In the “Sophist” Foreigner ironically speaks of young men and undereducated elders who enthusiastically exaggerate the paradox of “One-Many:” it is impossible to say that a man is good, but only “man — man,” “good — good.” The Stranger shows that such zealots of the strict unity are convicted by their own speech and says that we can ascribe an infinite number of properties and names to one person — this should be theoretically justified by the interlocutors (Sph.251-252). The report will show how Plato in “Sophist” solves the problem of “One-Many” at the level of interaction of Eide and identifies four main types of Eide with the help of three of which, understanding their relationship as participation, we can “grasp” and describe such complex and heterogeneous unity as a human being.

people, Eidos, “single-many”, participation, “Sophist”