Universe of Platonic Thought 2024

32nd International Conference “The Universe of Platonic Thought: Plato’s Heritage in the History of Science and Education”

Alina Dmitrievna Sevastianova, CSc in Philosophy; St. Petersburg State University of Veterinary Medicine (Санкт-Петербург, Russia), Lecturer

A dialogue on justice: the treatment of animals in the philosophy of Aristotle and the Stoics

The question of the presence of reason in animals has significant practical implications for the lives of humans, let alone animals. Since antiquity, the thesis that only humans are rational has been used as a basis for asserting the moral superiority of humans and as a justification for excluding other animal species from being moral agents whose interests should be given equal ethical consideration. Much of the reasoning about animal intelligence has been based on the assumption that rationality itself endows those who possess it with moral significance. The paper examines the treatment of animals in Aristotelian philosophy and Stoic ethics, focusing on questions of animal rationality, their moral significance, and the possibility of a just relationship between humans and animals.

Keywords: animal ethics, animal rationality, moral status of animals, ancient ethics

Aristotle denies the possibility of a just relationship between humans and animals, arguing that there is nothing in common between these species. Teleologically, animals are created for the use of humans, suggesting that there is no relationship between the species, but in the Politics, the formulation of the question of justice appears to be broader. Aristotle argues that friendship and justice are impossible between humans and animals, as well as between people who occupy unequal socio-political positions. Aristotle links the sense of justice to the mastery of language. One who seeks justice must be able to articulate the concept of just and unjust through meaningful speech. Since animal speech is limited to conveying notions of painful pleasantness, the inability of animals to communicate through speech the notion of just and unjust, this prevents them from creating a state in which an awareness of the nature of justice is fundamental. Epicurean ethics further propagates the idea that justice arises from a contract or agreement between those who desire justice and those who have the articulate speech to express that desire.

Aristotle writes that in situations where there is nothing in common between the master and the subordinate, there is no friendship, because there is no justice either, as in the relationship of the master to his tool, of the soul to the body, of the master to the slave. All these things are useful to those who use them, but in relation to inanimate objects there is neither friendship nor justice. Friendship with a horse or a bull or with a slave as a slave is impossible, for there is nothing in common between them ("Nicomachean Ethics" 1161a30-1161b2) [1, pp. 222-224].

Diogenes of Laertes illustrates the Stoic denial of justice to animals based on their lack of rationality and their consequent difference from humans. The doctrine of oikeiôsis provides the basis for Chrysippus' denial of justice to animals.

Porphyry reports that Chrysippus taught that animals were created by the gods specially for the use of man, and that pigs are born specially for slaughter and eating, "for God has joined its soul to its flesh like salt, for the purpose of preparing a dainty dish for us." Thus, by undergoing it, the pig achieves its purpose and finds its favour in it (Porphyrius. "On the Abstinence of the animated" III. 20) [3, pp. 176-181].

Chrysippus argues that justice towards animals is impossible. He writes: "...there can be no justice between us and other living beings, because we and they are too dissimilar (so say Chrysippus in Book I of "On Justice" and Posidonius in Book I of "On the Proper") (VII 129)[2, pp. 284-285].

The Stoics, according to the teachings of Aristotle, denied the presence of reason (logos, logismos) in animals, gave moral significance to this question, emphasising the biological aspect of animal reasonableness. The attitude to animals in Stoic ethics was expressed through the concept of "kinship, connection, belonging" (oikeiôsis). Ancient Stoicism sought to emphasise the fundamental difference between irrational animals and rational humans; hence, if animals are completely different from humans, there is no need to refrain from using them for human benefit.

However, thinkers such as Plutarch and Porphyry attempted to demonstrate that animal rationality is not a matter of its presence or absence, but rather a matter of the degree of rationality.

Thus, if animals are found to possess a degree of rationality, as Plutarch and Porphyry suggested, and if the possession of rationality is the criterion that determines the moral worth of animals, as the Stoics demanded, then the question arises as to the possibility of a just relationship between humans and animals, and the question of what exactly the term justice means in relation to interspecies relations. Some thinkers even wondered whether animals are capable of having a concept of justice, of applying this concept in interaction not only with their own kind, but also with humans.

List of sources:

1. Aristotel'. Etika / Aristotel' ; [per. N. V. Braginskoi, T. A. Miller ; vstup. st. F. KH. Kessidi ; primech. N. V. Braginskoi, V. V. Bibikhina]. — Moskva : ACT : AST MOSKVA, 2010. — 494 p.

2. Diogen Laertskii. O zhizni, ucheniiakh i izrecheniiakh znamenitykh filosofov / 2 izdanie, ispravlennoe. Moskva : Mysl', 1986. — 571 p. — (Filosofskoe nasledie).

3. Porfirii. Sochineniia / Per. s drevnegrecheskogo T. G. Sidasha. — Sankt-Peterburg : Izd-vo S.-Peterb. un-ta, 2011. — 660 p.