of views. C. P. Jones, 'The Reliability of
Philostratus', in G. W. Bowersock (ed.), Approaches to the
Second Sophistic (University Park, Penn.: American
Philological Association, 1974), p. 12, endorses Bowersock's
definition with regard to Philostratus ( A.D. 170-244), although
he suggests a pejorative use by earlier authors.
18H. I. Marrou, A History of
Education in Antiquity, English translation (London: Sheed
and Ward, 1956), pp. 194-95.
19Ibid., p. 197.
20παρεπιδείκνυμι, 'declaim'. For this
technical term see pp. 31-32 and also Spec. I.56,
Legat. 94.
63
choice stresses the notion that the elder's
concern for precision runs parallel to the affection for
'clever' words shown by orators and sophists in their public
declamations.
Fourthly, Philo contrasts the effectiveness of
communication between the lecturer and his audience. He says of
the elder's message: 'this does not lodge just outside the ears
of the audience but passes through the hearing of the soul and
then stays securely', #31b. The strong adversative in this
sentence indicates that he is still defining the elder by
contrasting him with orators and sophists.
Fifthly, Philo notes the motives of the two groups
later in the treatise. There he again discusses the elder's
methods of addressing his audience on a biblical issue or a
matter that has been discussed by another member of the
community.21 These methods betray no
thought of giving a 'display lecture' (ἐπίδειξις) for, Philo
explains, 'he has no ambition to get a reputation for clever
oratory', #75.22 This contrasts with
the ambitious speakers who declaim solely for reputation's
sake.23 The elder speaks for
honourable purposes: to 'gain a closer insight into some
particular matter and, having gained it, not to withhold it
selfishly from those who, if not clear-sighted as he is, have a
similar desire to learn', #75. Philo may be here alluding to
teachers who, for financial gain, refuse to share their
knowledge freely but dole out pieces one at a time, thus
compelling their pupils to return again and again, Ios.
125.
Again Philo contrasts effective communication by
the elder with the technique of the orators and sophists. To
ensure that the truth is grasped permanently repetition is used,
for without this, Philo argues, the hearer will not apprehend
the lesson. The elder differs in this from the speaker who 'goes
on descanting with breathless
rapidity'.24 The audience of the
Therapeutai even
21The president (ὁ πρόεδρος), 'the one
who takes the chair', is presumably the elder of
Contempl. 31.
22δεινότης when used of an orator can
refer to 'cleverness' or 'shrewdness'. Philo uses it in
Chr. 105 of the nature of rhetoric 'which seeks out and
weighs the materials for shrewd treatment'. This passage
describes the encyclical education. Cf. also Fug. 84;
Somn. II.283 (LCL, vol. V, pp. 570-71, n. a); Hyp.
6.4; Praem. 97. For other examples of δεινότης outside
Philo see Isocrates, Orator, 1.4, where it is used to
contrast learning that leads to sound character with learning
that seeks merely to provide skill in rhetoric; and Demosthenes,
De Corona, 242, 277; Thucydides also warns against being
carried away by this technique, Histories III.37;
Plutarch, Lives, Pompey, 77, 80.
23On Bowersock's understanding, both
the orators and the sophists desire recognition of their
oratorical ability. See Greek Sophists, p. 13.
24εὔτροχος characterises the glib
tongue with speech that is so rapid that the speaker does not
pause for breath, e.g., Demosthenes, De Corona, 308 where
the rhetorician strings words together without pausing. Philo
levels this charge elsewhere, cf. Congr. 64.
64
employ gestures to signal their comprehension:
they motion with 'nods and glances if they comprehend and if in
difficulty they move their head gently and point with a
finger-tip of the right hand', #77. Their lecturer aims to
communicate with his audience and so takes time to explain those
points not readily understood: the sophists do not share his
concern.
The use of orators and sophists and their
activities in the Therapeutai discussion was apposite, for they
were instructors of rhetoric, which remained at the heart of all
Hellenistic and Roman education and culture. They were regarded
as specialists in eloquence who both completed a student's
higher education and declaimed before an
audience.25 By developing the contrast
with these highly specialised professionals — themselves
involved in an educative process — Philo successfully
demonstrates the superiority of the Therapeutai
elder.26
In addition to these five comparisons we find that
Contempl. 31, 75 depends on a number of rhetorical terms.
These terms and their import would have been lost on Philo's
readers if they were not well versed in rhetoric, for he never
explains them.27 The fact that Philo
does explain the activities of the unknown Therapeutai elder in
contrast with techniques of known groups of orators and sophists
in Alexandria (often referred to with technical language) adds
to our impression of a widespread understanding of rhetoric.
This familiarity, furthermore, suggests that the sophists under
discussion were present and operative in Philo's world.
Contempl. 31 is not, moreover, Philo's only
specific reference to contemporary orators and sophists which
uses νῦν. In Post. 101 he refers to "the sophist group of
present day people', denying that their teaching contains true
philosophy, namely the utterance and word of God, #102. He
supplies three reasons for this. Firstly, they 'practised arts
of speech to use against the truth', that is, 'rhetorical
art'.28 Secondly, 'they have given the
name of wisdom to rascality'. Thirdly, they have conferred 'on a
sorry work a divine name'. Philo
25Marrou, History of Education,
pp. 194, 196-97.
26R. Mayer, 'Geschichtserfahrung und
Schriftauslegung: Zur Hermeneutik des frühen Judentums', in O.
Loretz and W. Strolz (eds.), Die hermeneutische Frage in der
Theologie (Freiburg: Editiones Herder, 1968), p. 320, argues
that Philo's allegorical exegesis 'is formally, even in details
the same as the pesher methodology of the Essenes and
Therapeutai'.
27Regrettably, rhetorical terms in
Philo are not always noted in the LCL translations; thus the
full import of Philo's lexical choice is not always conveyed by
the translation.
28LCL adopts a variety of translations
for τέχνη λόγων: Verbal artifices', LA III.232,
Post. 119, Aet. 121; Oratorical artifices',
Virt. 206; 'arts of speech', Det. 37, Migr.
77, Post. 101; 'arts that deal with speech', Det.
43; 'practice in speech', Det. 43; 'practice in
rhetoric', Det. 43 and 'arts of eloquence', Det.
35. In Det. 35-43 four alternative renderings are given
to the same phrase. The phrase is best translated 'art of
rhetoric' or simply 'rhetoric' in Philo, as it is
elsewhere.
65
notes, with the use of another strong adversative,
how present-day sophists differ both from the 'ancient band of
aspirants', who pursued with rigour the study of philosophy,
#101b, and the followers of Moses.29
Again we see that Philo speaks not anachronistically but of his
own contemporaries.
We can now conclude, in view of (1) the known role
of orators and sophists as teachers in first-century Alexandria,
(2) the rhetorical terminology Philo used to explain both their
work and that of the Therapeutai elder in Contempl. 31,
75, and (3) the reference to the sophists as a contemporary,
professional group misusing the art of rhetoric in Post 101,
that Fischel's assertion of a Philonic use of some 'implied
anachronism' or symbol is
unsustainable.30 The evidence suggests
that Philo denotes contemporary, professional orators and
sophists in Alexandria.31 Other
first-century writers such as Plutarch, Epictetus and Dio
Chrysostom likewise refer to both groups as a sort of
contemporary, identifiable and professional
guild.32
The throng of sophists in Agr.
136
Who
then should we include in the throng33
of sophists which Philo daily observed everywhere? Is Bréhier
justified in including all teachers? 'Les sophists désignent en
général chez Philon, non pas toute une espèce d'enseignement
régulier. Ce sont non seulement des chercheurs, mais des
grammairiens, des musiciens, des geómètres, ce sont les
specialistes dans chaque
science.'34
29#101 refers to Moses' followers, and
not ancient sophists, for they follow the 'central road' which
Philo clearly defines, 'This royal road…is called in the Law the
utterance and word of God', #102a.
30Fischel, Rabbinic Literature,
p. 130. He takes no account of Contempl. 31, nor does he
relate the sophist to the wider category of orators. His
evidence will not support the necessary nexus which is germane
to his thesis on Epicureanism and rhetoric.
31It is assumed that the orators in
Contempl. 31 are not legal advocates because of the
educative context in which the Therapeutai discussion is
conducted. Only in Mut. 198 and Agr. 13 is there a
reference to the legal advocate. Papyrological references to
legal advocates abound, e.g., P.Teb. 287.2; 343.75;
P.Amh. 29.10; P.Oxy. 37.4; 151.2; 237.21; 653.9;
707.13; 899.21; P.Lond. 188.79; 354.19; 1716.15. There is
only one papyrus in the early centuries A.D. referring to
sophists: P.Oxy. 2190.
32G. R. Stanton, 'Sophists and
Philosophers: Problems of Classification', AJP 94.4
(1973), 351-57, for references.
33LCL translates this as 'swarm', which
may be unnecessarily pejorative.
34The starting point for Bréhier,
Les Idées de Philon, p. 288, is Agr. 136-42.
Colson, 'Philo on Education', 161, using the same passage,
suggests that teachers of philosophers may be included as well
as those included in paideia. Because Philo likens them
to the pig, Colson suggests 'Much of this diatribe is rather
unjust.'
66
He rests his case on the statements made in
Agr. 136-42, especially #136.35
Day after day the swarm of sophists to be found
everywhere wears out the ears of any audience they happen to
have with disquisitions on minutiae, unravelling phrases that
are ambiguous and can bear two meanings and distinguishing
among circumstances such as it is well to bear in mind…Or do
not some [of them] divide the letters of written speech into
consonants and vowels? And do not some [of them] break up
language into its three ultimate parts noun, verb and
conjunction? Do not geometricians put all lines under two main
heads? Do not musicians divide their own science into rhythm,
metre, tune? Do not other experts place everything in
principal categories?
Bréhier's conclusion, however, falters when one
properly assesses the genre used by Philo. The whole treatise, a
discussion of Genesis 9.20 ('And Noah began to be a
husbandman'), is followed by a lengthy discourse on the virtues
of 'distinguishing', #126-68.36 It
indicates how Noah began well, but failed to reach the final
stage, #181. In #136-41 Philo provides examples of
'distinguishing', diairesis, undertaken by various
groups, namely sophists, grammarians, musicians, geometricians,
any other 'technician' (τεχνίτης), philosophers or
dialecticians. Bréhier assumes that this list of professions can
be subsumed under the title of 'sophists' who are discussed in
#136a, basing this at least partly on the fact that the second
group are grammarians but are not referred to by name.
But do grammarians (and the other professions)
really form a subset of the class 'sophists'? The difficulties
with this view are worth setting out. #136b provides examples of
diairesis of the grammarians. The use of οἱ μέν and ἔνιοι
δέ in #136b indicates the division of grammarians at the levels
of primary and secondary education. The first comments refer to
primary work: 'Do not some of them divide the letters of written
speech [letters of the alphabet] into consonants and vowels?'
Children began with reading, first learning the names of the
twenty-four letters of the alphabet and then
pro-
35A. Mendelson in 'Encyclical Education
in Philo of Alexandria', Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Chicago (1971), 180, n. 2, rejects Bréhier's identification of
the term with the specialist-professor in encyclical education
but without explanation, although in his Secular Education in
Philo of Alexandria (Cincinnati: Hebrew Union College Press,
1982), p. 9, n. 54 he appears to endorse Bréhier's position.
Pépin, 'Remarques sur la théorie de l'exégèse allégorique chez
Philon', pp. 148-49, n. 46, likewise feels uneasy about
Bréhier's conclusion but does not refute it with evidence.
36Philo's use of diairesis as a
literary genre in #1-124 is succeeded by a discussion of the
term; διαίρεσις occurs first in Agr. 127.
67
gressing to simple syllables in alphabetical
order: βα, βε, βη, βι, βυ, βω.37
Dionysius Thrax' Τέχνη γραμματική observes this
division.38 The second example from
#136b refers to a first-century-B.C. innovation, namely
instruction in the 'technique' of grammar combined with the
study of poets and historians at the secondary level. It
comprised the systematic study of the elements of
language.39 'And do not some of them
break up language into three ultimate parts, noun, verb,
conjunction?' This division of grammatical technique under three
headings originates with Aristotle, who added to Plato's twofold
division of the noun and the verb, the concept of conjunction to
cover all other parts of speech. Philo here follows this
division rather than the eightfold division of Dionysius Thrax
which was finally accepted.40 Bréhier
implies that Philo has connected #136b to #136a, subsuming the
grammarians under the sophists, but in fact this misses the flow
of thought. Philo simply provides two examples of
diairesis by grammarians, one from each level of
grammatical study. Their work was so well known that he need not
name them but only describe their activity in much the same way
that mention of 'learning the ABC would signal a reference to
primary education today. Thus Philo's distinction succeeds
because of the clear and well-known differences between primary
and secondary grammatical studies, as well as clear differences
within the levels.
In #136a Philo has provided examples of
diairesis from sophists who engage in 'unravelling
phrases that are ambiguous and can bear two meanings and
distinguishing among circumstances such as it is well to bear in
mind'.41 Then comes his illustration
based on the two levels of work undertaken by the grammarians,
which is then followed by more illustrations of diairesis
from other professions: musicians, #137; geometricians and other
experts, #138; philosophers, #139-40a; and dialecticians,
#140-41. Philo then resumes
37Marrou, History of Education,
pp. 150-51.
38For the text see I. Bekker,
Anecdota Graeca (Berlin, 1819), section III. This was the
foundational work for subsequent treatment of formal grammar as
we know it. See H. Steinthal, Geschichte der
Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern (Berlin,
1891), vol. II, pp. 189-209 for a discussion of ἡ γραμματική in
Dionysius; and R. H. Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval
Grammatical Theory in Europe (London: G. Bell & Sons,
1951), p. 39.
39Marrou, History of Education,
pp. 170-72.
40ἔνιοι δέ, 'and some' in contrast with
the previous group of primary grammarians, τὰ ἀνωτάτω τρία, 'the
three ultimate or main parts'. Robins, Ancient and Mediaeval
Grammatical Theory, p. 40.
41Philo in Agr. 16 attributes a
similar function to the key role of logic in philosophy when he
affirms that 'it disentangles ambiguous expressions capable of
two meanings', M. Alexandre, 'La Culture profane chez Philon',
in Arnaldez, Mondésert and Pouilloux (eds.), Philon
d'Alexandrie, p. 111.
68
his
discussion of those events which stimulate the intellect in
#141, that is, beneficial teaching sessions during which the
participants are not merely 'chewing the cud', #142. This bovine
imagery he then applies to the sophists and adds a further
reference to 'their hair-splitting and their clever
inventiveness', though not without acknowledging 'their
precision in speech and their rhetorical skill in collating
material', #143. Thus, in reality Philo speaks of the sophists,
turns aside momentarily to provide (non-sophist) examples of
diairesis (#137-41), and then returns to the sophists. In
#136 he does not classify the other professions under the one
heading but uses them — through an analogy — to
explain diairesis.
The Loeb translation contributes to the confusion
by translating oἱ μέν and ἔνιοι δέ in #136b as 'some of them'
when the description of the activities is of two levels of
grammarians. 'Or do not some on the one hand divide…And do not
others on the other hand…?' Furthermore, it does not translate
at all ἢ, 'or', which begins the sentence discussing the two
levels of the work of grammarians.
Bréhier's mistake is explicable. An initial
reading of #136-42 which misconstrues (1) diairesis as a
literary genre, (2) Philo's use of examples of diairesis
among professional groups, (3) the background of the differing
roles of primary and secondary grammarians and (4) the particle
introducing the sentence and the division of the labour of the
grammarians indicated by οἱ μέν and ἔνιοι δέ, prompts his
conclusion that the other professional groups are subsumed under
the term 'sophist'. We conclude that the 'throng of the
sophists' constitutes a specific group in #136, distinguishable
from others who specialize in grammar, music, geometry, other
sciences, philosophy and dialectics.
Sophists and Sceptics and
Academic philosophers in
QG III.33
Philo, in commenting on Genesis 16.12, 'He
will be a wild man; his hand will be against all, and the hands
of all against him', states in QG III.33:
Now this picture clearly represents the sophist
whose mother is wise learning and wisdom. But the sophist is
wild in thought, while the wise man is civil and is suited to
the state and to civilisation; but the man of wild thought is
from that very fact a lover of contention. Therefore
(Scripture) adds, 'his hands against all, and the hands of all
against him', for, being trained in wide learning and much
knowledge, he contradicts all men. (He is) like those who are
now called Academics and Sceptics…
69
For they are all kin, in a certain sense,
uterine brothers, offspring of the same mother, philosophy.
Therefore (Scripture) says, 'over against all his brothers he
will dwell'. For in truth the Academics and the Non-committals
take opposite stands in their doctrines, and oppose the
various opinions which others hold.
Nikiprowetzky suggests that Philo uses 'sophist'
in this portion to denigrate the Sceptics and Academics, and
that he does not confine it to the followers of the ancient
sophist Protagoras.42 If this is
correct, we must adjust our understanding of Philo's use of the
term to include, at least in this instance, negative
connotations.43 But can we agree that
Philo considers Academics and Sceptics actually to be
'sophists', or are we again witness to a metaphor which
effectively describes their methods?
Unfortunately, we have only an Armenian
translation of the whole of Quaestiones et solutiones in
Genesim and Quaestiones et solutiones in Exodum.
Greek fragments of both works exist, but none of QG
III.33, so that Philo's actual terms remain
uncertain.44 For example, the word
'Sceptics' in #33a means literally 'investigators' in Armenian,
and LCL notes that it evidently reflects the Greek. Of Philo's
phrase 'Academics and "Non-committals'" in #33b, we are
uncertain that the latter refers only to 'Sceptics'. LCL
comments, literally 'non-sayers', and notes that 'probably the
Sceptics are meant as above'. Now, 'non-committals' could
refer explicitly to Sceptics, but why then use a different word
in #33b from the one introduced in #33a to refer to the same
group?45 Clearly Philo chose a word
which encompassed the characteristics of both Sceptics and
sophists: both were certainly contentious, as Philo notes in
#33a. In fact, any doubt that he recognises the differing
positions of the two most closely linked members of his analogy,
the Academics and the Sceptics, dissolves upon his remark that
they 'take opposite stands in their doc-
42Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de
l’écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie, pp. 98 and 97-116,
where he has surveyed Philo's comments on philosophy and has
classified the term under three headings: Greek philosophy,
foreign 'exotic' schools, and the practice or study of the
Mosaic Law.
43They are therefore no 'virtuoso
rhetor' class, Bowersock, Greek Sophists, p. 13.
44F. Petit, Quaestiones in Genesim
et in Exodum: Fmgmenta graeca (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1978).
45QG, LCL, p. 221, n. 1. It is
unlikely that the Armenian translator would substitute another
word if σκεπτικοί was used by Philo in both instances. R.
Marcus, 'An Armenian-Greek Index to Philo's Questiones
and De Vita Contemplativa’, Journal of the American Oriental
Society 53 (1933), 251, cites with approval the assessment
of F. C. Conybeare, Philo about the Contemplative Life
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1895), p. 155, that the translator is
'marvellously faithful, reproducing the Greek original word for
word and as a rule without any change of order'.
70
trines'.46 He has
already mentioned one common denominator between the Academics
and the Sceptics, namely their opposition to other schools of
philosophy, a point which he repeats again in describing the
Academics and the 'Non-Committals'. Thus, Philo speaks
pejoratively of the Sceptics when he uses the term
'Non-Committals' and creates a useful analogy. 'Philo seems to
jettison his general dogmatic principles and enrol himself in
the school of the Sceptics.' Although he reproduces the
arguments of eight of the ten tropes of the Sceptic philosopher,
Aenesidemus, Philo does not in fact endorse these views. With
respect to Ebr. 164-68 it needs to be noted that in the
preceding treatise, De plantation, of which De
ebrietate is the sequel, Philo has been reproducing the
arguments of other philosophers on drunkenness which he has
'stated to the best of his ability', Ebr. 1, and
Plant. 142-77 follows the model of a θέσις in structure
and in the convention of presenting others' arguments in the
first person.47
Does Philo, however, identify the Sceptics as
sophists? Nikiprowetzky suggests that he does, citing
Mos. II.212 as supporting
evidence:48 'wisdom must not be that
of the systems hatched by word-catchers and sophists who sell
their tenets and arguments like any bit of merchandise in the
market, men who for ever pit philosophy against philosophy'. He
notes that Philo also uses λογοθῆραι in Congr. 53 to
describe certain philosophers 'who are merely word-mongers and
word-hunters'.49 That context,
however, describes the 'third race', that is, the Sceptics.
While Nikiprowetzky correctly identifies the λογοθῆραι of
Mos, II.212 with the Sceptics of Congr. 52-53, it
does not follow that the discussion of the false wisdom in the
former passage equates the Sceptics and the sophists, oἱ
λογοθῆραι καὶ σοφισταί refer to two separate groups, and the καί
is not epexegetical in the former citation.
Congr. 52 is also conscripted as evidence
for identifying Sceptics and Academics with
sophists.50 Here Philo speaks of the
Sceptics who 'spend themselves on petty quibbles and trifling
disputes'. But the use of the term σόφισμα
46Cf. Sextus Empiricus I.33, and his
whole chapter on 'How Scepticism Differs from the Academic
Philosophy'.
47It has been suggested that Philo
adopted as his own the ideas of the Sceptics. LCL, vol. III, p.
14, commenting on Ebr. 164. For a treatment of this
convention see D. T. Runia, 'Philo's De Aeternitate
Mundi: The Problem of Interpretation', Vigiliae
Christianae 35 (1981), 105-51, esp. 113, and on the
structure of Plant. 142-77 and for the literary
convention and literature cited in support of this, 130. For
Philo's refutation of Sceptic ideas elsewhere see LA
III.206; Ios. 125-470; Op. 170; Somn. II.283.
48Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de
l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie, 187.
49The derisive nature of Philo's
comment is reflected in the use of 'merely'.
50Nikiprowetzky, Le Commentaire de
l'écriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie, p. 108, n.
5.
71
in
this passage does not imply that Sceptics are sophists, for it
has a wider meaning.51
Thus, against Nikiprowetzky's notion that Philo
identifies the sophists as Academics and Sceptics, we
have suggested that 'the wild man', the sophist, is merely
described as possessing certain characteristics shared
also by Academics and Sceptics. Only such a conclusion can
adequately account for the words: '(he is) like…', #33. We do
not argue that no sophist ever held Sceptic or Academic views on
particular issues, but that Philo does not say Sceptic and
Academic philosophers as a class are sophists. In QG
III.33 Philo notes that the sophists possess 'wide learning and
wisdom'. As men of 'wild thought' they love contention. Thus,
like the Academics and Sceptics, they contradict all men as a
result of having been trained in 'wide learning and much
knowledge'. The analogy is apposite, although it constitutes no
argument for identifying them with these particular
philosophers.
Sophists and Peripatetics, Stoics,
Epicureans,
etc. in Congr. 67
Sandmel argues that in Congr. 67 Philo
identifies as sophists the philosophers of the following schools
of thought: 'the Peripatetics, Stoics and Epicureans, Eleatics,
Sceptics and non-Sceptics'. He cites in support of his
conclusion the editors of LCL. While the editors do indeed
extract a list of disagreements among the philosophical schools
concerning the nature of the cosmos from Philo's comment in
Her. 247, they do not share Sandmel's conclusion that the
philosophers are sophists.52
Two difficulties weaken Sandmel's thesis that all
who hold the philosophical positions outlined in Her. 247
are sophists, and thus the concomitant that this passage can
help explain Congr. 67. Firstly, this would demand that
Philo and Plato are also sophists, for both hold that the cosmos
is created and not to be destroyed. As Runia notes: 'The reason
that Philo quotes this Platonic text [The Timaeus, 41a-b,
cited in Aet. 13] is to prove that according to Plato the
cosmos is created (γενητός) but not to be destroyed (ἄφθαρτος).
It is more-
51σόφισμα carries a variety of
meanings: 'captious argument', 'quibble', 'sophism' or 'sly
trick' or 'artifice'.
52Sandmel, Philo of Alexandria: An
Introduction (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press,
1979), p. 168, n. 310, citing LCL, vol. IV, p. 574. For a
careful discussion of Her. 247 see J. Mansfeld,
'Philosophy in the Service of Scripture: Philo's Exegetical
Strategies', in J. M. Dillon and A. A. Long (eds.), The
Question of Eclecticism': Studies in Late Greek Philosophy
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), ch. 3, esp.
pp. 89-98.
72
over clear that there is no difference of view
between Plato and Moses [and of course Philo] on this issue, for
also Moses affirms this' (Gen. 1.1, 8.22, Aet.
19),53 what Philo has explicated in
Aet. 13ff. he merely notes in Her. 246: 'Thus
those who declare the universe to be uncreated are at strife
with those who maintain its creation; those who say that it will
be destroyed with those who declare that though by nature
destructible it will never be destroyed, being held together by
a band of superior strength, namely the will of its maker.'
On this second proposition, καὶ πάλιν, the editors
of LCL observe that Philo quotes from The Timaeus; but
Sandmel ignores this note. He then simply identifies the third
proposition as Eleatic, that is, those who subscribe to the
notion that 'nothing is, but all things become', in antithesis
to Plato's Theaetetus. Again Sandmel overlooks the
holders of the antithesis even as he cites the holders of the
thesis.54
Secondly, in Her. 246a Philo cites the
sophists simply to base an analogy on their conduct, not to
identify them, as the context shows. In discussing what 'the man
of worth' is like he compares him with a chairman or a president
of a council who can arbitrate, Her. 243. He comments
that some who might be regarded as allies, holding the same
position as Philo and Plato, ultimately cause offence when they
engage in the conduct of the sophists, namely 'strife' (ἔρις).
Philo thus simply notes the similarity between the sophists'
conduct and that of allies. He next remarks that some of the
proponents of certain views are allies and friends: 'In so far
as their minds are fixed on one end to discover the facts of
nature they are friends, but when they do not agree, they engage
in civil strife.' He thus sees the need of a 'man midwife' who
possesses discernment, a chairman who can 'observe', 'throw
away', 'save' and 'approve'.55 In
addition, Philo observes that the history of philosophy is 'full
of discordance, because truth flees from the credulous mind
which deals in conjecture', Her. 248.
Hence this portion simply describes the conduct of
philosophers of differingviewpoints and insists that allies can
hinder one another if their argumentative behaviour begins to
resemble the sophists' combativeness.
In addition, Sandmel has linked Her. 246-47
with Congr. 67 as examples of a negative attitude on the
part of Philo compared to a more favourable outlook elsewhere.
The latter text, he maintains, supports Philo's identification
of the philosophers as sophists.
53Runia, Philo and the Timaeus,
p. 234 and see pp. 233-38 for the importance of this very
substantial debate in the first century.
54This is the one passage where Philo
quotes verbatim from The Timaeus, 41a-b, as Runia notes,
Philo and the Timaeus, p. 233.
55Socrates so designates himself,
Theaetetus, 151c. Cf. #246 where Philo cites
Theaetetus, 152.
73
Again, however, Sandmel neglects certain germane
facts. In exegeting Genesis 16.2 in Congr. 63-67, where
Abraham 'hearkened to the voice of Sarah', Philo comments that
hardly a day goes by but lecture-halls and theatres fill with οἱ
φιλοσοφοῦντες. Various classes of people listen with different
but inadequate responses. But to whom does Philo refer? While οἱ
φιλοσοφοῦντες can be translated as 'philosophers', it often
means sophists in the Philo corpus. In Post. 34 Philo
mentions that many who have 'professed' philosophy arrive at
conclusions belonging to the ancient sophist, Protagoras.
Det. 74 refers to sophists who have proven to be
'lecturers of the highest order as far as understanding
beautiful things and philosophical discourses are concerned',
yet they invariably are caught 'indulging in practices that are
base'. This clearly refers to those already designated
'sophists' in Det. 72. This charge against them, that is,
that they teach virtue and yet practise evil, appears elsewhere
in Philo. In Deus 170 those who commend κακία are said to
φιλοσοφεῖν, and their activities to bar 'the heavenly and royal
road of virtue'. They are epitomised by the earthly Edomites,
referred to elsewhere as 'present day sophists', Post.
101. In this same passage Philo alludes to 'the philosophy which
is pursued by the present day sophists'. So sophists did debate
philosophical subjects,56 an instance
being the thesis, 'The unevenness of the earth would no longer
exist if the world were from everlasting', Aet. 132.
Congr. 67 seems to authorise translating oἱ
φιλοσοφοῦντες not simply as 'philosophers' but as those who
discourse on philosophical subjects. Further evidence only
reinforces this conclusion: Philo equates their efforts with
typical sophistic activity, for they are said to be ἀπνευστὶ
συνείροντες τοὺς περὶ ἀρετὴς λόγους;57
and the subject of their discourse in Congr. 67 is one
upon which the sophists elsewhere declaimed, for example,
Mut. 196-97.58
Finally, this audience in the lecture-hall
responds to the sophist in one of three ways, Congr. 65.
The minds of some wander to their daily preoccupations. Others
hear but do not profit, for they listen 'to please their sense
of hearing rather than to gain profit', Congr. 66. The
third group appear to be students of sophists who learn to
reproduce what was said but never bring their lives into
conformity with their words.59 While
capable of speaking on
56G. A. Kennedy, Classical Rhetoric
and Its Christian and Secular Tradition from Ancient to Modern
Times (London: Croom Helm, 1980), ch. 4.
57Philo uses ἀπνευστὶ συνείροντες in
the description of declamations of sophists, Contempl..
46, and in referring to orators and sophists in Mut.
197-98.
58Demosthenes, De Corona, 64
uses the same clause to describe a rhetorician as Philo does in
Congr. 67 and Contempl 76.
59For an example of students of
paideia listening to public declamations see P.
Oxy. 2190 and the discussion on pp. 30-34.
74
the
best, that is, about virtue, they fail to live up to what they
say, #67. The significance of these reactions for our purpose is
that these same charges are leveled elsewhere against sophists,
Det. 72.
Based on both the description of the activities of
οἱ φιλοσοφοῦντες and the observation that they affect their
audience in ways elsewhere ascribed to the sophists, we conclude
that Philo refers to sophists, not philosophers per se, in
Congr. 67.
Sophists and the ancient poets Homer and Hesiod in
Op. 157
H.
A. Wolfson and P. G. Geoltrain state that Philo uses the term
'sophist' to include the ancient poets, especially Homer and
Hesiod.60 Wolfson finds support for
his statement in Diogenes Laertius: 'Sophist was another name
for the wise men, and not only philosophers but for the poets
also. And so Cratinus when praising Homer and Hesiod in his
Archilochi gives them the title of sophist',
I.12.61
Philo does not follow Cratinus in the use of the
term 'sophist' but regards the poets, including Homer and
Hesiod, as important lifelong
educators:62 'if we are justified in
listening to the poets — and why should we not, since they
are our educators through all our days, and as parents in
private life teach wisdom to their children, so do they in
public life to their cities' (Prov. 1.143). He elsewhere
elevates the poets when he speaks of their importance in the
acquisition of 'civic virtue'. 'No doubt, it is profitable, if
not for the civic virtue, to feed the mind on ancient and
time-honoured thoughts, to trace the venerable tradition of
noble deeds, which historians and all the family of poets have
handed down to the memory of their own and future generations'
(Sacr. 78).
In the same section Philo cautions against
rejecting ancient learning and argues that 'we should make it
our aim to read the writings of the sages', Sacr. 79. He
acknowledges his own debt to the poets, for he had been exposed
to what he called the 'handmaid of philosophy', namely grammar,
when at the secondary level he 'consorted' with 'the study of
the writings of the poets', Congr. 74.
60Wolfson, Philo, vol. I, p. 28;
P. G. Geoltrain, 'Le Traité de la Vie Contemplative de
Philon d'Alexandrie', Semitica 10 (1960), 51, citing
Wolfson.
61Cratinus' Archilochi was
written ca. 450 B.C., but only a fragment exists.
62In Op. 157, which Wolfson does not
cite, Philo speaks of τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ σοφιστικόν, but here
γένος is used of two distinct groups, as in Ios. 56,
where it refers to Greeks and Barbarians. Elsewhere the term is
used of poets, Sacr. 78, Agr. 41, Spec.
II.164; prophets, Migr. 84, Her. 249, 265,
Fug. 247; and the Therapeutai, Contempl.
11.
75
Philo attaches importance to the poets — 'For
grammar teaches us to study literature in the poets and
historians, and will produce intelligence and wealth of
knowledge', Congr. 15. The task of this level of grammar
is 'the elucidation of the writings of the poets and the
historians', Congr. 148. Elsewhere he commends 'research
into poetry…and the study of the doings of old times',
Chr. 105, or 'the diligent search into what wise poets
have written', Agr. 18. Lovers of wisdom, among whom
Philo numbers himself, must have an 'acquaintance with the poets
and learning of ancient history', Somn. I.205. The index
in LCL indicates his considerable knowledge and use of literary
references.63 He speaks positively of
poets in a way he never does of
sophists.64
For Philo, Homer65 is
the poet par excellence: 'Homer [is] the greatest and
most reputed of poets', Conf. 4, and 'the poet most
highly esteemed among the Greeks' is Homer, Mut. 179; 'we
give the title "the poet"66 to Homer
in virtue of his pre-eminence', Abr. 10. Philo provides
twenty direct quotations from Homer.67
In one instance he cites 'chapter and verse' from memory:'The
same idea is suggested, I think, by Homer in the Iliad at
the beginning of the thirteenth book', Contempl. 17. LCL,
responding to the notion that Philo's attempt to locate the
quotation is strikingly rare, suggests that it must have been an
obscure passage the relevance of which would not have readily
occurred to the reader. Philo may, however, remember simply
because of a deep familiarity with the context: it is the only
Homeric quotation that appears at the beginning of a book in
either the Iliad or the
Odyssey.68 In at least one
instance Philo knows the context of two lines of Homer, for he
notes of Iliad
63Vol. X, pp. 434-86.
64On thirteen occasions Philo makes the
statement 'as the poets say', or 'to use the poet's term', or
'to use the poet's phrase', when referring to specific words or
phrases: Deus 60,169; Agr. 24; Plant. 151;
Ebr. 103; Somn. II.52, 275; Spec. I.74;
Prob. 42; Contempl. 40; Act. 63, 127;
Legat. 13.
65Homer was intensely studied in
encyclical education; S. J. Myres, Homer and His Critics
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958) p. 29. For the depth of
study, see F. W. Householder Jr., Literary Quotation and
Allusion in Lucian (New York: King's Crown Press, 1941), p.
57.
66Plutarch also calls Homer 'the poet',
Moralia 667f. For the debate as to precisely who is 'the
poet' see A. M. Harmon, 'The Poet κατ' ἐξοχήν, CP 18
(1923), 35-47; A. P. Dorjahn, 'Philodemus on Homer', CJ
26 (1931), 457-58, and Apollonius Dyscolus on Homer', CP
25 (1930), 282-24. Certainly Philo makes it quite clear to whom
he refers when he speaks of 'the poet'. Dio, Or. 55.6,
likewise regards Homer as 'a poet without a peer'.
67. For the use of Homeric quotations
by contemporaries of Philo see M. van der Valk, 'The Homeric
Quotations or the Indirect Tradition of the Homeric Text', in
Researches on the Text and Scholia of the Iliad (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1963), Part 2, ch. 12, esp. p. 285. He makes no
reference to Philo.
68For the learning of all of Homer by
rote see Xenophon, Symposium, 3. 5. See also Dio,
Or. 36.9.
76
II.
13.204-5 that the words apply more appropriately to God and the
world than to 'cities and men', Conf. 170: 'It is not
well that many lords should rule… Multiplicity produces many
evils.' Significantly, in this instance he cites Homer over
against Genesis 1.26, 3.22 to substantiate the monotheism for
which he contends, for the text of Genesis says 'Let us make
man'. In Legat. 149 he uses this same quotation to apply
to Augustus, which better fits the Homeric context.
Philo's reapplication of Homeric texts to new
situations resembles his approach to other literary
sources.69 For example, Iliad
II. 13.5-6 reads: 'The Mysians fighting hand to hand, and noble
mare's milk drinkers — Nought else but milk sustains their
life, these men of perfect justice.' Philo's rendering, offered
in a discussion of the superiority of the Therapeutai over the
Greek philosophers Anaxagoras and Democrates, explains: 'the
idea conveyed is that injustice is bred by anxious thought for
the means of life and moneymaking, justice by holding and
following the opposite creed', Contempl. 17. A survey of
Philo's use of Homeric quotations indicates that he, while
always accurate with the text, sometimes attends less carefully
to the context, a legacy of his literary education and proof of
his esteem for this poet.70
Philo's debt to Homer is also reflected in his
Quaestiones et solutions. R. Marcus suggests that in its
form it resembles the Hellenistic commentaries on the Homeric
poems.71 P. Borgen and R. Skarsten's
preliminary exploration of the whole Philo corpus would suggest
that the influence of such commentaries was even more
widespread.72 Indeed, the influence of
Homer on Jewish literature may reach well beyond Philo if F. E.
Halleway is correct that aggadic works 'resemble Greek
and Hellenistic commentaries to the poems of
Homer'.73 H. Dorrie argues that Philo
followed the Stoic allegorical exegesis of Homer which regarded
the non-literal meaning as superior to the
literal.74
69van der Valk, 'Homeric Quotations',
Part 2, p. 266.
70Householder, Literary
Quotation, p. 57 describes how the Iliad was studied.
Homer was the basic source of illustrations of tropes, figures,
barbarisms, solecism, styles, and many other points of grammar
and rhetoric. See also Μ. Η. Ibrahim, 'The Study of Homer in
Graeco-Roman Education', Ἀθηνα 76 (1976-77), 187-95 for a
description of the ongoing use of Homer at all levels of
paideia.
71R. Marcus, Philo Supplement,
LCL, vol. I, p. xi.
72P. Borgen and R. Skarsten,
<i.'quaestiones>: Some Observations on the
Formof Philo's Exegesis', SP 4 (1976-7), 1-15.
73F. E. Halleway, 'Biblical Midrash and
Homeric Exegesis', Tarbiz 31 (1959), 157.
74H. Dorrie, 'Zur Methodik antiker
Exegese', ZNW 65 (1974), 133-34; and also ). C. H.
Lebram, 'Eine stoische Auslegung von Ex. 3.2 bei Philo',
in Das Institutum Judaicum der Universität Tübingen in der
Jahren 1971-72 (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck],
1972), p. 31 for the view that Philo's method was based on Stoic
Homeric exegesis.
77
LCL
also suggests a Homeric allegorising influence on Philo's
treatment of the OT.75 Whatever the
outcome of current attempts to measure his indebtedness to
Homeric exegesis, Philo's attitude to Homer was consistently
positive and his debt considerable. He never calls him a
'sophist'.
Wolfson cites Contempl. 4 as his only
evidence that other ancient poets were called sophists. There
Philo refers to the ancient sophists who gave divine names to
the elements: 'air [is called] Hera, because it is lifted up and
exalted on high'. But Wolfson neglects the fact that those who
gave divine names to the elements were sophists, namely
Theagenes, Empedokles and Prodikos.76
While others may have referred to ancient poets as sophists,
Philo never so designates them.
Moreover, Wolfson's view that the term designates
Jewish 'sages' cannot be substantiated by a single occurrence
from the Philo corpus. His only evidence comes from Josephus
where, appropriately, a virtuoso forensic rhetorician described
as 'learned in the law' was called a sophist. Wolfson's case
thus rests on comments from Diogenes Laertius and Josephus, and
an unexplored assumption about Contempl. 4.
Conclusion
This examination of opinions on Philo's sophists
has shown that orators and sophists comprised an identifiable
grouping in Alexandrian society similar to those mentioned in
P.Oxy. 2190 and Dio's Alexandrian Oration. Within
the educational system of the first century, the term 'sophist'
was not a fluid one: it excluded philosophers, dialecticians,
grammarians, musicians, geometricians and any other specialised
group. Philo's 'sophists' comprised a specific group within
paideia, Agr. 136-42.
Philo does not use the term 'sophist' to
stigmatise philosophers such as
75LCL, vol. I, p. xvi.
76LCL, vol. VII, p. 610 believes that
this was first suggested by Plato and adopted by the Stoics,
citing Cratylus 404c. That suggestion is incorrect on two
counts. First, it misunderstands the nature of Cratylus
in believing that the comment by Plato is a serious one, aiming
to make fun of the established use of anagrams. See R. K.
Sprague, Plato's Use of Fallacy (London: Routledge &
Kegan Paul, 1962), ch. 3. Second, others were first
chronologically. Empedokles, the sophist whom Philo cites
elsewhere (Prov. I.23, Aet. 5, Chr. 25,
Somn. I.21) may well be the one to whom he refers, and
the others could be Prodikos and Theagenes. For evidence of
their use of this or similar anagrams see H. Diels and W. Kranz,
Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker (Berlin: Weidmann, 1974),
vol. I, Empedokles, line 35, p. 286; Prodikos, lines 35-36, p.
285, line 44, p. 286; Theagenes, lines 9-10, p. 52.
78
the
Academics and the Sceptics (QG III.33), non-Sceptics,
Peripatetics, Stoics, Epicureans or Eleatics, Her. 246.
Nor does he join others in applying it to poets,
77 although he does associate it with
those who gave divine names to the elements, Contempl.
4.
The term in Philo's corpus is neither a 'symbol'
nor a pejorative label applied to Greek or Jewish teachers or
Greek philosophers.78 Heinemann
correctly concludes that the word should be read
literally.79 Philo may well speak of
the sophists in a pejorative way, but like Dio, he does not use
it pejoratively of non-sophists.80 A
distinct vocabulary of invective, drawn from Plato and well
suited to its purpose, was used of the actual sophists in the
first century.81
While this chapter has endeavoured to identify the
Alexandrian sophists mentioned by Philo as the virtuoso orators
who have public followings, the survey has yielded important
information on the sophistic movement which also ought to be
noted. Philo records the impact of the sophists on city after
city, and describes the great admiration that their technical
prowess won for them. They drew the whole world after them, yet
were prematurely aged by indulging their lower natures,
Agr. 142-43. Another complaint is that the sophists
bestow no lasting benefit upon their hearers: they only declaim
to enhance their own reputations, Contempl. 75. In this
passage one also finds the allegation that some sophists
withhold information for a later lecture merely to inflate
profits. Philo notes that there is a threefold response of the
audience to the sophist. Some allow their minds to wander as
they hear the declamation. Others derive sensory pleasure from
the performance without benefit to the soul: the moment the
sophist ceases, so does that pleasure. The students listen to
their teacher's display just to learn rhetorical techniques,
never to reproduce that over which the sophists proclaimed
themselves master, namely ἀρετή, Congr. 66-67. The next
two chapters will add greater detail to this sketch as they
build upon this chapter's conclusions concerning Philo's use of
the term 'sophist'.
77Unlike Dio, Philo does not call poets
'sophists' because the former group is important for the
educated man as this chapter has shown, while the latter is seen
as an enemy to the seekers after virtue, as we shall see.
78D. I. Sly, Philo's Alexandria
(London and New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 95, states that Philo
looked down on philosophers and called them 'sophists', but she
provides no evidence from his corpus to support her
conclusion.
79See above, n. 6 of this chapter.
80On Dio see pp. 55-58.
81See p. 57.
79